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Abstract
Many low- and middle-income countries have many micro and small but
only a very few medium-sized and large enterprises. Micro and small firms
seem to have difficulties growing into medium-sized companies. This is
problematic because it is medium-sized companies that tend to be the main
creators of higher quality and better-paid employment, motors of innovation
and economic diversification, and future exporters.
Companies grow for various reasons that are beyond their control, such as
an increase in demand or failures of competitors. However, the only strat-
egy that an enterprise can control is growth through innovation, which we
term ‘upgrading’.
A large strand of literature discusses the factors that favour or hamper the
upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs): entrepreneur
characteristics (education, gender, behaviour, etc.), firm characteristics
(sector, location, workforce characteristics, etc.), inter-firm linkages (inte-
gration into value chains, clusters or business networks) and the business
environment (macroeconomic and political stability, regulation, availabil-
ity of finance, etc.). However, only a few studies provide empirical evi-
dence for determining the most significant factors for SME upgrading in
low- and middle-income countries.
This study is meant to fill this gap thereby referring to Egypt. It is based on
enterprise panel data from 2004 and 2008, a survey conducted by the
authors in early 2012 among 102 SMEs and interviews with experts on pri-
vate-sector development. It draws five main conclusions:
• The scarcity of medium-sized enterprises in Egypt is not only due to the
difficulty of SMEs to upgrade but also to their challenges in remaining
medium-sized – or large.
• In Egypt the main determinants for upgrading are the entrepreneur’s:
(i) human capital (quality of education, work experience and interna-
tional exposure), (ii) motivation and readiness to take risks, (iii) invest-
ment in human resources, (iv) market research, (v) access to finance and
(vi) ability to deal with persistent deficits in the rule of law. 
• SMEs in Egypt are also constrained by the business environment, no-
tably problems in state-business interactions such as licensing, taxa-
tion, inspections and competition control. But these problems are
mainly due to deficits in law enforcement rather than what these pro-
cedures cost in time and money.
• While integration into value chains and clusters might help SMEs to
upgrade, the great reluctance of Egyptian entrepreneurs to co-operate
with each other means that they cannot benefit from the advantages of
vertical or horizontal business linkages. 
• The success of an SME largely depends on the owner’s capabilities. All
SME owners in Egypt are constrained by structural factors such as defi-
ciencies regarding education, skilled workers, market information,
access to finance and law enforcement. However, a few SMEs manage
to circumvent these obstacles.
To enable more SMEs to upgrade, the government of Egypt should improve
its educational and vocational training system, help entrepreneurs conduct
human resource development and market research, ease SME owners’
access to finance and strengthen the rule of law.
Foreword
This report presents the findings of a research project on the determinants
of the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Egypt.
It was conducted between November 2011 and May 2012 by an eight-mem-
ber team from the German Development Institute/ Deutsches Institut für
Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) in Bonn and the Egyptian Center for Economic
Studies (ECES) in Cairo. The team included Markus Loewe (DIE), the
team-leader, and seven other researchers: Iman Al-Ayouty and Malak Reda
from ECES, as well as Annegret Altpeter, Lisa Borbein, Marc Chantelauze,
Maximilian Kern and Elisabeth Niendorf from DIE.
The research project on Egypt was part of a larger cluster of DIE research
projects on SME upgrading in low- and middle-income countries. Projects
using similar research methodology were conducted in the Philippines and
India, which will also be published by DIE in 2013.
The findings of the case study on Egypt were presented at a workshop at
ECES on 24 April 2012 in Cairo and during a conference held at the Arab
Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport on 26 June 2012
in Alexandria. The results received a lot of attention in the Egyptian media;
for example, the front-page story of the June 2012 issue of Business Today
Egypt was devoted to the DIE–ECES study (Aref 2012). The study was also
presented for discussion, along with the two case studies on India and the
Philippines, on 29 May 2012 at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Eschborn, Germany and at an academic work-
shop at DIE on 28 November 2012 in Bonn.
The DIE–ECES research project had two major objectives: (i) to provide
empirical evidence for academic debate on the determinants of SME up-
grading and (ii) to learn which factors policy-makers should focus on so as
to facilitate the upgrading of SMEs in Egypt.
This report addresses academics, journalists and policy-makers such as the
government of Egypt, independent private-sector associations, non-govern-
mental organisations and foreign donors that would like to contribute to the
field of SME development.
Of course, the special conditions of post-revolutionary Egypt have signifi-
cantly affected both the conduct and the results of this research. Many in-
terlocutors cited the post-revolution downturn of the Egyptian economy as
a major problem – not just for SMEs. Since this shock affected almost ev-
eryone in the country, it cannot be regarded as a factor that specifically con-
strains SMEs from upgrading. It was sometimes difficult to isolate the ef-
fects of this one-time general shock from the effects of more structural and
long-term factors.
All names of persons are spelled as the individuals wish. The names of
towns and other geographical terms have been transliterated into English in
the most common fashion.
By agreement, the names of all SME representatives and their companies
have been changed. We do not quote any of the interviewed SME owners by
their name or by the name of their company. We have promised them
beforehand to treat all information given by them confidentially.
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Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Executive summary
Most low- and middle-income countries are characterised by the phe-
nomenon of the so-called ‘missing middle’. These countries have a
huge number of micro and small enterprises and only a few larger com-
panies, which are not well linked to the smaller ones. In particular,
companies in the medium-sized segment are rare. Egypt is a typical
case for this phenomenon: More than 90 per cent of Egyptian firms are
micro enterprises, which is at least partly due to difficulties that small
firms face in growing and transforming into medium-sized companies.
In Egypt, medium-sized businesses provide only 3 per cent of total
employment (CAPMAS 2006), which is a problem because medium-
sized companies usually create most of the higher-quality and better-
paid jobs, are motors of innovation and economic diversification and
are firms that could begin to export sometime in the future (El-Meghar-
bel 2008). A large strand – of mainly theoretical – literature discusses
why only a very few small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) man-
age to upgrade, that is, to innovate and grow. Many factors are sug-
gested – ranging from the gender of the owner to the national tax sys-
tem – but no literature explains which factors are the most important.
This study seeks to redress the deficit by giving an answer to the ques-
tion: What are the main determinants of upgrading for small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Egypt? There are two aspects to
the research question:
Which factors explain why upgrading seems to be particularly difficult
for SMEs in Egypt? (macro-perspective identifying structural factors)
Which factors explain why some SMEs manage to upgrade better than
others despite the general difficulties? (micro-perspective identifying
individual/ differentiating factors)
This study was conducted to provide empirical evidence for answering
these questions but also to offer policy recommendations. Focused on
Egypt, it is mainly based on empirical research conducted during its
eight authors’ three-month mission to the country in early 2012. The
study is part of a larger research initiative of the German Development
Institute/ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) on SME
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upgrading. Two other studies using similar research methodology were
conducted simultaneously in India and the Philippines (Reeg 2013a;
Hampel-Milagrosa 2013).
SME upgrading and its factors: the conceptual framework
In this study, ‘upgrading’ is understood as successful innovation – inno-
vation that induces an increase in any target variable such as the com-
pany’s returns, sales, assets or number of employees. The term contains
both a qualitative aspect (innovation) and a quantitative aspect (firm
growth). We chose the term ‘upgrading’ (normally used only for the
qualitative aspect) rather than ‘graduation’ (normally used for the quan-
titative aspect) because there are many reasons why firms grow, and we
wanted to focus on growth through innovation, the only growth strategy
that entrepreneurs can control.
Innovation can mean the launch of a new or improved product (product
innovation), improvement in the production process (process innova-
tion), introduction of a new packaging, labelling or marketing method
(marketing innovation), an enterprise’s participation in new stages in
the value chain (functional innovation), or its entry in a new sector (sec-
toral innovation). Innovation enables firms to gain advantages over
their competitors for a period of time, thereby generating ‘innovation
rents’ and growth.
Different strands of literature stress the role of different factors in deter-
mining whether a single SME can upgrade (micro-perspective) respec-
tively whether it is generally easy for SMEs in one country or region to
upgrade (macro-perspective). These factors can be grouped into four
broad categories:
Entrepreneur characteristics (the gender, human capital, social capital,
family background and behavioural characteristics/personal qualities of
the SME owner),
• Firm characteristics (the age, size, sector, location, workforce char-
acteristics, product portfolio, strategy and formal status of the
SME),
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• Inter-firm linkages (the integration of an SME into value chains,
functional clusters or business networks such as business associa-
tions), and
• Business environment (macroeconomic and political stability, regu-
lation, taxation, trade policy, corruption, access to finance, business
development services and infrastructure). 
It is likely that most of these factors matter to some degree. However
academic literature has not yet drawn a broad conclusion as to which
factors are the most important (most significant) – something that this
study aims to do with regards to Egypt.
The ‘missing middle’ in the context of Egypt’s development
conditions
Egypt enjoys many favourable natural conditions for development:
mineral and energy resources; the potential for wind and solar-power
production; the Suez Canal; a huge potential for tourism; an econom-
ically and politically ideal location at the crossroads of Africa, Asia
and Europe; a large domestic market; and remittances from the Gulf
countries.
At the same time, Egypt suffers from structural deficits such as low
productivity, weak international competitiveness, limited technological
capacities, low structural diversification and low export rates. These
deficits are the main reasons why unemployment and external debt are
high, growth is neither sustainable nor pro-poor and the domestic
budget is in the red. 
One cause of these deficits is the ‘missing middle’. In terms of num-
bers of companies, employees and employment creation, Egypt’s pri-
vate sector is dominated by micro and small enterprises. 92 per cent of
all companies are micro enterprises (1 – 4 employees), 7 per cent are
small enterprises (5 – 49 employees) and much less than 1 per cent are
large enterprises (100 employees or more). Medium-sized enterprises
(50 – 99 employees) account for just 0.13 per cent of all formalised
Egyptian companies (CAPMAS 2006).
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
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Research methodology
We used three tools to answer our research question: (i) an economet-
ric analysis of panel data from the Egypt Investment Climate Surveys
(EICSs) of 2004 and 2008, (ii) semi-standardised interviews with SME
owners and (iii) more open in-depth interviews with experts from the
public sector, the private sector, academia, media, civil society and
donor community. We also compared our results with previous studies
on related issues that are mentioned throughout the text. 
Unfortunately, the econometric analysis did not provide the insights we
needed to answer our research question. This is because the EICS only
studies companies in the formal economy and lacks data on many of the
potential factors for SME upgrading in Egypt. No other representative
enterprise surveys have been conducted in recent years. 
For this reason, the findings are mainly based on our SME sample. We
used it: (i) to find out what Egyptian SME owners consider to be the
main constraints as well as the success factors for upgrading, (ii) to
learn what kinds of support they would like for their upgrading efforts
and (iii) to compare the characteristics of those who upgrade with
those who do not. We used both qualitative and quantitative analysis
techniques.
When selecting SMEs for our sample, we applied four different tech-
niques so as to ensure (i) that the sample includes similar number of
upgraders and non-upgraders are similar with respect to other charac-
teristics, and to ensure that their biases were counterbalanced and min-
imised by the other selection techniques. As a result, our sample turned
out to mirror the entirety of SMEs in Egypt with regards to several
parameters.
Our sample contained 102 SMEs, 80 of which were selected for the
core sample because five years earlier they had been micro or small (at
that time, the other 22 companies were already medium-sized). All 102
interviews were used for the qualitative analysis, but only the inter-
views with the 80 core-sample companies were used for the qualitative
analysis. In the core sample, 40 SMEs turned out to be upgraders while
the other 40 were non-upgraders.
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To be classified as an ‘upgrader’, an enterprise had to fulfil three criteria.
1. To have grown by 50 per cent or more in the previous five years as 
measured by one of five criteria (number of employees, sales, profit, 
assets or size of production area)
2. To have introduced some kind of innovation in the previous five 
years
3. To have grown faster than its competitors in the previous five years.
Twenty upgraders had even grown by 100 per cent or more during the
previous five years. We termed them ‘gazelles’ and the remaining 20
upgraders ‘non-gazelle upgraders’.
Factors in SME upgrading in Egypt
Our research led to five main conclusions: 
First, the shortage of medium-sized enterprises in Egypt is not only due
to the difficulty of small firms to upgrade, but also because upgraded
firms have difficulty sustaining their new (medium) size. It was easy
for us to identify upgraders: half the companies that we have inter-
viewed had upgraded since 2007 – despite the global financial crisis of
2008–2009 and the Egyptian revolution of 2011.
Second, six factors are main determinants of upgrading in Egypt: (i)
human capital (quality education, work experience and international
exposure), (ii) motivation and readiness to take risks, (iii) investment in
human resources development (HRD), (iv) market research, (v) access
to finance and (vi) deficits in the rule of law (especially in state-busi-
ness interactions).
There are two aspects to all but one of these factors (deficits in the rule
of law). All of them explain why upgrading is generally difficult for
SMEs in Egypt. All SMEs suffer from: (i) the owner’s inferior education
and work experience; (ii) the owner’s risk aversion; (iii) the lack of, and
high turnover of, trained workers; (iv) difficulties accessing finance; (v)
lack of market information; and (vi) deficits in the rule of law.
At the same time, five of these six factors also explain why, despite all
structural constraints, some SMEs manage to upgrade – while others do
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
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not. Owners of upgrader firms tend (i) to have superior education, work
experience and international exposure; (ii) to be more motivated and
willing to take risks; (iii) to invest more in HRD (training of, incentives
for and participation by workers); (iv) to spend more on market
research and (v) to have their own financial means.
It may not be surprising that these factors influence SME upgrading.
But it is probably less obvious that a number of other factors were
found to have little effect – including the company’s size, whether it is
formal or informal, its location and age, the owner’s gender, social cap-
ital, social status and membership in business associations, as well as
Egyptian trade and monetary policies.
Four factors turned out to be moderately important: corporate gover-
nance and access to land, business development services (BDSs) and
infrastructure.
These findings seem to hold true for various SME sectors in Egypt,
irrespective of the company’s size. We only provide findings for the tex-
tiles and garments, food-processing and software (ICT) sectors, but
since there is no significant variance in the results for these three sec-
tors, they could well be valid for other economic sectors in Egypt. 
Third, SMEs in Egypt are constrained by the business environment,
especially problems in state-business interactions such as licensing,
taxation, inspections and governmental efforts to protect competition.
Yet these problems are mainly due to deficits in law enforcement rather
than the cost of these procedures in terms of time and money. Despite
the high costs, if the likely results could be assessed in advance and the
costs estimated, they would be affordable for most SMEs. This is not
possible, though, because public officials’ huge discretionary leeway
results in the arbitrary interpretation of laws and guidelines.
Fourth, while integration into value chains and clusters might help
SMEs upgrade, we found no evidence of this because hardly any SMEs
in our sample were vertically or horizontally linked to other firms. This
is probably because entrepreneurs are generally reluctant to co-operate
in any way due to mutual mistrust. They report bad experiences from
the difficulty in enforcing contracts, yet they rarely undertake legal
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action because judicial decisions tend to be arbitrary. Once again the
root cause is the lack of law enforcement. Egyptians also have never
learnt to co-operate with others in business because at school, they are
taught to work by themselves rather than in teams.
Fifth, a lot depends on the capabilities of the individual entrepreneur.
All SME owners are constrained by structural factors such as the lack
of quality education, skilled workers, market information, access to
finance and law enforcement. A privileged few manage to circumvent
these obstacles because they have enough money to be able to do with-
out loans, and also to bribe public officials and invest in education,
work experience, international exposure, market research and worker
training. They have had enough education to understand the importance
of work experience, international exposure, market information, HRD
and solid finance. They also have the contacts necessary to obtain rel-
evant market information and find trained workers. It seems that a priv-
ileged few SME owners were born with work experience, international
exposure and market know-how, while the vast majority lack these
means of circumventing the structural constraints of upgrading.
These conclusions were drawn from our research data in three steps:
First, we quantitatively analysed the SME-survey interviewees’
answers to the question about what they consider to be the main obsta-
cles to upgrading in Egypt – by simply counting the number of compa-
nies that mentioned single factors. Second, we used various quantitative
tools to determine which factors account for the ability of some SMEs
to upgrade better than others. We ran a regression analysis with the
EICS data, counted the number of SME owners in our sample that cited
specific factors that account for some SMEs’ comparative ease in
upgrading, and compared the average characteristics of upgraders and
non-upgraders in our sample. Third, we applied a qualitative approach
to analyse the causal relations between independent variables and the
variable we sought to explain through our research: the ease of SME
upgrading. We also dissected the entrepreneurs’ stories about their
upgrading efforts in order to find out how different variables are inter-
related, or work together, to promote or constrain SME upgrading.
The six main determinants of SME upgrading in Egypt were derived
through this three-step process because they dominate the causal chains
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
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that impact on the potential of individual, or groups, of SMEs to
upgrade.
The human capital of SME owners (quality basic and vocational edu-
cation, quality work experience and international exposure): Almost
half the SME owners identified education, work experience or interna-
tional exposure as an important factor for SME upgrading in Egypt.
Human capital is also found at the beginning of numerous causal
chains, indirectly affecting SME upgrading in ways which may be even
more significant. For example, human capital positively impacts on
conducting market research, as well as on product quality and HRD.
International exposure was also found to be a key factor in SME own-
ers’ creativity, market research and innovation.
Ambition and SME owners’ readiness to take risks: Many upgraders
identified their own motivation and readiness to take risks as crucial for
their success and as a reason for investing in market research and HRD.
Similarly, a lack of motivation and risk aversion were among the prin-
ciple reasons why other entrepreneurs did not invest in machines, new
products or worker training.
HR development in SMEs: Differences in the level and quality of
investment in the workforce is one of the main reasons why some SMEs
upgrade and others do not. Investment includes worker training, incen-
tives (extra payments, health insurance, free transportation to work, on-
site childcare, etc.) for workers to remain at the firm and produce qual-
ity, and the involvement of employees in fundamental decisions about
the firm’s organisation and innovation processes.
Market research: Systematic market research was identified by many
SME owners – especially upgraders – as a key explanation for differ-
ences in the likelihood of SMEs in Egypt to upgrade. They recognised
that market research is crucial for generating ideas, identifying market
niches and making entrepreneurs aware of the importance of top-qual-
ity products.
Access to finance:While access to finance is another immediate deter-
minant of SME upgrading, since it is decisive for the entrepreneur’s
capability to invest in international experience, market research, prod-
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uct quality and HRD, it is also a factor of other immediate determinants.
Access to finance increases an entrepreneur’s readiness to take risks.
Law enforcement: Deficits in the rule of law explain why upgrading is
generally difficult for SMEs in Egypt; they are the root cause of obstacles
for SMEs in state-business interactions such as licensing, taxation, cus-
toms and company inspections, as well as the prevalence of corruption.
Policy recommendations
Our findings have shown that action is needed in five fields in order to
enable all entrepreneurs rather than only the more privileged ones to
overcome the structural obstacles to SME upgrading in Egypt, but also
to eliminate them:
Three initiatives are needed in the field of human capital (quality basic
and vocational education, quality work experience and international
exposure): (i) The entire educational system must be overhauled to pro-
mote creativity, imagination, analytical abilities, critical thinking and
other skills required for entrepreneurship instead of rote memorisation
of facts. Teachers should encourage pupils to work in teams. (ii) Basic
economic and business know-how should be part of school curriculum.
Practice-oriented business schools should be founded, SME incubators
set up at universities and business-plan competitions held. (iii) Interna-
tional student exchanges should be fostered and undergraduates
encouraged making internships in firms.
Human resource development: The government should (i) intensify its
support for firms sending their workers to short-term vocational train-
ing courses, (ii) raise entrepreneurs’ awareness of the importance of
HRD and (iii) support SME owners’ efforts to develop their own human
resources.
Market research: In order to reduce the costs of market research for
Egyptian SME owners and increase their knowledge of domestic and
export markets, the government of Egypt should: (i) enlighten entre-
preneurs about the importance of demand orientation, market knowl-
edge and product quality; (ii) provide free information on markets and
recent market developments, as well as on current offers in relevant
markets; (iii) assist SME owners with their own market research; and
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
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(iv) foster co-operation with international firms within global value
chains and other co-operative forms.
Access to finance: In order to boost the amount of finance available to
SME owners, the government should consider: (i) providing banks with
funds for lending to SMEs at preferential interest rates, (ii) fostering
competition in the banking sector in an effort to encourage banks to
move into market niches such as SME lending and (iii) permitting the
establishment of commercial microfinance institutions (MFIs). 
At the same time, however, the government should also consider ways
to encourage banks and MFIs to widen their product portfolios: Islamic
Financing – still underdeveloped in Egypt – could be helpful for entre-
preneurs who refuse ordinary loans on religious grounds. Leasing and
private equity would help SME owners who need more long-term
finance.
In order to strengthen the demand side, the government should: (i) start
an initiative to inform entrepreneurs of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of various funding forms and increase their financial literacy
(including basic information about credit, leasing and equity, as well as
the skills needed to keep proper accounts, write business plans and
apply for credit); (ii) improve banks’ capacities to screen SME cus-
tomers by training lending officers, who are often unfamiliar with the
peculiarities of SMEs; and (iii) establish a registry of ownership and
possession of movable assets at Egypt’s credit bureau, I-Score, in order
to help SME owners prove that they have enough collateral to qualify
for loans.
Finally, the government should review the bankruptcy law, which banks
use to put defaulting borrowers in prison – thereby discouraging many
SME owners from applying for bank loans.
Law enforcement: Egypt is still impacted by the Mubarak era. The cur-
rent lack of law enforcement in Egypt is predominantly due to insuffi-
cient checks and balances within and between governmental institu-
tions, which is symptomatic of states shaped by neo-patrimonial
regimes. A lack of accountability allows neo-patrimonial rulers to inter-
pret legislation in their favour. In Egypt, serious law-enforcement
reform requires a much more democratic regime than the old one.
Markus Loewe et al.
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The government should increase the accountability of public officials by:
(i) creating incentives for compliance with laws and guidelines; (ii) pub-
lishing all laws and regulations, so as to allow citizens to compare their
experience with official procedure; (iii) introducing elements of e-gov-
ernment in public administration (especially e-procurement and e-ten-
dering); (iv) conducting a performance evaluation of the public admin-
istration; and (v) facilitating customer complaints and whistle-blowing in
cases of public officials’ incorrect conduct.
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1 Introduction
Most low- and middle-income countries (LICs and MICs) are character-
ised by the so-called ‘missing middle’ phenomenon: They have many mi-
cro and small enterprises and comparatively few medium-sized and large
companies. They may host some large companies, which are able to com-
pete on world markets and generate a considerable portion of gross domes-
tic product (GDP). But most of these are not linked to smaller companies in
the country. In comparison with high-income countries (HICs), LICs and
MICs have a notable lack of companies in the ‘second tier’ – companies that
might be able to export their products in the near future, or become suppli-
ers of larger firms and integrated into global value chains (GVCs). Most
workers in LICs and MICs are employed in comparatively low-productivity
and low-income jobs in micro and small firms. 
Many medium-sized and large companies in LICs and MICs were created
that size by foreign investors or a handful of affluent natives; very few large
companies started small and grew over time. Apparently it is difficult for
small firms to transform into medium-sized enterprises. 
There are three reasons why the ‘missing middle’ phenomenon is problem-
atic: First, medium-sized enterprises are the main providers of quality
employment. Most people in low- and middle-income countries work in
micro and small enterprises where many of them are underemployed and
poorly paid. Since medium-sized enterprises typically offer better-paid,
more secure jobs for better-trained people who also receive social security
benefits, a country’s average wage tends to correlate positively with its share
of medium-sized enterprises (Altenburg / Eckhardt 2006, 7). Second,
medium-sized enterprises are significant in terms of a country’s current
account. Medium-sized enterprises are better able than small ones to pro-
duce commodities and services that can compete in world markets: they can
export their products themselves or through domestic or foreign exporting
partners. Third, a country’s total factor productivity is correlated with its
share of medium-sized and large companies. These tend to be more produc-
tive than smaller firms because they have the financial and personal means
to invest in research and development (R&D), new products, new methods
of production, new organisational forms and divisions of labour, new ways
of marketing and the like (Mead / Liedholm 1998, 64) – which is the main
reason that they provide higher-quality employment and higher pay.
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
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Enterprises grow for various reasons. They may benefit from rising de-
mand for their kind of product, competitors’ difficulties and other forms of
windfall profits – factors that they are rarely able to influence. The only
mechanism that enterprises can control is growth through innovation or
‘upgrading’, which appears to be a significant challenge for small and me-
dium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in low- and middle- (and probably also in
high-) income countries. Yet the fact that some companies do manage
to upgrade, thereby generating endogenous growth (Berner / Gomez /
Knorringa 2008), shows that in principle, small companies can transform
themselves into medium- or large-sized ones. 
The question then is: What exactly do small companies need to be able to
upgrade? What do most of them lack? The low number of SME upgraders
in developing countries is not new. A huge strand of literature discusses the
factors that are required for SME upgrading and offers some plausible
explanations. But most studies analyse only individual or specific sets of
factors that are responsible for small company upgrading. It is possible that
each of these factors plays a role; however, we need to know the most sig-
nificant factors.While it is true that these may differ from country to coun-
try, answering this question requires empirical evidence and so far, only a
very few empirical studies have been published on the issue.
This study helps fill the gap in the empirical literature about SME upgrading
in developing countries. It is mainly based on empirical research conducted
during the eight authors’ three-month mission in Egypt. Additional studies of
the same issue have been conducted with a similar research methodology in
the Philippines and India (Hampel-Milagrosa 2013; Reeg 2013a).
Egypt was selected for three reasons: First, Egypt is a typical example of a
middle-income economy with the ‘missing middle’ phenomenon. More
than 90 per cent of all firms are micro enterprises, while the share of large-
and medium-sized companies has grown during the last decade but re-
mains negligible. Furthermore, most micro firms are necessity-driven and
do not provide satisfying employment and income for their owners, let
alone the employees (El-Megharbel 2008, 1). Second, Egypt suffers from
high unemployment, low levels of total factor productivity, a low degree of
economic diversification, highly concentrated exports, very few manufac-
turing exports and a current structural deficit. A greater number of me-
dium-sized enterprises could help solve some of these problems – and giv-
en the sharp economic downturn that followed Egypt’s revolution, the need
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is great and urgent. Rising productivity, exports and per-capita income are
required to stabilise the country economically, socially and politically.
Third, there are very few studies on private-sector development in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa (MENA). Therefore a study on SME upgrading
in one country will contribute to filling the gap in empirical literature on
SME upgrading in the whole MENA region.
We address the question: Which are the main factors determining the up-
grading of small and medium-sized enterprises in Egypt?
The question has two aspects:
• Which factors explain why upgrading seems to be particularly difficult
for SMEs in Egypt? (macro-perspective identifying structural factors)
• Which factors explain why some SMEs manage to upgrade better than
others despite the general difficulties? (micro-perspective identifying
individual/differentiating factors)
The study does not end with the answers to these questions, but also de-
rives policy recommendations and comes to four major conclusions:
First, many more SMEs than expected manage to upgrade. More than half
of all the companies in our sample grew by at least 50 per cent between
2007 and 2012 although these were particularly difficult years, and a quar-
ter grew by even more than 100 per cent. This share is high, even if we take
into consideration that we have explicitly watched out and asked experts for
successful upgraders when we composed our sample. 
At the same time, however, an equal number of companies contracted by
100 per cent. This means that despite the astonishingly high number of
upgraders, the group of medium-sized companies in Egypt did not expand.
In Egypt, the ‘missing middle’ is not just due to obstacles to upgrading; it
may be more due to upgraders’ difficulties in sustaining their growth. Ad-
ditional research is needed on this issue.
Second, SME upgrading in Egypt is mainly determined by: (i) human capi-
tal (quality basic and vocational education, quality work experience and
international exposure); (ii) the owner’s ambition and readiness to take
risks; (iii) investment in human resource development (HRD); (iv) market
research; (v) access to finance; and (vi) law enforcement (for example, in
taxation, registration, licensing, and competition).
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Third, with regard to regulatory hurdles, what most affects firms is the un-
predictability of law enforcement, not the time and cost of compliance.
With regard to taxation, for example, what SME owners mostly suffer from
is not the tax burden as such but the arbitrariness in the determination of
their rates. Likewise, while complying with standards costs SME owners’
time and money, their main problem is not being able to even know the stan-
dards – because inspectors routinely come up with new ones.
Fourth, inter-firm linkages are extremely weak in Egypt. Hardly any SMEs
are effectively integrated into a global value chain (GVC) or a cluster –
which is why we were unable to ascertain if integration into GVCs or clus-
ters is helpful. Presumably it would be. But many SME owners mistrust
each other and so are reluctant to co-operate – perhaps as a result of bad
experiences with contract enforcement. Egyptians prefer to avoid legal dis-
putes because trials take forever and the outcomes are totally unpredict-
able. Egyptians also have never learnt to co-operate because even at school
they were taught to work alone.
Fifth, upgrading requires a combination of factors. It cannot be explained
by one or two isolated factors such as access to finance or deregulation.
Some factors are substitutes, such as a bank loan (for the entrepreneur’s own
capital), or access to trained workers (for the entrepreneur’s in-house worker
training). Other factors, such as labour and market information, are com-
plements. Upgraders need some of the substitute factors and all of the com-
plement factors, which means that SME owners’ success depends on access
to all of the complements as well as their ability to substitute missing fac-
tors (e.g. their own market research when they lack market information).
Based on our findings, we recommend the government of Egypt: (i) to im-
prove the quality of its educational and training systems, and to promote
young people’s travel to foreign countries; (ii) to raise entrepreneurs’ aware-
ness of the importance of HRD and to offer more short-term training for
workers; (iii) to provide market information for SME owners; (iv) to
improve SME owners’ access to finance by measures targeting both the sup-
ply side (banks and micro-finance institutions) and the demand side (entre-
preneurs’ financial literacy); and (v) to strengthen the rule of law – espe-
cially in state-business interactions such as taxation, licensing, regulation,
company inspection and competition policy – by improving accountability
mechanisms.
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These results are mainly based on the findings of our empirical research in
Egypt between February and April 2012. It included: (i) an econometric
analysis of panel data from two rounds of the Egypt Investment Climate
Survey (EICS) that the American University in Cairo (AUC) conducted of
some 1,000 manufacturing companies for the International Finance Corpo-
ration and the World Bank in 2004 and 2008; (ii) a semi-standardised sur-
vey of 102 SMEs in the textiles and garments, food-processing and soft-
ware sectors in five Egyptian governorates; and (iii) interviews with 123
‘experts’ (representatives of the Egyptian government, the private sector,
academia, civil society, the financial sector and media, as well as foreign
donors). Throughout this study, our results are contrasted with other find-
ings on SME development in Egypt.
It should be stressed that our research tools had obvious limitations. The
EICS only covered a limited number of variables that could explain SME
upgrading in Egypt, while our own SME survey was small and unrepresen-
tative. It provided a mere snapshot of some causal relations for some eco-
nomic actors, and looked at just three sub-sectors of the Egyptian economy
and a few SMEs in five of 27 governorates. Still, we believe that our survey
is broad enough to reveal more about Egypt than just about the few sectors
and governorates it covers.
This report has six chapters. Chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework
for our analysis. It explains how we defined the term ‘upgrading’ for our
research and summarises what factors have been considered as relevant in
the literature on SME upgrading – on the basis of theoretical arguments or
empirical findings from countries other than Egypt. Chapter 3 shows that
‘the middle’ is missing in the landscape of enterprises in Egypt and that this
phenomenon is one of the major reasons that the Egyptian economy is
under-performing. Chapter 4 describes our research methodology. It ex-
plains our research tools and provides insight into the composition of our
SME sample and expert interviews. Chapter 5 presents and interprets our
findings – and answers our research question. Chapter 6 concludes with
policy recommendations.
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2 SME upgrading and its factors: the conceptual 
framework
We define upgrading as the growth of SMEs through innovation. Various
strands of literature make most different factors responsible for differences
in the ease with which SMEs upgrade. These factors can be grouped into
four broad categories: entrepreneur characteristics, firm characteristics, in-
ter-firm linkages and the business environment.
Section 2.1 explains SME upgrading in greater detail and Section 2.2 pre-
sents possible determinants of SME upgrading.
2.1 SME upgrading
In this study, ‘upgrading’ refers to the growth of a small or medium enter-
prise (SME) that results from any kind of innovation. In this context, inno-
vation means a firm doing different things or doing the same things in a dif-
ferent way and in a manner that is different from its direct competitors
(Humphrey / Schmitz 2000, 3). The term refers thus to the introduction of
something new to a firm’s relevant markets – not something that is new to
the whole country or the world at large. The innovation could be a new good
or service, or a process that is new or significantly improved that can gen-
erate a rent, the ‘innovation rent’, for a certain period – because until com-
petitors imitate the innovation the company has a monopoly, although it
might be an imperfect one (OECD 1996).
Our definition of ‘upgrading’ differs slightly from some uses of the term,
which was coined by authors such as Gary Gereffi, Hubert Schmitz and
John Humphrey to describe processes within the narrow framework of
global value chains (GVCs). They identified four kinds of upgrading: prod-
uct, process, functional and inter-sectoral (Humphrey / Schmitz 2000, 3).1
We add a fifth kind of upgrading that we call ‘marketing upgrading’ that
includes all kinds of changes in product labelling, packaging, advertising
Markus Loewe et al.
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as the four “trajectories of upgrading” (see Navas-Alemán 2011; Dunn et al. 2006; Giu-
liani / Pietrobelli / Rabellotti 2005; Kaplinsky / Readman 2001). Dunn et al. (2006, 4) 
added a fifth category, the ‘channel level’.
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and selling (see Figure 1). In the initial literature on the subject, these forms
of SME upgrading were subsumed in other categories. Our adaptation,
however, is in line with the literature on innovation itself, which also dis-
tinguishes between product, process, functional and inter-sectoral inno-
vation but includes, in addition to these a fifth category, ‘channel innova-
tion’, which refers to new ways of distributing a product.
Our second adaptation of the standard definition of upgrading is to not re-
strict its use to the framework of GVCs.
Our third adaptation limits use of the term ‘innovation’ to something that
could also be called ‘successful innovation’, that is, innovation that leads to
any kind of improvement that matters to the entrepreneur or the economy at
large. This might be a significant increase of an enterprise’s return, number
of employees or assets (see Figure 1). Such growth may occur without inno-
vation, for example, because of an unexpected increase in demand for the
firm’s products. Growth of this sort, however, cannot be influenced by the
firm, which can only control its own innovation efforts.
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Figure 1: SME upgrading 
 
Source: own design; explanations in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 
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This exactly is why we do not use the term ‘SME graduation’, which is
mainly used to indicate a company’s move from one size bracket to anoth-
er (i.e. from micro to small or from small to medium) – regardless of the
reason for the growth. We understand ‘upgrading’ to combine both aspects
– the qualitative aspect of innovation, normally referred to as ‘upgrading’,
and the quantitative aspect of firm growth, normally referred to as ‘gradua-
tion’. We prefer the term ‘upgrading’ to ‘graduation’ because the latter is
also sometimes used for a company’s formalisation, that is, its transition
from an informal to a formal business, which can be confusing.
We consider five trajectories in which innovation may occur:2
• Product innovation is the introduction of new goods or services and leads
to increased unit values (Humphrey / Schmitz 2000, 3).
• Process innovation is the introduction of a new production technology
that enhances the flexibility of production, the speed of the production
process or the efficiency of input use (Tokatly / Kizilgün 2004, 227;
Gibbon / Ponte 2005, 89).
• Marketing innovation is the introduction of a new marketing method
including improvements in product design or packaging, product place-
ment, product promotion or pricing, or entry into a new, higher value-
added end market (Dunn et al. 2006, 4; OECD 1996). 
• Functional innovation is the participation in additional stages of a value
chain and the gradual assumption of these activities. It could also
involve switching from being a simple assembler to being an original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) or to original design (ODM) or original
brand name (OBM) types of manufacturing (Gereffi 1999, 17).
• Sectoral innovation3 uses knowledge about the functions of value chains
to enter other sector(s). 
Innovation can be simultaneously introduced in more than one trajectory,
and an innovative activity in one trajectory can stimulate changes in others.
Markus Loewe et al.
2 These trajectories result from combining the definitions of several authors: Schmitz 
(2004, 7 f.), Dunn et al. (2006, 4), OECD (1996, adapted).  
3 Kaplinsky and Readman (2001, 30) use the term ‘chain upgrading’ to refer to this shift
to another sector.
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An innovative activity is not necessarily new to the world, but rather some-
thing new in the given context, for example on the local market.
SME growth: Our definition of SME growth comprises different aspects of
growth: aspects that are key goals for entrepreneurs, such as company sales
and return, as well as aspects that primarily matter from a macroeconomic
or developmental perspective, such as employment. It is possible for each
of these aspects to increase while others either do not increase or actually
decrease, for example, firm owners can sometimes boost returns by sack-
ing workers. If, however, the measures display growth that is specifically
due to innovation, they should be termed ‘upgrading’.
Growth through innovation: An SME manages to upgrade when an inno-
vation makes it more competitive than other market participants and the
new competitive advantage causes the firm to grow. The link between in-
novation and growth is illustrated in the following: Process innovation
causes higher returns if a certain amount of units can be produced with less
input than before; product innovation causes higher returns if units can be
sold for a higher price; channel innovation causes higher returns if products
are sold to additional markets; functional innovation causes higher returns
if more value is added at this stage of the chain; sectoral innovation causes
higher returns if products are sold to additional sectors. A firm that inno-
vates must remain competitive in price and/or quality; but it generates
higher profits by being more innovative than its competitors.
Formalisation and entering new markets: Other processes, such as formal-
isation and export orientation, are to some degree also related to innovation
and growth – and count as upgrading processes. In particular, formalisation
may favour, or even be a prerequisite for, the first step in firm upgrading
(see Section 2.2.2). Likewise, a firm’s upgrading can induce its formalisa-
tion because when an SME reaches a certain size, its greater visibility lim-
its its ability to work informally. Upgrading could also enable a company to
export its products (which is another innovation: an innovation such as prod-
uct innovation makes a firm grow, thus helping it enter export markets).
2.2 Determinants of SME upgrading 
Scholars have long been debating which factors affect SME upgrading.
Their opinions can be divided into four groups, each related to one of the
layers of factors that influence the entrepreneur’s behaviour:
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22 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
• Some believe that mainly the entrepreneur’s characteristics determine a
firm’s upgrading potential. 
• Others consider the characteristics of the firm itself to be much more
important. 
• Yet another group of scholars believes that the upgrading potential of
SMEs is mainly determined by their integration into horizontal and ver-
tical linkage systems (clusters and value chains). 
• A fourth group emphasises the role that the business framework plays in
SME upgrading. 
Figure 2 illustrates these four layers of factors. In Chapter 5, we argue that
our empirical research was guided by four bundles of research hypotheses,
each of which focuses on a different layer.
Markus Loewe et al.
Figure 2: The four layers of factors that determine SMEs upgrading 
 
Source: Adapted from Reeg (2012) 
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We lacked empirical evidence to determine the most significant factors.
Although qualitative and quantitative studies on this subject exist, their re-
sults are highly contradictory. However, we can safely say that they influ-
ence SME upgrading in three different ways (see Figure 1):
• Some affect the willingness of entrepreneurs to innovate.This is the case
for such entrepreneur characteristics as motivation and risk readiness.
• Some factors affect the ability of entrepreneurs to innovate and grow.
These include entrepreneur characteristics (e.g. an SME owner’s educa-
tion and work experience), enterprise characteristics (e.g. worker train-
ing or the existence of an R&D department) and elements of the busi-
ness environment (e.g. access to credit or a licence to introduce new
products or production processes).
• Finally, some factors affect the possible impact of an innovation on SME
growth as perceived by the SME owner. By definition, what we call an
‘innovation’ automatically leads to the SME’s growth. No entrepreneur
would introduce anything new knowing that the measure would not pos-
itively impact on the firm’s sales or profit or number of employees. But
incomplete information can cause an entrepreneur to misjudge an inno-
vation’s impact. An owner could introduce something new, not realising
that it will have no impact – or refrain from making an innovation, mis-
understanding its potential to stimulate SME growth. What matters most
is whether a factor influences the impact of an innovation on SME devel-
opment (as perceived by the entrepreneur) – not the impact itself. One
example is the tax system: An SME owner might perceive the benefit of
any given innovation as negligible in view of the taxes that would be due
as a result of the increase in company earnings.
Below we provide an overview of the most common explanations for the
success or failure of SMEs to upgrade. We start with entrepreneur charac-
teristics (2.2.1) and firm characteristics (2.2.2) and continue with inter-firm
linkages (2.2.3) and the business environment (2.2.4). In each sub-section,
we present the major theoretical and empirical publications.
2.2.1 Entrepreneur characteristics
Many authors emphasise the characteristics of an individual entrepreneur as
being key to the SME’s upgrading potential. They refer to the entrepreneur’s
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human capital, social capital, achievement motivation, readiness to take
risks and gender. 
Human capital: Some authors argue that differences in education, training
and work experience explain why some SME owners find it easier to up-
grade than others. Human capital – the skills and knowledge that individu-
als acquire by investing in schooling, on-the-job training and other types of
experience (Becker 1964) – could explain the likelihood of SMEs to
upgrade in a particular country. Shane (2003) argues that the more skills
and knowledge an SME owner has, the greater is their capability to exploit
opportunities, learn about new processes or develop a growth strategy.
Empirical studies report that entrepreneurial innovativeness is positively
and statistically significantly impacted by variables such as the owner’s
years of schooling or years of experience in the sector (Ayyagari /
Demirgüç-Kunt / Maksimovic 2011; Koellinger 2008).4 At the same time,
since a country’s educational and apprenticeship systems contribute to its
entrepreneurs’ average human capital, they can help predict the general
likelihood of SMEs to upgrade – or not. (These systems also determine the
availability of skilled labour, another crucial factor for SME upgrading, as
is shown in Section 4.4). 
Social capital / networks: Other authors point to the fact that an entrepre-
neur’s social capital –broadly defined as social relations and networks –
accounts for differences between SMEs with regards to their likelihood to
upgrade. Social capital might also explain why SMEs are more likely to
upgrade in a particular country (van Dijk 2000). The SME owner’s social
network might facilitate access to information and resources such as fi-
nance, advice and/or support, as well as expedited access to official docu-
ments. Social capital might thus enable SME development through the
owner’s use of this rather informal support for upgrading. At the same time,
exclusion from certain social networks could disadvantage some SME own-
ers. This argument is supported by a case study on Ghanaian entrepreneurs
Markus Loewe et al.
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cation on firm growth by using survey data from about 1,600 MSEs from five countries 
in Southern Africa (McPherson 1996). Other studies, however, hint at problems in meas-
uring human capital: Unger et al. (2011) conducted a meta-study and argue that the vari-
ables commonly used in empirical studies, such as years of schooling and work experi-
ence, are imperfect proxies for skills and knowledge. 
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where the bonding in certain circles of acquaintances constitutes an access
barrier for entrepreneurs who are outside those circles (Fafchamps 2001).
Other studies argue that social capital – like human or physical capital –
requires investments in terms of time, effort or money. Investing in social
capital may come at the cost of investing time, effort or money in the busi-
ness itself, for example, in improving the product (Loewe et al. 2007, 87;
Putnam 2001). Nevertheless, the impact of social capital on SME upgrad-
ing depends on the SME’s societal context, which might explain the general
propensity of SMEs in a given country to upgrade. Social capital matters
most in countries where its use is widely accepted and informal institutions
are well established, and it seems to matter less in societies with strong for-
mal and transparent institutions. To our knowledge, no study adequately
compares the relationship between social capital and SME upgrading at the
country level. 
Achievement motivation and risk acceptance: Some literature indicates that
differences in behavioural characteristics, such as an entrepreneur’s
achievement motivation and willingness to take risks, explain why some
SMEs are more likely to upgrade than others. In turn, a country’s social and
political structure, as well as its values and norms, can explain the domi-
nance of certain behavioural characteristics in the society. 
Some scholars argue that SME owners’ varying degrees of achievement
motivation might determine whether or not SMEs manage to upgrade.
Achievement motivation is shaped by the owner’s family background, so-
cial position, convictions, and life and career experience. McClelland
(1961) argued that achievement motivation is significantly related to eco-
nomic growth and development – an argument supported by a meta-study
that found a correlation between the achievement motivation of SME own-
ers and their business success (Rauch / Frese 2000).5 However, the average
degree of achievement motivation in a particular country might explain the
general likelihood to upgrade there. It is argued that strong motivation to
achieve is based on the conviction that an individual’s actions determine the
reward, which is sometimes referred to as the ‘internal locus of control’. An
internal locus of control might in turn be influenced by the system of norms
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and values that prevail in a society; for example, in societies where the dom-
inant belief is that destiny alone decides individual success, the individual
internal locus of control will be much lower than in countries where the
dominant belief is that success results mainly from one’s own efforts.
Achievement motivation also may be encouraged in societies where an indi-
vidual’s reputation is solely based on their success. People from these soci-
eties are – on average – more motivated to achieve than people in other soci-
eties, and generally have more potential to upgrade SMEs. 
Other scholars stress the role of the entrepreneur’s readiness to take risks
with investments with respect to their likelihood of upgrading. While a cer-
tain degree of risk willingness is a precondition for any business, extreme
risk-seeking is negatively associated with business success (Rauch / Frese
2000).6 Some authors provide empirical evidence for the non-linear rela-
tionship between risk-taking and success (De Mel / McKenzie / Woodruff
2008; Begley / Boyd 1987; Rauch / Frese 2000). At the same time, the aver-
age inclination to take risks may diverge between countries, thereby
accounting for general differences in the likelihood of SMEs in various
countries to upgrade. It can be assumed that an SME owner’s willingness to
take risks depends to a large extent on their vulnerability7 and perception of
the risk involved. In turn, vulnerability is determined by the probability and
possible effect of risk occurrence as well as the ability to adequately man-
age risks (Loewe 2010, 26 ff.). A person’s ability to manage risk depends on
their assets that can be liquidated to cope with risks as well as access to
social protection schemes. Public social protection schemes can help reduce
concern about the possible effects of shocks that could occur as a result of
old age, illness and unemployment, and thereby strengthen an individual’s
readiness to accept the new risks that come along with investing (Loewe
2010, 27). Furthermore, an SME owner’s perception of vulnerability
depends on the country’s history. Inhabitants of a politically and economi-
cally unstable country might have experienced greater vulnerability over the
long term, causing them to be more sensitive to risk-taking than inhabitants
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grading should be read with care, as this may be a matter of reverse causality. In other 
words, the correlation is driven by positive feedback from earlier performance (Delmar 
and Wiklund 2008). 
7 Vulnerability can be defined as the probability of occurrences of unpredictable risks
which influence the individual’s well-being.
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in relatively untroubled countries. Such conditions influence an SME
owner’s willingness to take risks and hence the general chances for SMEs
in a certain country to upgrade.
Gender: Some authors argue that an SME owner’s gender also affects the
ease with which the enterprise can upgrade. While many empirical studies
show that female ownership is associated with lower firm performance
(Mead / Liedholm 1998; De Mel / McKenzie / Woodruff 2008; McPherson
1996), this negative correlation is mainly a result of differences in wage-
employment conditions, time and mobility, access to resources, markets and
social networks (Nichter / Goldmark 2009). Indeed, a study conducted for
the International Labour Organization (ILO) shows that the fact that women
in some countries have greater problems regarding innumeracy, illiteracy
and a lack of business skills, are more risk-averse and belong to less
growth-oriented networks – explains their difficulties in upgrading better
than their gender (Greenwood 1999). Gender seems to be a crosscutting
issue that must be analysed in combination with other factors. A country’s
societal norms and values that hamper or facilitate female participation in
business networks might well explain women entrepreneurs’ comparative
ease or lack of it in upgrading.
2.2.2 Firm characteristics
According to a second bundle of explanations in the literature, it is the char-
acteristics of the enterprises rather than of the owners that explain differ-
ences in SMEs’ upgrading potential. Some researchers also account for dif-
ferences in the SMEs’ general likelihood of upgrading in different coun-
tries. They distinguish between structural factors such as an enterprise’s
age, size, sector, location and formal status on one hand, and SME policies,
as well as organisational factors such as knowledge and innovation man-
agement, on the other.
Age: Many studies find a statistically significant relationship between the
age of an enterprise and its likelihood to upgrade. Nevertheless it is diffi-
cult to establish causality between these two factors. The empirical litera-
ture is undecided regarding the direction of the correlation. On one hand,
younger firms are more often associated with innovativeness than their older
counterparts (Evans 1987; Hausman 2005; Ayyagari / Demirgüç-Kunt /
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Maksimovic 2011),8 while on the other, older firms are more likely to grow
in terms of sales and profits as a result of their greater business sophisti-
cation (Shanmugam / Bhaduri 2002; Sleuwaegen / Goedhuys 2002). Age
may have an indirect impact on SME upgrading. If all other factors remain
constant over the lifetime of an enterprise, nothing will change with
respect to the company’s potential to upgrade. It is the high correlation
between age and other factors such as the accumulation of experience and
business sophistication that informs the relationship between age and SME
upgrading.
Size:Many authors argue that an SME’s initial size, generally measured by
the number of employees, explains its likelihood to upgrade: the size of an
enterprise affects its capability to innovate and thereby grow (Schumpeter
1964). Small firms are less able to spread risk over a product portfolio,
might encounter difficulties starting up in foreign markets and are likely to
experience difficulties funding long-term R&D (Rothwell / Dodgson 1991).
Several studies have provided empirical evidence on the correlation
between a firm’s initial size and its likelihood to upgrade (De Mel /
McKenzie / Woodruff 2008; Ayyagari / Demirgüç-Kunt / Maksimovic 2011;
McPherson 1996) – but none have been able to demonstrate a corollary
between the average initial company size in a particular country and the
average propensity of its firms to upgrade. 
Sector: Some scholars argue that the sector in which an SME operates af-
fects its potential to upgrade, however, we can only make assumptions
about whether or not the concentration of SMEs in a given sector also af-
fects their average upgrading potential. The level of competition between
sectors diverges so that upgrading might be easier in some sectors than in
others (Altenburg / Eckhardt 2006). Several studies have provided empiri-
cal evidence for this correlation, among them Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic (2011), Mead and Liedholm (1998)9 and Mel, McKenzie
and Woodruff (2008).10 They find that firms in the manufacturing sector
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9 The authors use survey data from the Dominican Republic as well as five countries in
East and Southern Africa.
10 De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) use data from surveys of about 2,300 entrepre-
neurs from Sri Lanka.
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tend to be more innovative – which suggests that the overall likelihood of a
given country’s SMEs to upgrade can be linked to the number of that coun-
try’s manufacturing-sector SMEs.
Location: Other authors emphasise that an SME’s location also has an im-
pact on its individual potential to upgrade (while, of course, it does not ex-
plain variations in the average likelihood of SMEs to upgrade in different
countries). SMEs in urban areas are more likely to upgrade than those in
rural areas because they tend to be closer to suppliers and customers. Em-
pirical studies have found a positive correlation between the location of
SMEs and their likelihood to innovate (De Mel / McKenzie / Woodruff
2008; Mead / Liedholm 1998; McPherson 1996). 
Informality: Another strand of literature stresses the role that informality
plays in upgrading. Informal SMEs are less likely to upgrade than formal
ones: first, because they cannot sign contracts with large domestic or for-
eign firms, and second, because they don’t have such easy access to credit
and business development services. Sleuwagen and Goedhuys (2002) pro-
vided empirical evidence for this correlation in the SME manufacturing
sector in Côte d’Ivoire.11 At the same time, countries with large informal
sectors generally have a smaller number of upgraders, which could be due
to the fact that a large informal sector normally results from the country’s
high tax rates and regulatory burden. When the costs of formalisation and
taxes are high, most SME owners decide to remain informal (see Section
2.2.4). 
Knowledge and innovation management: The notion that the nature of an
SME’s knowledge and innovation management influences its likelihood to
upgrade almost goes without saying (Van den Bosch / Volberda / de Boer
1999; Zahra / George 2002). However, it could be argued that this factor not
only explains differences in an individual SME’s ease of upgrading but also
the average likelihood that SMEs will upgrade. An SME’s ability to conduct
market research and acquire, integrate, utilise and manage knowledge and
innovation is shaped by internal (i.e. individual) as well as external (i.e. sec-
toral or nationwide) factors.
Internal factors include the number of qualified scientists and engineers, as
well as management leadership and education, the existence of a strategy
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for technology management and investment in R&D (Radas / Božić 2009).
Empirical studies have confirmed that the education of employees and man-
agement strongly affects a firm’s potential for innovating – and upgrading
(Ayyagari / Demirgüç Kunt / Maksimovic 2011; Lee / Temesgen 2009; Tan /
Batra 2003).
External factors are found in the political, economic and social spheres,
which means that a country’s average quality of knowledge and innovation
management determines the SME owners’ propensity to upgrade. One such
factor is the existence and potential of a national innovation system12 that
greatly enhances the quality of the SME owners’ knowledge and innovation
management, and thereby, their chances of upgrading. The same can be said
about the availability of financial and non-financial business development
services (BDSs) and funding for R&D (Cohen / Levinthal 1989; Radas /
Božić 2009) (see Section 2.2.4). The societal context plays a similarly cen-
tral role, for example, we can assume that SMEs in countries with patriar-
chal structures are less likely to be innovative since introducing new tech-
nology requires the patriarch’s consent.
2.2.3 Inter-firm linkages 
Another group of authors states that the average and individual likelihood
of SMEs in any given country to upgrade is mainly determined by the ex-
istence of horizontal and vertical inter-firm linkages. Such linkages pro-
vide SME owners with access to knowledge, resources and collective ac-
tion. Figure 3 depicts these linkages and differentiates between vertical
linkages in the form of GVCs and horizontal linkages in the form of for-
malised business networks. Firms in clusters can be horizontally and/or
vertically linked.
Global value chains (GVCs): The integration of an individual firm into a
global value chain (GVC) may facilitate its upgrading; likewise, the over-
all degree of SME integration in GVCs in a given country is a good pre-
dictor of their average potential to upgrade. The term ‘GVC’ implies that
the production process often takes place in various locations (Humphrey /
Schmitz 2000, 9). While it is difficult for firms in developing countries to
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to initiate, foster and spread innovation (Belitz / Schrooten 2008). 
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enter international markets on their own, participation in GVCs can help
them to export (Schmitz 2006; Stamm 2004). In addition, supplying bigger
global buyers can create regular demand and generate a stable cash flow for
a local producer. The accumulated capital can then be reinvested, thereby
facilitating expansion (Gereffi 1999). Furthermore, many authors point out
the learning opportunities that are possible through forward linkages in a
chain. Buyers not only transfer money, but also consciously invest in their
suppliers’ competences and capabilities, or produce unintended knowledge
spill-overs (Stamm 2004, 27) that enable local producers to meet high prod-
uct specifications (Schmitz 2006). Earlier studies in the GVC debate
demonstrated these advantages (Gereffi 1999; Kishimoto 2004; Lee / Chen
2000). Nevertheless, the potential benefits from integration into GVCs do
not equally apply to all SMEs: upgrading chances largely depend on the
governance and power relations within the chain13 (Humphrey / Schmitz
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32 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
2000; Navas-Alemán 2011). For example, larger firms might try to avoid
SME upgrading because they prefer to have “weak” counterparts than
potential competitors. Various case studies have provided empirical evi-
dence that an individual SME benefits less from being integrated into a
chain if certain dominant firms exercise power and defend their market
positions by discriminating against other members of the chain.14 In addi-
tion, a country’s overall level of integration into GVCs might explain the
comparative difficulty for SMEs to upgrade. Integration into GVCs
depends on the degree to which SMEs are globally linked and their ability
to create vertical linkages with global companies. Some countries are gen-
erally less integrated into the world market, which means that from the out-
set local SMEs find it more difficult to upgrade through GVCs.
Cluster:15 Some authors argue that clustering has an even stronger impact
on SMEs’ upgrading potential – both individual SMEs and SMEs country-
wide. Case studies on Pakistan (Nadvi 1999), Brazil (Schmitz 1999), Mex-
ico (Rabelotti 1999) and India (Knorringa 1995) demonstrate how clusters
help SMEs to upgrade. Being part of a regional agglomeration can raise an
SME’s competitiveness and promote upgrading (Caniels / Romijn 2003;
Knorringa / Meyer-Stamer 1999; Humphrey / Schmitz 2000). Firms in a
cluster can divide labour and specialise within the production cycle
(Kaplinsky / Readman 2001). Nadvi (1999) showed the advantages of shar-
ing investment costs in his case study on a surgical-instrument cluster in
Pakistan. Spillovers mainly relate to learning effects within clusters which
are crucial for a firm’s chances to upgrade (Kaplinsky / Readman 2001).
Clusters are reported to have a positive impact on the spread and applica-
tion of knowledge (Humphrey / Schmitz 2000). Audretsch and Feldman
(1996) have provided econometric evidence for the effect of knowledge
spillovers on innovative activities in the United States. The prevalence of
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14 These case studies include investigations by Giuliani, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2005) of
Latin-American clusters in the manufacturing and software sectors, Knorringa and
Schmitz (2000) on the footwear industries in China and India, Bazan and Navas-Alemán
(2004) on the Brazilian footwear industry, and Bair and Gereffi (2001) on jeans produc-
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15 A ‘cluster’ can be defined as the sectoral and geographical concentration of enterprises
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2007, 235; UNCTAD 1999).
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clusters in a given country might explain the average propensity of local
SMEs to upgrade by helping increase the average number of firms inte-
grated in clusters and facilitating inter-firm co-operation. 
Formalised business networks: Some authors argue that formalised co-oper-
ation through business networks increases the likelihood of SME upgrading.
Upgrading opportunities may also depend on the type and prevalence of for-
malised networks in the country, which include sector-specific networks such
as trade or business associations and regional organisations such as chambers
of commerce. They can be important providers of knowledge, enable access
to resources and markets and facilitate collective efficiencies. In addition,
members of business and trade associations may choose to share risks and
increase their bargaining power Humphrey / Schmitz 2000, 19 f.). A shared
– and thereby reduced – risk increases an individual firm’s willingness to
invest, and facilitates upgrading. Greater bargaining power increases the
chance of influencing policy-making and encourages a favourable environ-
ment for upgrading. However, the structure of business networks is very dif-
ferent in each country. The benefits of formalised networks are significantly
reduced in countries where business associations are controlled by the state
and do not represent or support their members’ interests. SMEs in these
countries may find it generally harder to upgrade than SMEs in countries
with strong and independent formalised network structures.
2.2.4 Business environment 
Many studies have shown the business environment to be the key determi-
nant of the average likelihood of SMEs in a given country to upgrade, alt-
hough its ability to account for the differences in the likelihood of individ-
ual firms to upgrade is limited. Various authors have illustrated how com-
ponents of the business environment impact on the innovative potential,
growth and investment behaviour of SMEs.16 Macroeconomic and political
stability, regulation, competition, corruption, availability of skilled labour,
trade policy, access to finance and insurance, non-financial business devel-
opment services (BDSs) and infrastructure are the most important el-
ements of the business environment. 
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Macroeconomic stability: Several authors have argued that macroeconom-
ic stability eases the upgrading of SMEs in a country. Moderate inflation
and a stable real exchange rate provide firms with more security and great-
er ease in predicting future developments, which positively affect their in-
vestment behaviour and upgrading efforts (Stieglitz et al. 2006). Bhattar-
chajee et al. (2002) found that macroeconomic stability reduces the risk of
bankruptcy. 
Macroeconomic stability does not have the same effect on every firm. Firm-
level data suggests that SMEs are more affected by instability than large
firms because they have less flexibility to deal with volatilities at the
macro-level (Beck / Demirgüc-Kunt / Maksimovic 2005). Furthermore,
fluctuations in inflation or exchange rates are especially critical for firms
with little access to finance since a lack of liquidity makes it more difficult
to cope with imbalances. 
Political stability: Many authors similarly argued that a stable political en-
vironment increases a firm’s willingness to invest and therefore facilitates
SME upgrading. In contrast, political instability, such as that in a post-con-
flict phase, may hinder firm growth. Collier and Duponchel (2010) used a
survey of firms in Sierra Leone to show that political instability negatively
affects productivity and the use of new technologies.
Regulation: Other scholars have emphasised that the regulatory framework
impacts on the general propensity of SMEs to upgrade and can also explain
differences between countries. Regulation can have both positive and nega-
tive effects on firm investments and likelihood of upgrading.
On one hand, regulation provides entrepreneurs with more security in both
their business-to-business and their business-to-state relations. For exam-
ple, regulation is needed to protect intellectual and other property, and for
contract enforcement and dispute resolution (World Bank 2012a). All this is
particularly helpful for SME owners, which tend to be disproportionately
risk-averse (Loewe et al. 2007, 18). Regulation also means that the public
administration has clear rules for dealing with private entrepreneurs that
ensure transparency in government procedures and the equal treatment of
firms (both large and small).
On the other hand, regulation may raise the costs of doing business in terms
of both time and money. Various empirical studies have shown that exces-
sive regulation burdens entrepreneurs and reduces their propensity to invest
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and innovate (World Bank 2010a; OECD 2010a). The World Bank’s Doing
Business 2012 argues that when less time and money and fewer procedures
are needed for dealing with construction permits, registering property, pay-
ing taxes and closing a business, the business environment is more
favourable for SME owners (World Bank 2012a). The same applies to the
cost and time required to get land titles, permissions or licences to operate
a business. Djankov et al. (2002) argued that high barriers to register a busi-
ness result in a large informal economy (see above). SME owners weigh the
trade-off between the benefits and the costs of regulation in deciding
whether or not to formalise (de Soto 1989).
The influence of these two contradictory effects of regulation on a firm’s
propensity to upgrade depends to a large degree on its individual character-
istics. Some authors have argued that the degree of formalisation and the
size of the firm are important. Informal SMEs are excluded by and large
from the advantages of regulation. They do not benefit from the protection
of property rights, the possibility of enforcing contracts through judicial
processes, government BDSs or access to formal credit – which limits their
ability to upgrade. At the same time, informal firms save substantial costs
that formal firms have to pay for taxes, registration, licensing etc., and
which limit profits, thereby discouraging them from investing and upgrad-
ing. Meanwhile, SMEs are disproportionately affected by high tax burdens
and the costs of regulation, which large firms can absorb more easily
(Weichenrieder 2007; Schiffer / Weder 2001; OECD 2004). 
Competition: Other scholars have argued that competition is the main de-
terminant of SME upgrading: without it, firms have few incentives to in-
vest and innovate. Michael Porter, in particular, emphasises that competi-
tion increases a company's value, productivity and profitability. In Porter's
understanding, the main goal of competition is to be unique, which allows
a firm either to lower its costs or to charge higher prices. The threat of new
entrants into markets forces firms to optimise and innovate (Porter 2008).
Many authors have emphasised the need for effective laws regulating com-
petition and strong institutions to guarantee fair competition (Singh 2002;
Laffont 1998). 
At the same time, competition within a country could account for differ-
ences in some companies’ ease in upgrading, with unfair competition priv-
ileging some firms at the expense of others. For example, firms with social
capital – good personal connections to the government or influential people
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in the bureaucracy – may get preferential treatment regarding registration,
licensing or taxation, or when applying for land, credit or a government
tender that can ease market access and help expand the business (Loewe et
al. 2007). Such firms accumulate artificially created rents. In contrast, most
SME owners do not have good connections and are unable to influence
decisions taken by the government or public administration. For them,
unfair competition constitutes a high barrier to market entry and an
obstacle to upgrading.
SMEs in the informal sector are an exception to this rule because they de-
pend much less on the public administration’s goodwill than companies in
the formal sector. While informal SME owners have limited access to
credit, licenses and government tenders, they can circumvent government
regulations and so are less concerned by unfair market competition (OECD
2009). Their informal status also creates unfair conditions that work to their
benefit and that are harmful to formal enterprises. Since informal enter-
prises do not comply with government-defined standards and requirements,
they can often produce at lower costs, meaning that from the point of view
of formal enterprises, they are unfair competitors.
Corruption: Many scholars have emphasised that corruption negatively af-
fects the upgrading potential of firms in a country. Some have argued that
corruption could have positive effects such as reducing information and
transaction costs or speeding up administrative procedures.17 However, only
wealthy entrepreneurs can afford to pay high bribes and only entrepreneurs
with connections benefit from favouritism in state-business relations; all
others are disadvantaged by corruption. If one group of entrepreneurs ben-
efits from connections or pays bribes and another does not, the former will
see its applications and requests processed more quickly with better
chances of approval, while the latter will have to wait longer and work
harder to get its applications processed – with greater likelihood of being
refused (Loewe 2013). Corruption also reduces entrepreneurs’ incentives to
be competitive. If it is clear that bribes and connections are the main deter-
minants for getting an application approved or winning a government bid,
they will shift their time and money investments from the research and
development of new products to investments in connections and bribery. As
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a consequence, widespread corruption decreases entrepreneurs’ rates of
investing, which may have a negative effect on the average chances of
SMEs in a country to upgrade (Loewe et al. 2007). 
Availability of skilled labour: Empirical evidence shows that a lack of
skilled labour constitutes a constraint to SME upgrading, explaining why
SME upgrading might be particularly difficult in some countries – al-
though it does not explain differences for SME upgrading within a single
country. Humphrey (2003) argued that firm upgrading requires highly
skilled managerial and technical workers “that can provide the manage-
ment and supervisory systems that will ensure adherence to the specifica-
tions demanded by global buyers” (Humphrey 2003, 16). Even SMEs re-
quire skilled – as opposed to unskilled – labour when they upgrade in or-
der to be able to use technology effectively and become competitive on in-
ternational markets (Lall 1999). According to the enterprise survey in the
Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011, many business leaders in the
developing world consider an inadequately educated workforce to be one of
their main constraints (WEF 2011).
Trade Policy: Other authors have demonstrated that the liberalisation of
external trade positively impacts on the upgrading of all local SMEs. How-
ever, trade does not easily explain variations in the ease with which SMEs
in the same country upgrade unless other factors such as differences in mar-
ket orientation are taken into account (for example, while companies that
export may benefit from trade liberalisation, companies that serve the local
market do not). 
The World Bank’s Innovation Policy: A Guide for Developing Countries
claimed that deregulated cross-border trade opens windows for the transfer
of technology to local firms (World Bank 2010a). Trade liberalisation also
opens up new opportunities for sales by giving SMEs access to interna-
tional markets (Wignaraja 2003). It makes it possible for SMEs to use cheap
imported goods and thereby become less dependent on the limited, and
sometimes more expensive, domestic supply market. This enhances SME
productivity. 
At the same time, trade policy does not affect all firms in one country in the
same way since the ability to reap the benefits of liberalisation is depend-
ent on each firm’s individual competitiveness in export markets (Tambunan
2011). Tewari and Goebel (2002) show that liberalisation produces winners
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and losers in the auto-components industry of southern India. They found
that some firms were able to upgrade and take advantage of technology
spill-overs from foreign firms, while most firms saw no difference, and 15
per cent of all companies in the study had gone bankrupt as a result of the
increased competition following liberalisation.
Access to finance: Many scholars have focused on access to finance to ex-
plain the general potential of a country’s SMEs to upgrade, as well as vari-
ations in the ease of upgrading within the country. Empirical evidence has
mainly been provided for access to credit but some scholars have also dis-
cussed other forms of finance such as factoring, leasing or equity. 
While there is a lot of literature on the link between finance and economic
growth in general (Levine 1997), the channels through which finance af-
fects firm growth have not been studied as well. Several cross-country re-
gressions and case studies have found that access to finance appears to be
positively correlated with firm growth18 and productivity19. Other studies
have sought to identify the channels through which finance enables growth.
King and Levine (1993) developed a theoretical model in which financial
institutions mainly provide finance to firms that engage in innovation.
Another study (Demirgüç-Kunt / Beck / Honohan 2008) suggested that
external finance enables firms to invest and take advantage of opportunities
for growth and investment, thus enabling entrepreneurs to obtain a more
productive set of assets. Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2006)
stated that the financial system might foster growth at the firm level by
channelling funds to those firms that employ innovation in order to be-
come more efficient. 
Evidence on the correlation of access to finance and innovation is rather
limited. A study of firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia by Correa,
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18 See Rahaman (2011), Beck et al. (2000) as well as Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Mak-
simovic (2006). Other sources of empirical evidence are case studies that analyse the
impact of finance on firm development. They exhibit mixed results: two studies (Zia
2008; Banerjee / Duflo 2008) found a positive impact, i.e. greater access to finance is
associated with firm growth, while other studies did not find that credit or capital signif-
icantly determine firm performance (Akoten / Sawada / Otsuka 2006; Fafchamps,
McKenzie / Woodruff 2011).
19 For example see Butler and Cornaggia (2011) or Gatti and Love (2006), who examined
the impact of external finance on productivity and found a significant positiverelationship.
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Fernandes and Uregian (2008) provided evidence that access to finance is
correlated with technology adoption. Maksimovic, Ayyagari and Demirgüç-
Kunt (2007) used a sample of 10,000 firms in various developing countries
to show that external finance – both equity and bank finance – correlates
positively with firm innovation and firm dynamism.20
While in most cases, access to finance is equally ranked with access to credit,
the availability of additional financing instruments may be an important
determinant for SME upgrading. Factoring might be an alternative financing
instrument for SMEs in developing countries that cannot get bank credit
(Klapper 2006b). Leasing helps SME owners obtain business equipment
without having to pledge collateral (UNCTAD 2001), and equity provides
entrepreneurs with long-term capital. Venture capital can promote innovation
at the firm level because it supports young and quickly growing firms.
The effect of a firm’s size on its access to finance is viewed as a determi-
nant that explains differences in upgrading between SMEs within a coun-
try. A study of more than 10,000 firms in 80 countries found that access to
finance is more difficult for small enterprises than for large ones (Schiff-
er / Weder 2001; Beck et al. 2006). Small firms are also more vulnerable
to limitations in accessing finance than large companies, which can better
assume the functions normally provided by financial intermediaries
(Beck / Demirgüç-Kunt / Maksimovic 2005).
Access to insurance:Another strand of literature stresses that insurance has
a very strong effect on the investment decisions of SME owners, explaining
both the general chances for SMEs in a country to upgrade and within-
country variations in the chances to upgrade. It is argued that insurance
decreases vulnerability to risks, thereby encouraging entrepreneurs to make
investments that bring about additional risks (Slater et al. 2009). Some
authors have even stated that protection against basic risks (such as illness,
work disability and death) predisposes entrepreneurs to accept the addi-
tional risks that investments and upgrading efforts usually entail (Loewe
2009, 42). Empirical literature on this subject supports these claims. Elbers,
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technologies” and firm dynamism as “activities that promote knowledge transfers such 
as signing joint ventures with foreign partners” (Maksimovich / Ayyagari / Demirgüç-
Kunt 2007, 2 and 11 f.).
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Gunning, and Kinsey (2003), for example, demonstrated that in Zimbabwe
risk substantially reduces firm growth as measured by the firm’s capital
stock, and Cai et al. (2009) found that access to formal insurance increases
Chinese farmers’ willingness to invest, while Cichon and Scholz (2009)
emphasised that health insurance increases labour productivity. 
Non-financial business development services (BDSs): Many authors have
also emphasised the role of BDSs in explaining the general propensity of
SMEs to upgrade in a given country, as well as accounting for some differ-
ences between SMEs within one country. BDSs include “services that
improve the performance of the enterprise, its access to markets, and its
ability to compete […] both strategic and operational” (UNDP 2004, 5). A
distinction is often made between financial and non-financial BDSs. The
former are intended to ease the access of enterprises to finance, while the
latter may include “training, consultancy, marketing, information, technol-
ogy development and transfer, business linkage promotion, etc.” (ibid.).
Few empirical studies have rigorously tested the impact of non-financial
BDSs on firm upgrading or growth. Bennett and Robson (2000) did, but
found no significant correlation. In contrast, Goldmark (1999) analysed the
financial viability of BDS programmes in Latin America, interpreting the
high level of cost recovery of many of the programmes as an indicator for
the fact that they helped SMEs increase profits: had that not been so, the
SME owners would not have been willing to pay for the services. Zand-
niapour, Sebstad and Snodgrass (2004) reviewed the impact evaluations of
27 BDS programmes throughout the developing world and found that many
of these programmes impacted positively on SME growth. Unfortunately,
the evaluations suffer from severe methodological weaknesses such as the
lack of control groups and selection bias.
Infrastructure: Many scholars argue that the general likelihood of SME
upgrading in a given country, as well as differences in SME upgrading
within the country, is significantly influenced by the infrastructure. Good
transportation links, reliable supplies of energy and water and access to up-
to-date information technology are required to efficiently run a business,
while inferior infrastructure may lower returns and levels of private invest-
ment (Hausmann / Klinger / Wagner 2008). The state of the infrastructure
either similarly affects all the SMEs in a country or influences the upgrad-
ing chances of individual firms – depending on the overall availability of
these resources and the conditions for access.
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There is a good deal of empirical evidence on the link between infrastruc-
ture and SME upgrading, but the relationship between infrastructure and
innovation has not yet been discussed. Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier and
Menigstae (2005) showed that the quality of infrastructure is the most im-
portant determinant of firm performance as measured in terms of profits
and productivity in five developing countries in Asia. Hallward-Driemeier,
Wallsten and Xu (2006) studied firm performance in five large Chinese
cities and found that physical infrastructure, such as transportation and en-
ergy supply, is less important for firm performance than elements of the
technological infrastructure such as telecommunications, which signifi-
cantly and positively impacts on firm productivity. Goedhuys and Sleuwae-
gen (2010) analysed firms in the manufacturing sector in 11 countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa and found that firms with their own transport facilities
grew faster. Using a sample of 70,000 enterprises in 107 countries, Aterido,
Hallward-Driemeier and Pages (2007) showed that weak infrastructure – in
the form of power outages – negatively affected SME employment growth.
3 The ‘missing middle’ in the context of Egypt’s
development conditions
Despite its considerable potential for development, Egypt suffers from sig-
nificant structural deficiencies, partly caused by the ‘missing middle’ phe-
nomenon, a lack of medium-sized companies that are able to graduate and
become exporters or link with larger domestic or foreign companies inte-
grating into global value chains (GVCs).
This chapter begins with an analysis of Egypt’s potential for development
(3.1) and discusses how neo-patrimonial structures in the political and eco-
nomic systems, which emerged under the previous authoritarian regime,
affect entrepreneurship in Egypt in 3.2. Section 3.3 identifies Egypt’s most
significant economic problems and 3.4 explains how filling the ‘missing
middle’ could help to solve them. Section 3.5 closes with an overview of the
sector of Egyptian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
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3.1 Economic development conditions
Egypt has both favourable and disadvantageous conditions for development. 
In particular, the country enjoys numerous favourable natural conditions for
development – extensive energy reserves and excellent conditions for the
production of renewable energies, especially wind and solar. Egypt has a
large domestic market, and easy access to sizeable sales markets by reason
of its proximity to Europe and location between Asia and Africa. Egypt also
has a variety of sources of external income, such as Suez Canal user fees, a
large tourism industry, development aid, military assistance and remit-
tances. Egypt is ethnically homogeneous (over 90 per cent of the population
are Sunni Muslims) with a common language, which can help reduce the
risk of certain types of conflict. Finally, Egypt displays a low rate of epi-
demic diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria (Brach 2011; Loewe 2012).
At the same time, however, some factors hamper Egypt’s economic devel-
opment. Rapid population growth, for instance, aggravates a number of al-
ready existing problems. The fact that the Egyptian economy is not grow-
ing much faster than the population intensifies the already critical employ-
ment situation and the scarcity of water Sustainable use of water is not in
sight: today, the agricultural sector alone consumes as much as 70 per cent
of Egypt’s water, which is largely sourced from the Nile. Egypt’s develop-
ment is further hindered by the scarcity of arable land. Finally, the country
suffers from the heritage of decades of neo-patrimonial political rule.
3.2 The neo-patrimonial rule under Mubarak
Prior to the so-called ‘Tahrir revolution’ that took place in January and early
February 2011, Egypt was ruled by President Mubarak’s neo-patrimonial
regime, which had hampered the country’s economic development. Since then,
Egypt has moved: President Mubarak resigned and was condemned to life
imprisonment in a trial, the old ruling party was dissolved, and for the first time
a parliament was elected in democratic elections. The army took over for a tran-
sition period until a new president, Mohamed Morsi from the Muslim Brothers
party Al-Ḥurriyya wal-cAdāla, was elected president and formed a new gov-
ernment in summer 2012. 
However, Egypt’s polity, economy and society still bear the marks of the neo-
patrimonial structures of the old political system, which means that knowledge
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of Egypt’s past is crucial for understanding some of the country’s most pressing
current problems (see Box 1). 
‘Neo-patrimonialism’ describes a type of authoritarian rule based on the strong
formal and informal ties of personal relationships.21 In a neo-patrimonial sys-
tem, the formal state apparatus is supplanted by an informal pyramidal system
of personal relations: only people with connections have power, not those who
hold higher positions. The sole leader (the president in Egypt) commands
patron-client relationships and uses state resources to legitimise his power
(Nawaz 2008; Bank / Richter 2010).
Neo-patrimonial patterns of rule are observed in almost all countries of the
Middle East and North Africa – including Egypt under Mubarak. Prior to the
2011 revolution, the president stood at the centre of all decision-making in the
country. No political decision could be taken against his will, and he could veto
all decisions taken by other Egyptian political bodies. Decision-making did not
follow formal channels and rules, but instead was characterised by complex
processes of balancing, containing, exploiting and neutralising various influen-
tial segments of the power elite (Loewe 2010; Loewe 2012). All the political
elites depended directly on Mubarak, who recruited the political elites prima-
rily with regard to their personal (political) loyalty to him, rather than because
of their professional performance and competencies. Loyalty to Mubarak was
based partly on traditional loyalties (family, heritage and religion) but also on
material rewards, such as jobs, grants and licences (Bank and Richter 2010).
Egypt’s economic development suffered from its neo-patrimonial political
framework because of: 
• The misallocation of state resources:The legitimacy of the president and
the ruling elite was based on the strategic allocation of state resources
(jobs, income, housing, etc.) to specific societal groups (patronage). The
same mechanism was used at the micro-level to reward individuals for
loyalty to the regime with employment, housing and promotions (clien-
telism). The allocation of state resources thus primarily served to ensure
loyalty to the regime rather than serve the interests of the people or to
increase Egypt’s economic efficiency (Loewe 2013).
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can be considered to be a sui generis regime type. We treat neo-patrimonialism as one 
particular manifestation of authoritarian rule.
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Box 1: The political economy framework: a historical breakdown and the 
effects of Egypt’s revolution
Following Egypt’s independence, Gamal Abdu-n-Nasir led the ‘Free Officers’ coup
d’état in 1952and installed an authoritarian regime. Although elections were held
occasionally, they were never free and transparent. Power was shared among the
army, the president, who relied on his charisma (Nasir) or personal networks
(Mubarak), the state bureaucracy and the state political parties (the National Dem-
ocratic Party under Mubarak). Events during and after the January 2011 revolution
have shown that, despite what has been written before about the political role of the
various Egyptian presidents, the army has probably always been the real corner-
stone of the political order with the presidents powerless to take decisions con-
flicting the core interests of the army – even during 1988—2011 when the army
was hardly apparent at all.
Egypt followed various economic policies between independence and the revolu-
tion of 2011. Under Nasir, who became president in 1954, most large companies
were nationalised and foreign trade was heavily regulated. But Nasir’s ambitious
policy of import substitutions failed for both economic and foreign policy reasons.
In 1970, Anwar as-Sadat succeeded Nasir and adopted a strategy of ‘controlled
opening’ (infitāħ). He created new incentives for investors (tax holidays, tariff
reductions on imported goods and guarantees for private property). His strategy
benefited from the 1970s oil boom as well as from increased income from Suez
Canal user fees, tourism and remittances but it failed to initiate a real structural
change. As a result, Egypt continued to suffer from large public debt. It was unable
to attract increasing amounts of foreign investment, and because most foreign
investments did not target productive sectors of the economy, the manufacturing
sector deteriorated a lot. Egypt’s economic situation was further aggravated by the
post-1985 collapse of international energy prices. 
In 1981, Sadat was assassinated by an Islamist terrorist and succeeded by his Vice
President Husny Mubarak, a military man who stepped up Sadat’s efforts to dereg-
ulate markets and attract investors. In an effort to make Egypt more competitive on
world markets, Mubarak abolished central planning and devalued the Egyptian
Pound (EGP) – which did stimulate economic growth, increasing the share of
manu-facturing goods in total GDP and industrial workers’ productivity. However,
Mubarak continued to support public-sector companies by manipulating prices,
customs tariffs and interest rates, which retarded the development of the private
sector. Despite the growth of Egypt’s manufacturing sector, the economy was
unable to cope with declining oil prices and rising global interest rates. 
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In 1991, almost-bankrupt Egypt was forced to accept the conditions set by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for a stand-by credit.
Mubarak reduced government spending, deregulated markets, liberalised foreign
trade, cut subsidies, introduced a general sales tax and began to liberalise the finan-
cial market. However, despite his promise, he only half-heartedly pursued the pri-
vatisation of state-owned industries. In 2000, after a period of relatively high
growth rates and macroeconomic stabilisation which was largely due to external
windfall profits, the Egyptian economy again began to stagnate. Experts hold that
this recession resulted from an incomplete and short-sighted structural adjustment
programme that failed to create incentives for the underdeveloped manufacturing
sector. 
In 2004, Mubarak appointed a new ‘reform cabinet’, headed by Prime Minister
Ahmed Nazif, that included a good number of successful businessmen. Much more
ambitious and better designed than all previous reform efforts, the cabinet quickly
launched new economic reforms to promote Egypt’s private sector, improve the
country’s international competitiveness and further its integration into the global
economy. As a result, Egypt’s economy experienced another growth spurt, which
was only slightly slowed by the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 to
2009. However, the development benefits were very unevenly distributed: While
the wages of workers and informal sector employees almost stagnated, the urban
middle class experienced an extraordinary economic boom, and some members of
the business elite saw their incomes and fortunes explode within just a few years.
Among the main beneficiaries were those with good connections to President
Mubarak’s family and the reform cabinet.
On 25 January 2011, a widespread popular uprising began to protest Mubarak, his
sons and the government. Following two weeks of non-violent demonstrations,
civil resistance, civil disobedience and labour strikes, during which the security
forces killed hundreds of protesters and maimed thousands, Mubarak resigned on
11 February 2011. He ceded power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF), an institution that had never been public before. The SCAF’s head,
Mohamed Husein Tantawi, became the effective head of state. He suspended the
constitution, banned the state party, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and dis-
solved both houses of parliament. In March, the army appointed a new cabinet as
the interim government.
In the meantime, the Egyptian economy had almost collapsed. Right after the Jan-
uary 2011 uprising, tourists stayed away, foreign investors put new projects in
Egypt on ice, and manufacturing-sector workers halted production in order to con-
duct huge strikes for higher wages and protest the old regime and the prohibition
of independent labour unions. The domestic security situation deteriorated because
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the police had completely disappeared from the streets after the revolution. In order
to safeguard basic public order, thousands of Egyptians stepped in to regulate local
traffic and to safeguard security in the streets at night, but they were unable to pre-
vent the rise in pick-pocketing and sexual harassment that made women in partic-
ular anxious about going to work. In some parts of Greater Cairo, vehicular traffic
came to a standstill.
During the spring of 2011, tourism and production in the manufacturing sector
slowly picked up, but domestic consumers drastically cut back wherever they
could. As a consequence, smaller Egyptian companies that had been geared to the
local market experienced a collapse in sales. Some were forced to lay off workers,
which reduced domestic consumption while at the same time, the cost of imported
goods continued to rise because of the increase in global energy prices following
the recent world financial and economic crisis. This added pressure to the govern-
ment budget as the state continued to subsidise consumer goods such as energy,
water and basic food items. The interim government was loath to make major pol-
icy changes before a new parliament was elected. By late 2011, more than half of
Egypt’s foreign currency reserves had been depleted.
Initially, the Egyptian population had welcomed the army seizing power. But when
it saw little progress was being made towards democracy, it renewed and intensi-
fied its protests. In July 2011, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians in Suez, Alexan-
dria and Cairo demanded faster progress towards elections and the elaboration of
a new democratic constitution – as well as swifter and more rigorous prosecution
of former officials. Fierce fighting broke out in November and December 2011,
with the police beating, shooting and using tear gas on demonstrators. Although the
SCAF issued an apology, the public had turned against it. Most of the population
considered that the army had lost its legitimacy.
Between November 2011 and January 2012, a new parliament was elected in three
rounds. The result was an unexpectedly clear victory of Islamist parties, which won
more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament (the Freedom and Justice Party of
the Muslim Brotherhood got 42 per cent, the Salafist An-Nour Party 21 per cent
and other Islamist parties 9 per cent). Former NDP members captured a mere 1 per
cent of the seats, liberals and social democrats 10 per cent and the old national
Wafd Party 7 per cent.
The new parliament soon turned out to be powerless as the army still made the
important decisions. On several occasions in April 2012, protesters gathered in
Cairo and elsewhere to demand an end to military rule and the cleanup of the judi-
cial system, as well as to complain about the disqualification of several candidates
for the impending presidential election.
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The June 2012 presidential election resulted in the victory of Mohammed Mursi,
the Muslim Brotherhood’s number-two candidate (their preferred candidate had
been disqualified by the electoral commission), who was inaugurated as the fifth
President of Egypt on 30 June 2012. He appointed a government that was com-
posed of a combination of Islamists, representatives of the old Mubarak regime and
the interim military regime and a few independents. On 12 August 2012, Mursi dis-
missed Mohamed Husein Tantawi from his functions of Minister of Defense and
head of SCAF, along with Sami Annan who, as the Army Chief of Staff, was prob-
ably behind most of the military regime’s post-revolution decisions. He appointed
a new government that was dominated by the Muslim Brothers. A new constitution
was drafted by a Constituent Assembly dominated by Islamists in November 2012
and ratified in a referendum held in December 2012. However, it is not yet clear if
the Egyptian army has definitively ceded power.
Source: Loewe (2012); Loewe (2013); Matzke (2011); Roll (2010); 
Stevenson (2010)
• Ineffective administration: Pervasive clientelism led to massive under-
employment and the public administration’s ineffectiveness. Employ-
ment in the public sector was commonly used to reward individuals for
loyalty to the regime. As a result, the public administration was highly
developed and omnipresent, with even small villages having their own
schools, health stations and offices for the public administration. Vast
employment in the public sector burdened the state with high costs for
wages, while at the same time, the quality of public services was low,
bureaucratic procedures were slow and administrative decisions were
unpredictable (Loewe 2013). 
• Great income inequality: Neo-patrimonial systems typically suffer from
great income inequality. Significant state resources are directed to elites
and individuals who benefit from patronage and clientelism, while those
outside the neo-patrimonial informal structures bear the costs (e.g.
through taxes). For example, in Nigeria it is estimated that in recent
years, 1 per cent of the population received 80 per cent of the oil rev-
enues (Nawaz 2008). In Egypt, the army and a few influential families
have accumulated vast sums through neo-patrimonial structures.
• Corruption: The informal patrimonial governance system that overrules
the formal rational-legal state apparatus and formal laws meant that cor-
ruption was rife under Mubarak. Egypt scored a mere 2.8 on a scale of
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1 (high corruption) to 10 (low corruption) in Transparency Internatio-
nal’s Corruption Perception Index. According to the Global Competi-
tiveness Report, corruption was Egyptian entrepreneurs’ single most
important concern in 2010 (Loewe 2013).
• No authentic private-sector participation: Chambers of commerce and
industry, professional unions, employer’s associations and labour
unions all played roles that benefited the government much more than
their members. These bodies have been described as ‘neo-corporatist
organisations’ that exist to inform the government early about changes
in public opinions and explain government policies to their members
and mobilise them on behalf of the government – rather than to repre-
sent members’ interests and opinions to the government. Until 2010,
many of their leaders were not even elected by their members but
rather were appointed by the government and had no veto power
(Loewe 2013).
3.3 Economic problems
One issue that substantially contributes to Egypt’s economic problems is the
lack of a robust private sector. Experts argue that Egypt’s reliance on exter-
nal resources has hindered sustainable, employment-intensive, pro-poor
growth. The Egyptian economy is characterised by low productivity, inter-
national competitiveness and weak technological capacities (Malik 2011;
Dessus / Suwa-Eisenmann 1998). Steve Lee comments, 
“Too much of the private sector in Egypt is based on cheap labour, low
productivity, limited value-added production. This has to change. The chal-
lenge is to raise the productivity, add more value and employ more skilled
labour in the production-steps done within Egypt.” (Steven Lee, freelance
consultant, 17 February 2012)
Economic growth: In the last 10 years, Egypt has experienced an impres-
sive growth spurt. Gross domestic product (GDP) increased on average by
4.7 per cent annually between 2000 and 2008, when it peaked at 7.2 per
cent. Thereafter it decreased – mainly because of the global financial and
economic crisis. Principle factors driving GDP growth were increased rev-
enues from Suez Canal user fees and remittances, rising commodity prices,
and easier and cheaper access to capital and international markets (Loewe
2012; Stevenson 2010). 
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Not pro-poor: The steady GDP increase was not especially pro-poor. GDP
growth had little impact on poverty levels and income distribution. Some 20
per cent of the approximately 82 million Egyptians get by on less than USD
2 per day, with 16 per cent of them below the national poverty line (Ber-
telsmann Stiftung 2009; Stevenson 2010).
Not employment-intensive: GDP growth also had no significant impact on
unemployment and underemployment.22 The official unemployment rate
stands at about 10 per cent, while independent observers estimate the ef-
fective rate to be between 20 and 25 per cent. With an unemployment rate
of 25 per cent (in 2006), adult women are particularly exposed to unem-
ployment (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009). More than one million women
would like to work but cannot find employment (Stevenson 2010). The
unemployment rate among university graduates is also rising (Bertels-
mann Stiftung 2009). With the total population growing by 2 per cent
annually and the working-age population growing even faster (by 2.5 per
cent per year), Egypt must create more than half a million new jobs each
year just to keep unemployment rates at their current levels (Loewe 2013;
Stevenson 2010).
Unsustainable growth: The growth spurt of the last decade lacks sustaina-
bility because it resulted from changes in commodity and capital prices and
temporary windfall profits rather than from innovation and industrial diver-
sification. The share of manufacturing exports has remained comparatively
low. In order to attain sustainable long-term growth, Egyptian enterprises
must diversify their product base, and improve both the quality of their prod-
ucts and their competitiveness. Increases in economic productivity and pro-
ductive investment are essential (Brach 2010; Loewe 2012; Stevenson 2010).
Current account deficit: Egypt suffers from a sizable balance of trade defi-
cit. Although the country’s exports rose considerably during the last decade
(more than 20 per cent annually between 2003 and 2008), the country suf-
fered from a trade balance deficit of USD 25 billion in 2009 to 2010.
Imports amounted to USD 49 billion with exports of less than half that
value (USD 24 billion) (Marks 2010, 5).
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Limited level of technology absorption:The technological content of Egypt-
ian exports is low. In 2008, only 30 per cent of the country’s exports were
finished goods. High-technology products accounted for just 1 per cent of
Egypt’s exports, while they made up 13 per cent of Turkey’s exports, 16 per
cent of Tunisia’s exports and 54 per cent of Malaysia’s exports. According
to the Global Competitiveness Report, in 2009 Egypt ranked 66th out of
133 countries with regard to the availability of the latest technologies. The
Philippines, which is roughly the size of Egypt, reports more technology
royalty payments (an indicator of technology importation) than all Arab
countries combined (Loewe 2013).
Limited level of diversification: It is not surprising that the Egyptian econ-
omy is not diversified enough since manufacturing accounts for just 16 per
cent of GDP. Likewise, exports are still dominated by primary goods: In
2008, electricity, oil, gas and their derivates accounted for almost two-
thirds of the merchandise exports, with other raw materials making up 4
per cent. The remaining 30 per cent consisted mainly of foodstuffs (9 per
cent), textiles and clothes (6 per cent each), chemicals and pharmaceuticals
(5 per cent) and machinery (5 per cent). Thailand, with a population
smaller than Egypt, exports 10 times as many manufactured goods. Egypt’s
export volume amounts to USD 100,000 – for a mere 1,000 different prod-
ucts – in comparison with 2,000 for the Philippines and 4,000 for Malaysia
(Loewe 2012).
Inflation: In 2008, rising commodity prices and strong domestic demand
pushed inflation to an average of 18 per cent, with a peak of 24 per cent in
August. Subsequent tight monetary policies by the Central Bank of Egypt
(CBE) and decreasing international commodity prices lowered inflation,
with the year-on-year rate of inflation dropping steadily to 11 per cent in
2010. Since the revolution, however, inflation has risen and commodity
prices are expected to continue to increase (EIU 2011).
3.4 Responding to Egypt’s economic problems by filling 
the ‘missing middle’ 
Several of Egypt’s problems have to do with its ‘missing middle’. There are
many ways that increasing the number of medium-sized enterprises could
help advance Egypt’s economic development.
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• Reduce unemployment and underemployment: In Egypt, most people are
employed in micro and small enterprises. An increase in the number of
medium-sized companies would be helpful since jobs at medium-sized
companies require higher skills, are better paid and involve better work
(in terms of rights at work, working conditions, social-security provi-
sions and the promotion of social dialogue).
• Promote pro-poor and sustainable growth: The growth of medium-sized
companies is labour-intensive and generates above-average income for
people from the lower and middle classes. Jobs created by medium-sized
companies are usually more stable than those in micro and small enter-
prises.
• Enhance productivity and economic diversification: Total factor produc-
tivity is associated with a higher share of medium-sized enterprises in
economic activity (Altenburg / Eckhardt 2006). This is probably because
medium-sized enterprises are flexible and active and willing to invest in
research and development (R&D), with all its ramifications for knowl-
edge accumulation, innovation and economic diversification. 
• Ease technology absorption: Medium-sized enterprises have greater
potential to absorb technologies than micro and small enterprises. 
• Reduce the current account deficit: Medium-sized enterprises may be
able to export their products, either through domestic brokers who con-
nect them with foreign buyers or by directly engaging with foreign part-
ners (Dessus / Suwa-Eisenmann 1998).
• Establish resilience to cyclical fluctuations: More medium-sized enter-
prises would help make Egypt more resilient to the effects of interna-
tional crises because medium-sized companies generally suffer less from
external shocks than small enterprises.
3.5 The SME sector  
Egypt’s very large SME sector is heavily skewed towards small and very
small companies – and in Egypt, the terms ‘small’ and ‘medium’ indicate
much smaller sizes than in industrialised countries. In Egypt, just 1.6 per
cent of all enterprises have more than 10 employees. Only 0.2 per cent have
more than 50 employees – compared with 0.6 per cent in Turkey and 0.7 per
cent in Jordan. Although several government programmes were launched in
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the last decade to provide business development services (BDSs) to SME
owners and thereby promote their upgrading, the number of medium-sized
companies has not substantially increased. The middle is still missing.
3.5.1 Definition of SMEs  
In Egypt, various criteria are used to distinguish between ‘micro’, ‘small’
and ‘medium’ enterprises. No official standard definition exists.23
In this study, we apply the criteria for defining SMEs that are used by the
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), Egypt’s
central authority for statistics, because they are most common. Since it uses
only the number of employees, the definition is unequivocal and easy to
apply: 
• ‘Micro’ enterprises are individuals or business entities with 1 to 4 em-
ployees,
• ‘Small’ enterprises are business entities with 5 to 49 employees,
• ‘Medium’ enterprises are business entities with 50 to 99 employees, and
• ‘Large’ enterprises are business entities with 100 employees or more.24
In terms of ceilings for staff headcount, this definition differs only slightly
from the definition for ‘micro’ and ‘small’ enterprises in the Egyptian Small
Enterprise Development Law of 2004, which defines micro and small but
not medium-sized companies.25
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23 Interviews with Jennifer Bremer, American University in Cairo, Giza, 14 February 2012
and Mohamed Zakaria, Egyptian Banking Institute, Cairo, 21 February 2012.
24 The upper and lower thresholds of this definition of SMEs are in line with the criteria used
in the studies simultaneously conducted in India by Caroline Reeg and the Philippines by
Aimée Hampel-Milagrosa.
25 Articles 1 and 2 of ‘Law141/2004’ define micro enterprises as every individual undertak-
ing or business entity engaged in economic, productive, service or commercial activities
with: (1) less than 50,000 Egyptian Pounds (EGP) capital paid and (2) below 5 employ-
ees up to 10 employees. Small enterprises are defined as every individual undertaking or
business entity with: (1) between EGP 50,000 and EGP 1 million capital paid and (2) up
to 50 employees.
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Other SME definitions26 include additional indicators such as a firm’s
turnover or assets. The use of more than one indicator helps create a more
comprehensive and accurate picture, while the use of a single indicator can
be misleading because the labour intensity of production differs substan-
tially between economic sectors. However, a single indicator does help to
compare firms.
3.5.2 Characteristics of the SME sector 
Although Egypt is estimated to have 4.3 million formal and informal SMEs,
most of them are micro or small. According to CAPMAS (2006), micro and
small enterprises account for 99 per cent of all enterprises, 80 per cent of
total employment and 75 per cent of the national value added, with micro
enterprises accounting for 92 per cent of all enterprises and 58 per cent of
total employment (see Table 1) but only 29 per cent of domestic sales and
just 4 per cent of industrial exports (El-Megharbel 2008, 4). According to
El-Hawary (2007), between 1998 and 2006 the number of micro and small
enterprises grew annually by about 5 per cent, while their contribution to
total employment also increased (El-Hawary 2007, 68). By way of contrast,
in Europe (EU 27) micro enterprises account for only about 30 per cent of
total employment (Stevenson 2010, 83).
Micro and small enterprises (MSEs) are also the main source of employ-
ment generation. Between 1986 and 1996, they created about 1.4 million
new jobs, while medium-sized and large enterprises created only 200,000
new jobs (Court / Osborne 2006). 
Most MSEs belong to the tertiary sector with 66 per cent of them in trade
and 20 per cent in services. Only 14 per cent belong to the manufacturing
or construction sector (Stevenson 2010; Court / Osborne 2006). Here, they
contribute, in particular, to the production of food, leather, wood, paper,
rubber, metal and electronic products (El-Megharbel 2008, Table 3).
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
26 For example: In order for a company to be listed on the Nile Stock Exchange (NILEX),
the Egyptian stock exchange market for SMEs, its paid in capital must not exceed EGP
25 million. No differentiation is made between small and medium-sized enterprises.
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Most micro enterprises are informal, while most small and medium-sized
enterprises are formal. Generally, the bigger a firm is the less likely it is to
be informal. Hardly any large companies are informal (El-Hawary 2007, 73).
The phenomenon of the ‘missing middle’ is also illustrated in individual
economic sectors. Figure 4 displays data on the distribution of both public
and private formal-sector firms in two of the three sectors of this study –
food-processing and textiles and garments – in the categories of micro and
small, medium-sized and large companies. The U-shape distribution illus-
trates the dearth of medium-sized companies. Unfortunately, no corre-
sponding data are available for the information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) sector.
The U-shaped distribution of firm size is a characteristic of the ‘missing
middle’ phenomenon. It is particularly evident in the textiles and garments
sector, while food-processing is characterised by a left-skewed distribution
that indicates the huge predominance of micro to small enterprises in the
sector. Of the 3.4 per cent (middle category) share in food-processing firms
with between 50 and 99 employees, the public-sector share is 0.5 per cent;
of the 9.3 per cent (middle category) share in textiles and garments, the
public-sector share is 0.1 per cent; public-sector enterprises have always
been large.
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Table 1: Distribution of formal private-sector enterprises and share 
of nation-wide employment 
Category Size Contribution 
to total  
employment 
Share of all 
enterprises 
Micro enterprises 1–4 employees 58% 91.91% 
Small enterprises 5–49 employees 22%  7.82% 
Medium enterprises 50–99 employees 3%  0.13% 
Large enterprises 100 employees  
or more 
17%  0.14% 
Source: CAPMAS (2006) 
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The problem of the ‘missing middle’ is linked to the failure of Egypt’s pol-
icy-makers and governments to effectively support SME upgrading. The
state’s efforts to foster large-scale private economic activities were much
more obvious and effective than its support for the SME sector. Until the late
1990s state policies favoured big business, relying on a few large, mostly
public, firms to increase exports and create jobs, while state efforts to pro-
mote the SME sector were smaller in scope and less efficient (Court /
Osborne 2006). Nihal El-Megharbel, Director of the Decentralization Sup-
port Unit at the Ministry for Local Development commented: 
“In the past, governmental efforts had a focus on large companies. The
large companies were supposed to directly create employment and in the
long run take the SMEs along. However, the SME sector never ‘took off’.”
(Nihal El-Megharbel, Ministry for Local Development, 19 February 2012)
The Nazif cabinet under Mubarak boosted several private-sector develop-
ment programmes. However, many of these adopted a piecemeal approach
that focused on just one category of enterprises. The individual pro-
grammes were poorly coordinated and lacked follow-up mechanisms to
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Figure 4: Distribution by size of formal-sector firms in food-
processing and textiles and garments sectors in Egypt 
 
  
Source: CAPMAS (2008); CAPMAS (2009) 
 
: i t i ution by size of formal-sector firms in food-
cessing and textiles and garments sectors in Egypt
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monitor the upgrading of enterprises from one category to another – micro
to small, small to medium, and medium to large. The three most prominent
governmental BDS institutions were the Social Fund for Development
(SFD), the Industrial Modernisation Centre (IMC) and the General Author-
ity for Investment and Trade Zones (GAFI) (see Section 5.2.4).
4 Research methodology
The obvious question arises: Why does the ‘missing middle’ persist in
Egypt? Which factors explain why only a limited number of micro and
small companies in Egypt are able to upgrade and become medium or
large? Why are some able to upgrade while others are not? 
Although the literature on small and medium enterprise (SME) develop-
ment in Egypt does not adequately answer these questions, it does contain
some evidence about the factors that enable SMEs to upgrade, and shows
that most of the factors discussed in Chapter 2 are relevant. But it does not
prioritise the factors.
In light of this, we adopted a different approach: Which are the most signif-
icant – the most important – factors for SME upgrading in Egypt? This
approach is new, at least for Egypt.
Our research approach takes both macro- and micro-perspectives on SME
upgrading.
• The macro-perspective asks: What factors explain why upgrading seems
to be particularly difficult for SMEs in Egypt?
• The micro-perspective asks: Which factors explain why some SMEs are 
better able than others to upgrade – despite the common difficulties?
Most empirical research that has been conducted on SME upgrading has
focused on either the micro- or the macro-perspective and therefore em-
phasised either the importance of the business environment or the impor-
tance of the entrepreneur and firm characteristics. We sought to compare
both sets of factors and to shed light on their interactions.
The third novelty of our research approach is that it uses a broad combina-
tion of qualitative and quantitative research tools: (i) an analysis of econ-
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ometric panel data, (ii) a semi-standardised SME survey and (iii) semi-
structured interviews with SME experts in Egypt.
The rest is fairly standard: We focused on three economic sectors and five
Egyptian governorates, which account for about half of the Egyptian SME
sector.
Our methodology was designed in close coordination with the two research
projects that DIE was running simultaneously on SME upgrading in India
and the Philippines (Reeg 2013a; Hampel-Milagrosa 2013).
In the rest of this chapter, we formulate our research hypotheses (4.1), ex-
plain how we selected the sectors (4.3) and describe our research tools (4.3).
4.1 Research hypotheses  
To guide our research, we formulated a number of research hypotheses that
are based on assertions about the factors important for SME upgrading that
are made in the conceptual and empirical literature (see Chapter 2). Each
hypothesis refers to one factor that could explain differences in SMEs’ ease
in upgrading.
However, since the various strands of literature suggest so many factors for
differences in SME upgrading, we came up a large number of hypotheses,
each referring to one factor. Rather than list all of them, we grouped the
hypotheses into four broad bundles containing the hypotheses that are
related to: (i) enterprise characteristics, (ii) firm characteristics, (iii) inter-
firm linkages and (iv) business environment (see Figure 2).
Since each factor can explain differences regarding the ease of upgrading
for companies in Egypt (the micro-perspective highlighting individual fac-
tors) or general trends in Egypt (the macro-perspective highlighting struc-
tural factors) – or both – all four bundles of hypotheses (BoH) have both a
micro-level dimension (a) and a macro-level dimension (b):
BoH 1: Individual entrepreneur characteristics (such as education, motiva-
tion, gender, etc.) are the main determinants for the probability of SMEs to
upgrade.
• BoH 1a: Individual entrepreneur characteristics best explain the differ-
ences in the ease with which various Egyptian SMEs are able to upgrade
(the micro-level).
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• BoH 1b: The accumulation of specific individual entrepreneur charac-
teristics in Egypt (e.g. the average educational level of SME owners in
Egypt) best explains the propensity of SMEs throughout the country to
upgrade (the macro-level).
BoH 2: Firm characteristics (such as firm size, location, informality, etc.)
are the main determinants for the probability of SMEs to upgrade.
• BoH 2a: Firm characteristics best explain the differences in the ease with
which various Egyptian SMEs are able to upgrade (the micro-level). 
• BoH 2b: The accumulation of specific firm characteristics in Egypt (e.g.
the size of the informal sector in Egypt) best explains the propensity of
SMEs throughout the country to upgrade (the macro-level).
BoH 3: The degree of integration of SMEs into inter-firm linkages (such as
global value chains (GVCs) or clusters) is the main determinant of the prob-
ability that they will upgrade.
• BoH 3a: The degree of integration of individual SMEs into inter-firm
linkages best explains differences in the ease with which various Egypt-
ian SMEs are able to upgrade (the micro-level).
• BoH 3b: The spread of inter-firm linkages in Egypt (e.g. the occurrence
of business clusters in Egypt) best explains the propensity of SMEs
throughout the country to upgrade (the macro-level).
BoH 4: The business environment contains the main determinants for the
probability of SMEs to upgrade (the degree of regulation, the prevalence of
corruption, etc.).
• BoH 4b: The business environment in Egypt best explains the propen-
sity of SMEs throughout the country to upgrade (the macro-level).
• BoH 4a: Elements of the business environment best explain the differ-
ences in the ease with which various Egyptian SMEs are able to upgrade
(the micro-level).
(Explanation: Some elements of the business environment differ between
regions, sectors, enterprise- size category, etc. Others are similar for all
SMEs in a country but cause problems that some SME owners can solve
or circumvent more easily than others – for example, because they have
higher financial reserves or better personal connections.)
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4.2 Sector selection   
In order to ensure the most concrete results possible, we focused our re-
search on three sectors of the Egyptian economy and, within each of them,
on only one or two sub-sectors. This was necessary to more easily compare
the results of the interviews regarding SMEs that had successfully upgraded
with those that have not (yet) upgraded and are still small (see Section 4.3).
It would have made no sense to combine information generated from inter-
views referring to completely different sub-sectors because differences
regarding SME upgrading are more likely to be due to differences between
the framework conditions of these sectors than to differences between the
explanatory (independent) variables of SME upgrading processes.
At the same time, however, we recognised that the determinants of SME
upgrading could vary between sectors. We wanted to ensure our ability to
estimate the degree to which our results were valid for not just one or two
of our selected sub-sectors but also for other sectors of the Egyptian econ-
omy. In order to represent a broad range of the Egyptian economy, we se-
lected three sectors that are as different as possible in terms of products
(merchandise goods vs. services) and historical timeframe (traditional vs.
new sectors).
The sectors had to fulfil three criteria in order to fit into our research:
(i) The sector had to include a significant share of SMEs: Only in sectors
with a significant share of SMEs could we possibly find enough evi-
dence to support or refute our research hypotheses.
(ii) The sector had to contribute a significant share to gross domestic
product (GDP) or display high growth potential: Only sectors that
contribute a large share to Egypt’s GDP or enjoy high growth rates
were relevant to our research. SMEs that manage to upgrade in these
sectors could meaningfully address economic problems such as high
unemployment and the high balance of trade deficit.
(iii) The sector had to display opportunities for SMEs to integrate into
GVCs: This criterion allowed us to compare SMEs integrated into a
global value chain (GVC) with those that are not so as to discover
whether such integration affects upgrading. Had we only studied sec-
tors that do not display opportunities for SMEs to integrate into a
GVC, we would not have been able to find any counterfactuals (inte-
grated SMEs) to those companies that are not integrated. 
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On the basis of these criteria, we selected two well-established manufactur-
ing sectors –food-processing and textiles and garments – and one recently
emerging service sector, the information and communications technology
(ICT) sector.
4.2.1 The food-processing sector
The food-processing sector has high potential for development since the
relatively high cost of imports creates no serious competition for domestic
products. Exports to Sub-Saharan Africa, other countries in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) or in Asia are increasing.27
The food sector as a whole has suffered much less than other sectors from
the Egyptian economy’s post-revolution downturn – perhaps because the
domestic demand for food is relatively inelastic with regard to changes in
income and prices compared with the demand for other commodities (e.g.
textiles and garments). In addition, many producers were able to counter-
balance the decrease in domestic demand for their products by expanding
their exports.28
At the same time, however, we realised that SMEs in the food sector face
numerous challenges that producers in other sectors do not have at all, or to
a smaller degree. Many regulations apply only to food-sector producers, as
well as high health and safety standards and the need to renew licences and
health certificates on a regular basis. Food also requires special storage,
cooling and transportation facilities.
The food-processing sector fulfils our three selection criteria:
(i) The sector had to comprise a significant share of SMEs:
The Egyptian food industry is characterised by a dual market structure. Few
large firms produce a wide range of products for the local and export mar-
kets, while some 87 per cent of all formal-sector food-processing is by
small or medium-sized enterprises, which focus on regional and local mar-
kets (IMC 2005).
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27 Interview with Mohamed Abo Elwafa, United States Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID), New Maadi, 21 February 2012.
28 Interview with Khalil Nasrallah, Wadi Food, Giza, 27 February 2012.
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(ii) The sector had to contribute a significant share to GDP or display high
growth potential:
Egypt’s food-processing sector is the second largest industry – after tex-
tiles and garments. The formal food-processing sector is estimated to have
4,700 registered establishments with a total of 250,000 employees. The for-
mal sector alone generates 31 million Egyptian Pounds (EGP) annually (8
per cent of GDP), about 25 per cent of Egypt’s total industrial manufactur-
ing output. The total market size (both formal and informal) is estimated at
EGP 155 million (Coface 2011). Local demand continues to grow because
of steady population growth and increasing demand for convenience foods,
pre-cooked meals, snack foods and confectionery (El Araby / Irgens 2005).
In 2009, food accounted for 38 per cent of domestic consumption; annual
retail sales of domestic food grew by an average 19 per cent between 2006
and 2010 (OBG 2012, 129). Because of the low income-elasticity of
demand for food items, the sector has not been severely impacted by
Egypt’s post-revolution economic downturn.
(iii) The sector had to display opportunities for SMEs to integrate into
GVCs:
Egypt’s location has many potential advantages for food processing includ-
ing very good agro-climatic conditions, low labour costs, increasing avail-
ability of skilled labour, and proximity to Europe and the Gulf. However,
the small-, cottage- and micro-scale food-processing sectors underperform
and little has been done to increase their competitiveness, so that their
export performance is negligible. Its successful expansion depends on
improved product quality and the implementation of current standards (El
Araby / Irgens 2005).
We focused on two sub-sectors of the food-processing sector:
• Vegetable processing (according to the International Standard Industrial
Classification: the processing and preserving of fruits and vegetables,
including vegetable oil such as olive oil) (UNSTATS 2012), and 
• Sweets and cookies (according to the International Standard Industrial
Classification: the manufacturing of cocoa, chocolate, and sugar con-
fectionary, which includes among others biscuits from bakeries)
(UNSTATS 2012).
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We focus on these sub-sectors because they have a substantial export po-
tential and a high concentration of SMEs.29
4.2.2 The textiles and garments sector
Of the many sub-sectors in the Egyptian textiles and garments sector, we
chose the ready-made garments, which fulfils our criteria in contrast to
some of the other sub-sectors:
(i) The sector had to comprise a significant share of SMEs:
Whereas the spinning, weaving and dying industries are comparatively cap-
ital-intensive and thus are dominated by medium-sized and large com-
panies (GAFI 2010), there are many more small companies in the ready-
made garments industry. This is because this sector requires less expensive
machinery and is therefore much less capital-intensive. Around 76 per cent
of all enterprises in the textiles and garments sector are micro, small or
medium-sized enterprises (CAPMAS 2009). In 2005, they accounted for 42
per cent of the production of textiles in Egypt and for 43 per cent of their
export – but only for 24 per cent of the production of ready-made garments
and 23 per cent of their exports (El-Megharbel 2008, Table 3).
(ii) The sector had to contribute a significant share to GDP or display
high growth potential:
The textiles and garments sector is a key element of Egypt’s economy. In
2008, it accounted for 30 per cent of local employment. In 2009, it ac-
counted for 3 per cent of GDP, 27 per cent of total industrial output and 14
per cent of all non-petroleum exports. Furthermore, it accounted for 30 per
cent of local employment in 2008. In 2010, it had 3,243 registered compa-
nies (OBG 2012, 118). The 2004 termination of the multi-fibre agreement,
which ensured textiles producers in developing countries preferential access
to markets in industrialised countries, had hurt Egypt’s textiles and gar-
ments industry because competitors in China and other Asian countries
were able to produce more cheaply. The Egyptian textiles and garments
industry was then rescued by several free-trade agreements, notably one
with the US and Israel, which gives Egyptian products free access to the US
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market provided that they have been produced in a ‘Qualifying Industrial
Zone’ (QIZ) and at least 37.5 per cent of the final consumer price was added
by the input of goods from Israel. This agreement has convinced Turkish
garments producers to also move to QIZs in Egypt in order to benefit from
the cheaper local labour and free access to the US market.
Egypt’s textiles and garments sector greatly benefits from endogenous ad-
vantages such as the high quality and moderate price of locally grown cot-
ton, cheap power supply, low labour costs and the proximity to European
markets. Egyptian cotton costs the same as that from China and India and
only slightly higher than Turkish cotton – but it is much higher quality. At
the same time the cost of Egyptian labour is comparable Chinese, lower
than Indian and much lower than Italian or Turkish (OBG 2012, 118).
Egyptian labour productivity is admittedly much lower than in these coun-
tries – which means that in spite of very high rates of unemployment and
underemployment, unit labour costs are still very high (Kheir el-Din 2005,
xvii). More significantly, perhaps, the Egyptian textiles and garments in-
dustry has embarked on down-stream operations – all the way from cotton
farming to high-end ready-made garments and upholstered furniture with
ample capacities and expertise on all stages of the value chain. 
The ready-made garments industry is the largest sub-sector – 75 per cent –
of the Egyptian textiles and garments industry (GAFI 2010).
(iii) The sector had to display opportunities for SMEs to integrate into GVCs:
In general, the growth rates for textiles exports are very high. The main
markets for the Egyptian textiles and garments sector are Arab countries; in
2008 exports grew by 38 per cent (GAFI 2010). Principally companies
operating within QIZs30 have been able to sustain their business through
export orders,31 while other companies were hit by the recession and the
revolution. When export orders are urgent, companies in QIZs can always
outsource sewing and assembly to SMEs, which suggests that SME owners
may have less difficulties in this sector than in other sectors to build link-
ages to other large firms and thus integrate into GVCs.
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
30 ‘Qualifying Industrial Zones’ or ‘QIZs’ are designated areas that benefit from a duty-free 
status with the United States, provided that they satisfy the Israeli component stipulated 
in the rules of origin (MFTI 2012).
31 Interview with Ahmed El Genedy, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 27 February 2012.
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4.2.3 The information and communications technology
(ICT) sector
We added the ICT sector to the food-processing and textiles and garments
sector as our third research focus so as to have a modern service sector
alongside two manufacturing sectors. 
Within the ICT sector we focused on software producers because it is the
only sub-sector that fulfils all three criteria:
(i) The sector had to comprise a significant share of SMEs:
The share of SMEs in the ICT sector is relatively high: only 6 per cent of
all companies are large while 94 per cent are micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises. However, the relative concentration differs considerably
between the sub-sectors. In the telecommunications, internet provision, call
centres and hardware-assembly sub-sectors, the share of SMEs is particu-
larly low, while it is much higher in the software production and ICT serv-
ice and maintenance industry sub-sectors.32
(ii) The sector had to contribute a significant share to GDP or display
high growth potential:
Since the beginning of the new millennium, the ICT sector has been one of
the most quickly growing industries in Egypt, with its growth rate exceed-
ing 20 per cent annually between 2003 and 2008. Thereby, its contribution
to the country’s total GDP more than to almost 4 per cent in 2008 (Helmy
2009). Although software production contributes only a minor share to
value added in the entire ICT sector, it is growing at similarly high rates.
(iii) The sector had to display opportunities for SMEs to integrate into
GVCs:
Egypt has become one of the leading developing economies in the trade of
ICT goods and services. The UNCTAD Information Economy Report
2007–2008 ranked Egypt 40th of the top-50 exporters of ICT-enabled ser-
vices between 1996 and 2005, with an ICT-enabled- services export value
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of USD 2.3 billion in 2006. In 2006, the per capita volume of Egypt’s ICT
service exports surpassed those of Indonesia, China and Brazil. In 2008, the
National Outsourcing Association in London named Egypt the “Outsourc-
ing Destination of the Year”, which shows that Egypt’s competitive work-
force and location are making it a competitive international location for off-
shore ICT services (Helmy 2009).
4.3 Research design   
We used a predominantly qualitative approach to answer our research
questions because our preferred tool – an econometric analysis of panel
data taken from two rounds of enterprise surveys – could not provide the
necessary data.
First we ran an econometric analysis of panel data that was provided by
two rounds of the Egyptian Investment Climate Survey (EICS) con-
ducted in 2004 and 2008 by the American University in Cairo (AUC),
funded by the Enterprise Survey Unit of the International Finance Cor-
poration (IFC) and the World Bank. Each round covered about 1,000
companies that were representative of the formal firms in Egypt’s manu-
facturing sector.
However, the utility of this approach was limited for four reasons: First,
the EICS only provided information regarding a limited number of pos-
sible factors in SME upgrading such as: (i) the existence of a specialised
research and development (R&D) department, (ii) workers’ training
level, (iii) company location, (iv) company export orientation, (v)
owner’s educational background and (vi) owner’s gender. Many other
factors – such as the owner’s social networks and behavioural character-
istics, the degree to which the company was integrated into clusters or
GVCs and the amount of market competition – were not investigated.
Second, the EICS covers only formal-sector firms, while most SMEs in
Egypt are informal. Third, the data were from 2004 and 2008. Fourth,
SMEs frequently change their identities, which makes it difficult to trace
developments over a four-year period.
For these reasons we chose to use the results of the econometric analysis
just to triangulate the results of our own enterprise survey, which became
our main research tool. It covered 102 SMEs in the food-processing, tex-
tiles and garments, and software sectors in five governorates, out of
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which we could however fully use only 80. The interviews that were con-
ducted during a three-month research trip to Egypt (February to April
2012) were analysed using both quantitative and qualitative techniques.
In the interviews, we applied a two-step technique that Liedholm and
Mead (1991, 21) called the ‘bore hole survey’. First we asked SME own-
ers about the firm’s current position and problems, and then we explored
the firm’s history to identify factors for its recent progress or lack
thereof.
This approach allowed us: (i) to identify causalities rather than just cor-
relations; (ii) to detect unidentified variables (i.e. explanatory factors
that had not yet been considered in literature); (iii) to study soft vari-
ables, such as risk aversion, in the same way as hard variables, such as
access to electricity; and (iv) to determine if only a combination of inde-
pendent variables affected the dependent variable (SME upgrading).
These effects would have been difficult to achieve with quantitative
research techniques.
As a third research tool, we conducted semi-structured interviews with
experts on SME development in Egypt from the government, the private
sector, academia, civil society, the financial sector and development co-
operation.
Starting in November 2011 in Bonn, Germany, we prepared our research
mission to Egypt, where from 12 February until 28 April 2012, we con-
ducted on-site empirical research. We started to interview the experts in
Weeks I and II and continued with our enterprise survey during Weeks III
to VII (see Table 2). In Week VIII, we analysed the data from the inter-
views and then during Weeks IX and X we drafted a preliminary report,
which was presented for discussion with various SME experts at the
Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES) in Cairo in Week XI. We
referred to the comments made about our preliminary report to rewrite
and finalise the report that we presented at DIE in Bonn on 24 May and
28 November 2012.
Markus Loewe et al.
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4.3.1 Analysis of panel data from the Egypt Investment
Climate Surveys 2004 and 2008
The results of our econometric analysis are based on an average of 600 firm
cases (the exact number differs somewhat between the various regressions
built on different models). The EICS contains data on about 1,000 firms in
each round, but we could only analyse the cases for which panel data are
actually available, and almost 300 cases from 2004 had to be replaced by
new cases in the 2008 round for various reasons. Another 100 cases could
not be used because data was not available for either dependent or inde-
pendent variables in one of the rounds.
The EICS panel data had already been used by Stone and Badawy (2010)
to run logistic regressions to explain SME development in Egypt by means
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Table 2: Distribution of formal private-sector enterprises and share 
of nation-wide employment 
Week: I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI 
Interviews 
with experts 
on SME  
development: 
           
Interviews 
with non-up-
grading SMEs: 
           
Interviews 
with upgrad-
ing SMEs: 
           
Data  
analysis:            
Report  
drafting:            
Presentation 
and discussion 
of results: 
           
 
Timeline f research mission to Egypt
(February–April 2012)
ble 2: Timeline of research ission to Egyp
(February–April 2012)
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of different independent variables (mainly firm characteristics).33 However,
Stone and Badawy’s dependent variable was firm growth that was gen-
erated by innovation, market forces or other reasons. We wanted to look at
the factors for upgrading and so focused on firm growth that was due
to innovation.
We generated a new ‘upgrader’ variable for the dependent variable in our
regressions. It is a dummy variable, which is ‘1’ only for firms that were
both ‘innovative’ and grew in terms of their number of employees by at least
40 per cent (‘upgrader’) – respectively more than 80 per cent (‘gazelle’)
(depending on the model) – between 2004 and 2008. In order to cover as
many different trajectories of innovation as possible (see Section 2.1), we
termed a company ‘innovative’ if it fulfilled at least one of the following
five criteria: (i) began a new major production activity, (ii) upgraded an
existing product line in the factory, (iii) obtained a new licensing agree-
ment, (iv) outsourced a major production activity, or (v) received an inter-
nationally recognised quality certificate. Meanwhile, the two thresholds
used to define firm growth were in line with the thresholds that we later
used in our own enterprise survey (growth by 50 – respectively 100 – per
cent – within five years, i.e. both times about 10 per cent respectively 20 per
cent annually).
The EICS dataset contains panel data for 695 enterprises. Of these, be-
tween 2004 and 2008 232 had introduced some of the innovations34 de-
scribed above. Of this group, 69 grew by at least 20 per cent in terms of
number of employees (which is equal to 10 per cent of all enterprises with
panel data), 47 grew by at least 40 per cent (‘upgraders’: 7 per cent of all
enterprises with panel data), and 30 grew by at least 80 per cent (‘gazelles’:
4 per cent of all enterprises with panel data).
Markus Loewe et al.
33 According to Stone and Badawy (2010), Egyptian SMEs in the manufacturing sector that 
grew by at least 20 per cent annually between 2004 and 2008 tended to: (i) have trained 
employees, (ii) use e-mail, (iii) be less than 10 years old, (iv) have frequent inspections 
by the public administration, (v) experience few power cuts, and (vi) employ foreign-
licensed technology.
34 Of the 232 innovators, 63 per cent had upgraded an existing product line, 46 per cent had
built up a major new production activity, 37 per cent had received a new licensing agree-
ment, 9 per cent had outsourced a major production activity and 2 per cent had received
an internationally recognised quality certificate (double counting was allowed).
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Since our dependent variable was binary, we used logit models with entre-
preneur and firm characteristics as independent variables (see Table 3). In
order to control for reverse causality, we just used data from 2004 for our
independent variable, and the variations in numbers of employees between
2004 and 2008 for the growth component of our dependent dummy varia-
ble. The complete results of the estimations are displayed in Annex C.
The results of the logit estimations revealed that the following factors in-
fluence SME upgrading in Egypt (see Tables C1–C4 in Annex):
Knowledge and innovation management: The estimations showed that the
existence of a specialised R&D department has a positive effect on the up-
grading potential of manufacturing SMEs in Egypt. Most regressions de-
livered high positive coefficients and a significance at the 5 per cent level
(meaning that the probability that the high positive correlation was due to
coincidence was lower than 5 per cent) (see Table C1 in Annex).
Training of workers:Worker training also seemed to play a positive role. In
most of the logit model specifications, we found a positive correlation of
our dependent variable with the training index variable, which was signifi-
cant at the 5 per cent level (see Table C1 in Annex).
Export orientation: Estimations further showed that Egyptian manufactur-
ing SMEs were more likely to upgrade if they exported a large share of their
products. The ‘domestic sales’ variable showed a negative correlation in all
model specifications, which for most of them was significant at the 1 per
cent level (see Table C1 in Annex). It is improbable that this resulted from
reverse causality because we generated our independent variables from the
EICS data from 2004, the year before any possible upgrading.
Location: The results of the logit estimations showed that the likelihood of
SMEs upgrading is highest in the governorates of Sharqiyya and Al-Minya,
followed by Minufiyya and Gharbiyya (with Cairo as the reference category).
The correlation with upgrading of the dummy variables ‘Sharqiyya’ and ‘Al-
Minya’ turned out to be significant through all specifications, while the cor-
relation of ‘Minufiyya’ and ‘Gharbiyya’ were only significant for the 40-per
cent-growth threshold – which means that location in these governorates
increased the chances of being an upgrader, while location showed no clear
effect on becoming a gazelle (see Table C2 in Annex). This result is in line
with the descriptive statistics: In the EICS study, the relative share of
upgraders was highest in Al-Minya, Sharqiyya, Gharbiyya and Minufiyya and
below average in Alexandria, Dakhiliyya, Bahaira and Cairo.
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70 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
Table 3: Description of variables in analysis of EICS panel data  
(logit estimations) 
Dependent variables 
Upgrader Dummy variable: 1 if the company grew by at least 
40% over the previous four years and introduced at 
least one type of innovation; 0 otherwise 
Gazelle Dummy variable: 1 if the company grew by at least 
80% over the previous four years and introduced at 
least one type of innovation; 0 otherwise 
Independent variables 
Entrepreneur characteristics 
Manager’s education Level of education  
Female owner Dummy variable: 1 if principal owner female; 0 
otherwise 
Firm characteristics  
Size Total number of employees in 2004 
Domestic sales Per cent of domestic sales 
Training index Dummy variable: 1 if training available; 0 otherwise 
Specialized R&D  
department 
Dummy variable: 1 if had R&D department;  
0 otherwise 
Used foreign technology Dummy variable: 1 if company used technology 
licensed from foreign company; 0 otherwise 
Industrial zone Dummy variable: 1 if located in industrial zone 
Single shareholder Per cent of firm owned by the single largest  
shareholder or owner 
External finance Dummy variable: 1 if company had a loan at the 
time; 0 otherwise 
Insurance Dummy variable: 1 if company had an insurance 
contract at the time 
Location Dummy variables for one of the 12 governorates in 
study; ‘Greater Cairo’ is the reference category 
Sector Dummy variables for dairy, finance, textiles and 
garments, and other; meat is the reference category 
able 3: Description of vari bles in analysis of EICS panel d ta
(logit estimations)
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The results of the econometric estimations from the EICS panel data revealed
that location in an industrial zone increased the likelihood of being a gazelle,
but not necessarily the likelihood of being an upgrader. The coefficients for the
respective independent variables were positive in all models, but this result was
only significant (at the 5 per cent level) in the model that used the 80 per cent
threshold (Table C1 in Annex). An industrial zone location has several advan-
tages that are discussed under the heading ‘access to land’ in Section 5.2.4.
Sector: The results of the econometric estimations using the EICS panel data
also showed that SMEs in the textiles and garments sector were less likely to
upgrade between 2004 and 2008 than those in the other sectors. The coefficient
for the respective independent variable was negative; this result was significant
at the 10 per cent level (Table C3 in Annex). The results for the dairy sub-sector
were not significant. Unfortunately, the EICS did not cover companies from the
software or the food-processing sectors (besides the dairy and meat sub-sectors). 
Business environment:With two exceptions, analysis of the EICS data did not
display significant results on the upgrading of SMEs for factors related to the
business environment. However, firms that considered ‘business licensing’ or
‘macro-instability’ to be their main challenges in the business environment
had an above-average likelihood to upgrade. These results were significant at
the 5 and 10 per cent levels, the reference being firms that mainly suffered
from problems with the tax system (see Table C4 in Annex). One interpreta-
tion could be that firms with no challenges that were more serious than those
they faced in ‘business licensing’ or ‘macro-instability’ had fewer problems
than other firms. Put differently: The challenges regarding ‘business licensing’
and ‘macro-instability’ were less serious than other challenges in the business
environment – meaning that for SME owners in Egypt ‘business licensing’
and ‘macro-instability’ are not major issues.
The same exercise with probit models delivered very similar results.
We also ran an ordinary least square (OLS) regression using firm growth as
the dependent variable, and the same variables from the logit estimations as
independent variables. We ran OLS regressions separately for innovators and
non-innovators – again using firm growth as the dependent variable. This
exercise was intended to separate the direct effects of the independent vari-
ables on SME growth (measured by the OLS regression with only non-inno-
vators) from the indirect effects of the independent variables, that is, their
impact on innovation, which again allows for additional SME growth (mea-
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sured by the differences between the results of OLS regressions with innova-
tors and non-innovators). In this exercise, too, innovators were defined as the
companies in the EICS sample that fulfilled at least one of the five criteria that
we applied in the logit estimations: (i) had developed a major new production
activity, (ii) had upgraded an existing product line in the factory, (iii) had
obtained a new licensing agreement, (iv) had outsourced a major production
activity, or (v) had received an internationally recognised quality certificate. 
Unfortunately, the OLS regressions did not deliver significant results.
4.3.2 SME survey
The core element of our research was our survey of 102 SMEs in the three
sectors described in Section 4.2. The survey was restricted to five gover-
norates (Cairo, Giza, Gharbiyya, Qalyubiyya and Sharqiyya) for pragmatic
reasons (to reduce the transaction costs) as well as for reasons of comparabil-
ity. Comparability is easier when firms have similar local environments.
Most of our conclusions are based on the analysis of a smaller core sample of
80 enterprises that we generated from the full sample by excluding all the
companies that had more than 50 employees in 2007 (that year, 78 companies
had a maximum of 30 employees). Exactly half (40) of the companies in the
core sample were classified as ‘upgraders’ (they had introduced some kind of
innovation and grown by at least 50 per cent in the previous five years), while
the other half (40) were ‘non-upgraders’.
The interviews with upgrading and non-upgrading enterprises were intended to:
• Learn what the SME owners perceived to be the main determinants of
upgrading in Egypt – or the most important constraints and factors for
success;
• Find out about the main differences between upgraders and non-
upgraders in Egypt, in the hopes of identifying the main reasons why
some SMEs were able to upgrade while others were not; and
• Learn what kinds of support the SME owners believed would facilitate
the upgrading of their businesses.
Markus Loewe et al.
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Below we describe: (i) the selection of interview partners; (ii) the criteria
used, including the SME’s location and sector or the owner’s gender; (iii)
the structure of the owner interviews; (iv) the classification of an SME as
an ‘upgrader’ or ‘non-upgrader’; and (v) the analysis of the interview data.
Selecting the SMEs (sampling methodology)
The methods that we used to select SME owners for our interviews were
intended to create a sample that fulfils three criteria despite its limited size:
• It should be fairly representative of the distribution of firms across sectors
and locations, as well as the owner’s gender and educational level.
• It should include comparable numbers of upgraders and non-upgraders. 
• It should include upgraders and non-upgraders that, in 2007, were as sim-
ilar as possible – in terms of size, location, sector, owner’s gender, etc. –
in order to help identify the factors important for subsequent development.
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Figure 5: Selection methods for SME survey 
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For this purpose, we applied four different selection methods (see Figure 5
and Table A1 in Annex). Each selection strategy creates a different major or
minor bias in the sample, so combining different methods allowed us to
limit the effect of each bias on the total sample. 
The first method of selection was to randomly pick companies from repre-
sentative enterprise lists, such as the member list of the Egyptian Cham-
bers of Textile Industries as well as Food Industries or the official yellow
pages. In our sample, 23 of 102 companies were selected this way. This
method’s bias delivers mainly formalised companies. While all companies
are required to register with the chambers of industries and may register in
the yellow pages for almost nothing, only formal enterprises actually do.
Some owners may not list their companies in the yellow pages because they
are unaware of its benefit.
The second method of selection was to randomly choose companies from
lists that were less representative but had already been used by other re-
searchers.35 A total of 30 companies were selected in this way. We applied
this method for three reasons: first, it helped us make contact with some
informal companies; second, it allowed us to identify SMEs in the software
sub-sector, for which we had no chamber of industry member list; and third,
we realised how difficult it was to identify a sufficient number of SMEs
using the first method because many companies were listed with outdated
names, addresses and telephone numbers. However, since companies were
selected from non-representative lists, we defined an upper limit of six
companies to be taken from each of them.
We called the third method of selection ‘geographic screening’. To begin
with we looked for geographical accumulations of food-processing, tex-
tiles and garments, or software companies such as Tanta or Mahalla-al-
Kubra in the Gharbiyya governorate, or Shubra, Warraq and Imbaba in
Greater Cairo. Then we requested interviews with the owners of 19 local
SMEs – from the three sectors – that we happened to meet in the street. The
bias was limited because all owners agreed to talk with us. This method led,
Markus Loewe et al.
35 These included the database that the ECES uses for its barometer, the customer list of the 
Information Technology Industry Development Agency (ITIDA), local branch books and 
the list of participants at programmes organised by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Inter-
nationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 75
however, to some geographical bias, which is apparent in the distribution of
the companies across locations: 14 are located in Shubra and eight are
based in Tanta or Mahalla-al-Kubra (see Tables A2 and A3 in Annex). But
it helped us to locate many informal companies, as well as a number of
upgraders and non-upgraders that had been of similar size in the same place
and under comparable conditions five years earlier.
Our fourth method of selection was to ask experts on Egyptian SME devel-
opment to indicate interesting SMEs from different sectors: success stories,
such as SMEs that were micro or small (preferably with fewer than 30
employees) five years earlier and that had significantly grown since then, as
well as SMEs that had tried to grow but failed. We used this method to
ensure a sufficiently large number of upgraders in the sample. In the course
of our research, we realised that it was easier than anticipated to find suc-
cess stories in the company lists and by ‘geographical screening’. Never-
theless, the experts’ recommendations did contribute a considerable share of
the successful upgraders to our sample. The weakness of the method is that
it produces a comparatively strong bias in the sample because each expert
knows only specific types of SMEs. Therefore, we interviewed at most two
SME owners suggested by each expert and requested suggestions from as
wide a variety of experts as possible – from financial institutions (such as
NILEX), German development co-operation (GIZ), chambers of commerce
(e.g. the German Arab Chamber of Commerce), sector-specific training
centres (e.g. the Technical and Vocational Education and Training System –
TVET), governmental SME-promotion programmes (e.g. the Social Fund
for Development) and small enterprise-development associations. We also
asked leading firms in our focus sectors for the contact details of one or two
of their suppliers. In this way we selected 30 companies.
To be as representative as possible, we applied three rules: First, since each
selection method involves a certain bias, we counterbalanced this bias by
using four different selection methods. Second,we set upper thresholds for the
number of interview partners identified by each of the four selection methods.
Third, we made sure to counterbalance stark disequilibria in the main com-
position criteria such as gender, formal status, location, sector and size. We
were constantly on the lookout for women entrepreneurs and informal enter-
prises so as to have at least a minimal number of SME owners with these cri-
teria. We also made sure to include a certain number of SMEs from all three
sectors, as well as a certain number of companies from the five governorates.
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
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Sample composition
Although the sample was not representative of the entire SME sector in
Egypt, our focus on specific sectors and governorates made it compara-
tively well-balanced. It contains the various kinds of SMEs classified by
criteria such as the owner’s gender, formality status, size, etc.
Location: Because we focused on five governorates (Cairo, Giza, Ghar-
biyya, Qalyubiyya and Sharqiyya), our sample does not cover the entire
geographical range of SMEs in Egypt. It contains 46 SMEs from Cairo,36
19 from Giza,37 18 from Gharbiyya, 13 from Qalyubiyya and six from Shar-
qiyya (Figures 6 and 7). According to the Egyptian Banking Institute (EBI
2012b), 52 per cent of all Egyptian SMEs are located in these five gover-
norates (Table 4).
Sector:More than half of the SMEs in our sample were active in the textiles
and garments sector (46 produced clothes and seven produced textiles),
while 34 were active in the food-processing sector (sweets and cookies, 14;
processed vegetables, 7; other food, 13) and 14 were software producers
(Figure 8, Table A4 in Annex). More than 50 per cent of all Egyptian manu-
facturing SMEs are in these three sectors (see EBI 2012b, Table 4).
Formality:We classified the 13 companies that did not have tax identifica-
tion numbers as ‘informal’, and the remaining 89 as ‘formal’ (Table 4 and
Table A21 in Annex). Most experts in Egypt agreed that the tax identifica-
tion number was a useful criterion to distinguish between formal and infor-
mal companies.
Gender of company owner: In our core sample 15 companies (19 per cent)
were owned by women, while men owned 65 (81 per cent) (Table A5 in
Annex). The share of women owners of all SMEs in Egypt is only slightly
higher, at 20 per cent (IFC 2004–2008) (Table 4).
Owner’s educational level: According to the EICS panel data, most SME
owners in Egypt have a university degree (73 per cent) (IFC 2004–2008). In
our core sample, the respective share was slightly smaller (71 per cent) (see
Figure 9, Tables 4 and A18a in Annex).
Markus Loewe et al.
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37 Five companies from the Giza Governorate are located in the 6th of October City.
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Innovation: In our sample, the most common innovation was the introduc-
tion of new products (39 per cent of all companies), followed by the im-
provement of a product (38 per cent). The production process had been
improved by 15 per cent of the companies, 10 per cent had changed their
labelling or packaging, and 6 per cent had entered new domestic and 6 per
cent new foreign markets (Figure 10 and Table A9). These results are similar
to the EICS panel data. In the EICS sample, the most frequent innovations
were upgrading an existing product (146 cases) and introducing a new prod-
uct (107 cases) – followed by the purchase of a new licence (86 cases), the
outsourcing of major production activities (21 cases) and the receipt of an
internationally recognised quality certificate (four cases) (IFC 2004–2008).
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Table 4: Representativeness of sample 
Characteristics Our sample Country level 
Sectors Food-processing, textiles 
& garments, software 
development  
Food-processing and textiles & 
garments account for 52% of all 
manufacturing SMEs in Egypt 
Location Five governorates:  
Cairo, Giza, Sharqiyya, 
Qalyubiyya, Gharbiyya 
52% of all Egyptian SMEs are 
located in these governorates 
Education 71% of company owners 
have a  university degree 
73% of company owners have 
a university degree 
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Gender 19% female  
entrepreneurs 
20% female entrepreneurs 
Source: Tables A9 and A18a in Annex; EIB (2012);, EICS panel data (2004–2008) 
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Figure 8: Distribution of companies interviewed – by economic sector 
 
     
 Figure 9: Distribution of companies interviewed – by owner’s  educational level 
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Interview structure
Our interviews with SMEs were semi-structured with five elements (guide-
lines in Annex B): 
The first element consisted of questions that allowed us to classify the in-
terviewee as an ‘upgrader’ or a ‘non-upgrader’. The questions focused on
the company’s start-up phase and development in terms of quantitative
growth (e.g. employment and sales figures) and qualitative growth (e.g.
innovation within the company) – in line with the philosophy of the bore-
hole survey methodology developed by Liedholm and Mead (1991, 21).
The second element included open questions about what the interviewee
considered to be the major constraints of and factors in Egyptian SMEs’
successful upgrading. We also used these open questions to capture ex-
planatory factors that had not occurred to us.
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Figure 10: Types of company innovations 
 
Note: Multiple innovations were acceptable 
Source:   Table A9 in Annex 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Product innovation:
New product: 28
Improved product: 27
Reduction in number of products: 1
Process innovation:
Improved process: 13
Marketing innovation:
New export market:7
Other new market: 5
New labelling or packaging: 7
New marketing strategy: 6
Other: 3
Sectoral innovation:
Orientation to new sector: 1
Functional innovation:
Downstreaming: 1
i  0: Types of company innovations
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The third element was closed questions about the most important factors
that had influenced so far the growth of the SME both positively and nega-
tively. We presented a set of cards (featuring the factors presented in Chap-
ter 2) and asked the interviewees to choose up to four factors that positively
affected their business, and four factors that negatively affected it. This was
done to help interviewees think of yet other factors. We also asked the entre-
preneurs to rank the four positive and four negative factors in order of their
significance, hoping to discover which factors were not just relevant for
SMEs but were also the most binding constraints for SMEs in their efforts
to upgrade. We then asked how these factors affected the company.
The fourth element consisted of one open and one closed question about
what kind of governmental support would facilitate upgrading. 
The fifth element was a number of closed questions about general charac-
teristics of the SME: entrepreneur characteristics such as education; firm
characteristics such as size; business linkages such as membership in a
business association; and regarding the business environment, issues such
as access to finance. These questions were used to find out if the two groups
of interviewees (upgraders and non-upgraders) differed significantly in
terms of one of the characteristics, which could be a variable explaining
why some SMEs manage to upgrade while others do not.
Before starting our survey, at the beginning of Week III in Cairo, we pre-
tested our questionnaire on five SMEs from different sectors. These inter-
views were not included in our final sample because after reviewing the test
results, we tweaked the questionnaire.
Classification of SMEs
Classifying the interviewed companies involved three steps: (i) checking
whether in 2007 the company was micro or small (preferably with fewer than
30 employees); (ii) differentiating between upgraders and non-upgraders;
and (iii) identifying especially fast-growing upgraders, or ‘gazelles’.
Concentration on companies that had been small (fewer than 50 employees)
five years earlier
In order to determine the causes of Egypt’s ‘missing middle’ syndrome,
we were mainly interested in companies that had managed to upgrade (or
not) from being a micro or small enterprise, preferably with fewer than
Markus Loewe et al.
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30 employees, into being a medium-sized enterprise with more than 50
employees.
We tried to only contact companies with fewer than 50 (preferably fewer
than 30) employees, which turned out to be very difficult because many
SME owners could not or did not want to tell us the exact number of em-
ployees in their firm on the phone or before the interview.
As a result, we eventually found out that 22 of the 102 companies inter-
viewed had had more than 50 employees in 2007. Since we wanted to use
the information from our interviews with these firms we did not eliminate
them from the sample. We included these interviews in our qualitative
analysis and limited the quantitative analysis to a core sample of 80 compa-
nies, all of which had had fewer than 50 employees in 2007 (see Figure 11).
The decision to use the number of employees as the sole identification cri-
terion for small enterprises was taken for pragmatic reasons. During the in-
terviews it quickly became obvious that other criteria (sales, commercial
return, assets, or size of production area) could not be used because inter-
viewees were not willing – or able – to provide us with reliable figures. The
threshold of 50 employees corresponds with our definition of SMEs in Sec-
tion 3.5.1, as well as with existing studies on SMEs in Egypt. In fact, in
2007, 78 companies had had fewer than 30 employees. 
Distinction between upgraders and non-upgraders
Of the 80 companies in our core sample, exactly half (40) were classified
as upgraders (see Figure 11). Of course, this ratio is not representative of
the whole country, partly because we searched for success stories in order
to have two comparator groups (upgraders and non-upgraders) of similar
sizes. By chance we found more upgraders than we had expected so little
purposive sampling was needed. The fact that the two groups were exactly
the same size was accidental. 
To be classified as an ‘upgrader’, an enterprise had to fulfil three criteria
(see Table 5): 
• Have grown by at least 50 per cent during the previous five years by one
of five criteria (number of employees, sales, profit, assets or size of pro-
duction area).
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• Have introduced at least one innovation during the previous five years. 
• Have grown faster than the competition during the previous five years.
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Table 5: Indicators used to verify upgrading 
Criterion 1:  
Quantitative dimension 
Criterion 2:  
Qualitative dimension 
Criterion 3:  
Comparison with 
competitors 
Increased by at least 50% 
within the previous 5 
years in terms of: 
(i) Employees, 
(ii) Returns, 
(iii) Assets, 
(iv) Sales, 
(v) Or size of area used 
for production,  
storage and  
administration. 
Innovation within the  
previous 5 years:  
(i) Product innovation  
• Improved product(s) 
• Introduced new 
product(s) 
(ii) Process innovation 
• Improved process(es) 
• Introduced new  
process(es) 
(iii) Functional innovation 
• Increased domestic 
input as % of total 
inputs 
• Moved up/down  
value chain 
(iv) Marketing innovation  
• Applied new forms 
of marketing, label-
ling or packaging 
• Oriented towards 
new markets 
• Was certified for  
typical standards 
(ISO, labour) 
(v) Or sectoral innovation 
• Moved from one  
sector to another 
Within the previous  
5 years: 
Grew faster than  
competitors 
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These criteria were meant to typify the definition of upgrading explained in
Section 2.1. 
The first criterion was intended to capture only the quantitative dimension
of upgrading: the growth of the company. Of course, the threshold of 50 per
cent growth within five years is arbitrary, but any other threshold would
have been even more so. Our threshold was in line with that applied for the
same purpose by the DIE case studies on SME upgrading in India and the
Philippines, and is sufficiently high to identify companies that grew signif-
icantly faster than the average. A total of 51 companies out of 80 in our core
sample fulfilled the criterion (see Table A9 in Annex).
With the second criterion we wanted to ensure that the growth of a com-
pany was not due to windfall profits but coincided with some kind of in-
novation, that is, any of the changes in the second column of Table 5. In our
core sample, 55 companies fulfilled this criterion but only 42 fulfilled both
the first and second criteria (Table A9 in Annex).
The third criterion (the company grew faster than its competitors) was ap-
plied for two reasons: First, to know whether an innovation (Criterion 2)
brought something new to the whole market rather than to just the firm.
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Figure 11: SME classifications 
 
Source: own design 
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Here, comparison with the competitors was used as a proxy indicator for the
accumulation of an innovation rent, which only occurs when something new
is introduced to the market. Second, this criterion showed whether the
growth spurt of a company (criterion 1) was actually due to some innova-
tion (Criterion 2), and did not just happen to coincide with it. In our core
sample, 44 companies had grown faster than their competitors, thus fulfill-
ing the third criterion for an upgrader. But only 41 of them had effectively
grown by more than 50 per cent within five years (Criterion 1), only 42 had
introduced any innovation (Criterion 2). Only 40 fulfilled all three criteria
– while 15 fulfilled none (Table A9 in Annex).
Identification of very fast growers (‘gazelles’)
Finally, within the group of ‘upgraders’ we distinguished between two
more sub-categories of SMEs: We labelled all upgraders that had grown
particularly fast in the previous five years (by at least 100 per cent, or
about 20 per cent per annum) as ‘gazelles’. This criterion was fulfilled by
exactly half of all upgraders (20, the result of pure coincidence), while the
other half (20) fell into the category of ‘non-gazelle’ upgraders (Figure 11
and Table A6 in Annex).
The term ‘gazelle’ was taken from a concept that David Birch introduced in
the early 1980s to analyse very-rapidly-growing SMEs and has been further
developed by other scholars such as Zoltan Acs, who added an ‘employ-
ment growth’ component to Birch’s definition (Gibson / Stevenson 2011, 3–
4). Stone and Badawy (2011), who studied the determinants of high growth
in SMEs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, also used the
term.38 Our definition of a gazelle is similar to theirs: While we used a
threshold of 100 per cent for the growth of an SME over a five-year period
(approximately 20 per cent per annum), Stone and Badawy (2011) set a
threshold of 80 per cent within four years (2004 to 2008). In contrast to our
definition, for them, gazelles need not have introduced an innovation.
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38 Stone and Badawy’s 2011 study analysed the same EICS panel data that we used in our 
econometric analysis of SME development in Egypt between 2004 and 2008 (see
Section 4.3.1).
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 87
Data analysis
We analysed the data that we gathered in interviews with SME owners us-
ing quantitative and qualitative techniques.
The quantitative analysis, used to detect the main determinants of SME
upgrading in Egypt, had two elements. 
The first element was to count how many interviewees had identified dif-
ferent independent variables as a major constraint (or pushing factor) for
upgrading in Egypt in general, or as a major factor that explains well why
some Egyptian SMEs are more successful at upgrading than others. Sep-
arate analyses were made of answers to the open and closed questions
(see interview guideline, Annex C).
The second element was to make a correlation analysis. We compared the
gazelles, the non-gazelle upgraders and the non-upgraders to find out if
they differed substantially in any of the independent variables – which
would indicate that the respective factor might be a major determinant of
SME upgrading in Egypt. We used various statistical methods for this
comparison.
Both elements produced lists of ordered factors for SME upgrading in
Egypt that ranged from ‘significant at a high level’ to ‘significant at a
lower level’ and from ‘very important’ to ‘less important’. We had to set
a cut-off somewhere in order to ascertain what is a main determinant and
what is not. Table 6 illustrates our solution. It ranks factors A, B, C, etc.
by the percentage of interviewees who identified them as major con-
straints for SME upgrading. In this example, we marked the cut-off
between the important and less important factors between Factors B and
C because this is where the difference between the respective percentage
points is particularly wide. There is only a 1 per cent difference in men-
tioning Factor C, D and E, whereas the difference in mentioning Factors
B and C is 16 per cent. Thus, Factors A and B were included in the list,
while Factors C, D and E were excluded.
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The qualitative analysis, in contrast, was intended to show how the inde-
pendent variables affect SME upgrading in Egypt and provide evidence that
the correlations between independent factors and SME upgrading that were
identified by the quantitative analysis were in fact due to causalities. We
began by assigning codes to sentences and paragraphs in the transcripts of
interviews with SME owners (as well as in the transcripts of interviews with
experts – see Section 4.6), which reflected their statements. Then we cre-
ated lists with all the quotations for the respective codes. These lists were
the basis for our discussions about causal relationships and interrelations.
For instance, reading the statements for the code ‘state-business relations’
helped us not only to understand in which context state-business relations
hinder or facilitate upgrading, but also why and through which channels
they do so. For example, which aspects of state-business relations are prob-
lematic? Is it getting a business licence or getting a construction permit? Is
it too costly, in terms of time and money, to get a licence or a permit? Or is
the main problem the insecurity of state-business relations: Will I be able to
even get a permit or licence? 
The qualitative analysis helped us to interpret our qualitative findings and
derive causal chains for the interrelations between the factors. Apart from
the factors that were most relevant for upgrading (that were mentioned most
frequently and showed up in many causal chains), we also identified factors
of moderate importance for upgrading. Finally, for some factors we found
no evidence indicating their role in upgrading.
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Table 6: Identification of cut-off points (exemplified) 
Factor Frequency of mentioning in per cent 
of total companies of the core sample 
Factor A 34% 
Factor B 29% 
Factor C 13% 
Factor D 12% 
Factor E 12% 
Source: own design 
 
Cut-off point 
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4.3.3 Interviews with SME experts
A third component of our empirical research was interviewing experts for
SME development in Egypt from a variety of professional fields. 
The objective of these interviews was to obtain general information and
opinions on the SME sectors and SME upgrading in Egypt, especially on
the factors that constrained or helped SMEs to successfully upgrade. We
also collected viewpoints on the differences between Egypt and other coun-
tries and the reasons for such differences. 
Altogether, we conducted 104 interviews with 123 persons from more than
70 institutions:
• The government (the Agriculture and Agro-Industries Technology Cen-
ter, the Egyptian Banking Institute at the Central Bank of Egypt, the
Egyptian National Competition Council, the Egyptian Regulatory
Reform and Development Authority, the Enterprise TVET Partnership
for Food, the Enterprise TVET Partnership for Ready Made Garment,
the Food Technology Centre, the General Authority for Investment and
Free Zones, the Industrial Council for Technology and Innovation Coun-
cil, the Industrial Development Authority, the Industrial Modernization
Centre, the Industrial Training Council, the Ministry of Communica-
tions and Information Technology, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry
for Industry and Foreign Trade, the Ministry for Local Development, the
Social Fund for Development, the Technology Innovation and Entrepre-
neurship Center, and the Textile and Clothing Business Center),
• Private-sector institutions (the American Chamber of Commerce, the
Chamber of Food Industries, the Egyptian Chamber of Textile Indus-
tries, the Egyptian Junior Business Association, the Egyptian Stock
Exchange, Endeavour, Entrust, the German-Arab Chamber of Industry
and Commerce, Nile Stock Exchange, Sphinx Private Equity Manage-
ment and 11 SME associations).
• Micro and SME finance institutions (Tanmeyah Microenterprise Ser-
vices, First Microfinance Foundation and Banque du Caire).
• Non-governmental organisations (the Association for Women's Total
Advancement & Development and Expolink).
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• Academia (the American University of Cairo, Cairo University, the Eco-
nomic Research Forum, Fraunhofer Society, the German University in
Cairo, the University of Mainz and the University of Minnesota).
• Lead firms (the Bishara Textile and Garments Manufacturing, the Cairo
Cotton Center, Femina, Juhayna, Sekem, Wadi Food and the World Trad-
ing Company Egypt).
• The media (Al Ahram and Al Iqtisadi).
• Development co-operation (the Canadian International Development
Agency, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit,
the Egypt Enterprise Development Project, Egypt's Competitiveness
Programme, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Friedrich Naumann
Foundation, Global Project Partners, the KfW Development Bank, the
Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization, the World Bank, the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development and the International Finance Corporation) 
A detailed list of interlocutors is in the Annex.
5 Factors in SME upgrading in Egypt: the findings
Our research led us to five main findings: 
First, the shortage of medium-sized enterprises in Egypt is not only due to
the difficulty that small firms have upgrading, but also to the difficulties
that upgraded firms face in sustaining their growth. Our research identified
a significant number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that
were able to upgrade at different periods. We found many more such firms
than we had expected – most of them by chance.39
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39 In our core sample, 59 companies were selected either through geographical screening or 
from a more or less representative list of firms. Originally we assumed that most SMEs 
selected in one of these ways would be non-upgraders because our only criterion for 
selection was that the company had had fewer than 50 employees five years earlier. But 
this assumption turned out to be wrong: 29 of the 59 companies selected by one of the 
two strategies had grown by at least 50 per cent – and 17 had grown by at least 100 per 
cent – between 2007 and 2012 (see Table A7 in Annex). 
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Figure 12: Growth and contraction of companies in sample 
 
 
Source: Own design based on survey data 
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More than half of all the companies in our sample grew by at least 50 per
cent between 2007 and 2012 despite the effects of the global financial cri-
sis and the post-revolution economic downturn. To some extent we had
explicitly searched for upgraders and the share of upgraders is high, with a
significant number of firms that had grown by more than 100 per cent (see
Figure 12 and Table A7 in Annex).
We also found a large number of companies that had contracted in size be-
tween 2007 and 2012. During those five years, the number of firms that
grew was equal to the number of firms that contracted – in all sectors and
bracket sizes.40 Such a coincidence of ups and downs is a common phe-
nomenon known as ‘churning’. As long as the number of firms that is grow-
ing exceeds the number of firms contracting, the group of medium-sized
companies can expand. This situation may have occurred between 2002 and
2007 since quite a number of the companies we interviewed had grown sig-
nificantly during those years and only a few had contracted. However, the
evidence is weak, because a similarly large number of companies might
have contracted during the period of 2002 to 2007 and were no longer
around to tell us what happened (see Figure 12 and Table A7 in Annex).
In any case, we can say for sure that even during the difficult years 2007–
2012, upgrading was possible for Egyptian SMEs. If the number of medi-
um-sized companies did not increase during that period, it must be because
an equal number of companies contracted (or went out of business) during
the same period. The ‘missing middle’ in Egypt would therefore be due not
only to the obstacles that SMEs face in upgrading, but also (and perhaps
more so) to the difficulty in sustaining their growth. Additional research is
needed on this issue.
Second, there are six main factors that determine upgrading in Egypt: (i)
human capital (quality basic and vocational education, quality work ex-
perience and international exposure), (ii) ambition/motivation and risk
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40 Even if we had excluded all the SMEs that experts recommended, we still would have 
had 29 upgraders in our sample, including seven SMEs that had crossed the threshold 
from micro to small companies (10 employees) and 12 that had crossed the threshold 
from small to medium-sized companies (50 employees). At the same time, six SMEs 
(excluding those recommended by experts) had dropped below 50 employees (trans-
forming from a medium-sized to a small enterprise) and eight dropped to 10 employees 
(becoming micro enterprises) (Table A7). 
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readiness, (iii) investment in human resource development (HRD), (iv) mar-
ket research, (v) access to finance, and (vi) deficits in the rule of law (espe-
cially in connection with taxation, company registration, licensing, com-
pany inspections, quality infrastructure and competition control). Most of
these factors were revealed as major determinants of SME upgrading in the
studies conducted in India and the Philippines (see Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10). 
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Table 7: Main determinants of SME upgrading in Egypt 
 
Why is upgrading  
generally difficult for 
SMEs in Egypt? 
Why are some SMEs  
better able to upgrade than 
others? 
Entrepreneur 
characteristics 
– Low quality of entre-
preneur’s education 
and training  
Generally limited level 
of risk acceptance 
– Lack of finance  
(see also below) 
– Entrepreneur’s human 
capital  
(education, work  
experience and  
international exposure) 
Entrepreneur’s  
ambition/motivation and 
readiness to take risks 
Firm  
characteristics 
– Low quality of workers’ 
education and training  
– Lack of market  
information 
– Investment in HRD 
(skills and incentives for 
employees) 
– Market research 
Inter-firm  
linkages   
Business  
environment 
– Lack of finance (can 
explain differences, but 
usually characterises 
the entrepreneur; see 
above) 
– Deficits in the rule of law 
(especially in taxation, 
company registration,  
licensing, inspections, 
quality infrastructure and 
competition control) 
– Entrepreneur’s individu-
al access to finance  
(personal savings or  
assets that can be sold or 
serve as collateral for a 
bank loan; preferential 
access to formal or  
informal credit; financial 
literacy & ability to  
design a business plan, 
etc.)  
 
able 7: Main determinants of SME upgrading in Egypt
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There are two aspects to all but one of these factors (deficits in the rule of
law). On one hand, they explain why upgrading is generally difficult for
SMEs in Egypt. All SMEs tend to suffer from: (i) the owner’s low quality
of education and work experience, (ii) the owner’s risk aversion, (iii) the
lack of or high turnover of trained workers, (iv) difficulties accessing fi-
nance, (v) lack of market information, and (vi) deficits in the rule of law
(Table 7).
On the other hand, five of the six factors also explain why some SMEs in Egypt
are more likely to upgrade than others. Owners of upgraders tend to: (i) have
better education, more work experience and international exposure; (ii) be more
motivated and more willing to take risks; (iii) invest more in HRD (worker
training, incentives and participation), (iv) spend more on market research, and
(v) have personal wealth or easy access to finance in the core family (Table 7).
While it may not be surprising that these factors affect SME upgrading, our
results also found that certain other – not so obvious – factors are less relevant
(see Table 8): 
• Hardly any interviewees mentioned trade or monetary policies, the
exchange rate or inflation as obstacles to the firm’s development.
• Insurance was not an issue for the SME owners we surveyed. 
• Membership in formalised business networks was not decisive for SMEs’
success. Some upgraders joined business associations but did not find mem-
bership beneficial.
• The location of a firm was found to have no direct impact. Companies in
industrial zones generally face fewer difficulties in upgrading because such
companies have better infrastructure and more space for production. The big
challenge is being admitted to an industrial zone in the first place, which is
a complicated and not always transparent procedure. There is great compe-
tition for the limited number of parcels of land in the more popular indus-
trial zones because Cairo and other large Egyptian towns are becoming
increasingly overcrowded. One could in fact argue that access to land deter-
mines a company’s success.
Markus Loewe et al.
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Table 8: Main determinants of SME upgrading in Egypt 
 
Most im-
portant factors 
(main  
determinants) 
Factors with 
intermediate 
importance 
Less important 
and  
unimportant 
factors 
Factors with 
ambiguous or 
insufficient 
evidence 
Entre-
preneur 
charac-
teristics 
– Human 
capital 
(quality basic 
and vocation-
al education, 
quality work 
experience, 
international 
exposure) 
– Ambition and 
risk readiness 
– Individual 
access to  
finance 
 – Gender 
– Social capital 
 
Firm  
charac-
teristics 
– Market  
research  
– HRD (skills 
and worker 
loyalty) 
– Corporate  
governance 
– Location 
– Age 
– Informality 
– Size 
– Sector 
Inter-firm  
linkages 
  – Business  
networks  
– GVCs 
– Clusters 
Business  
en-
viron-
ment 
– Access to 
finance  
– Law enforce-
ment (esp. in 
taxation, 
company  
registration, 
licensing, in-
spections and 
competition 
control) 
– Economic  
downturn  
after the  
revolution 
– High input 
prices  
– Access to 
land  
– Availability 
of BDSs 
– Infrastructure 
(mainly  
transpor-
tation) 
– Trade policy  
– Insurance  
– Exchange 
rate 
– Inflation  
 
Classification based on research results presented in Tables A11a to A14a in Annex  
Cl ssification of factors based on importance for SME upgradingable 8: Clas ification of ctors based on importance for SME upgrading
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• The gender of an entrepreneur was also not found to have a negative
impact on a firm’s upgrading potential. The portion of female upgraders
in our sample was no smaller than the share of women entrepreneurs in
Egypt as a whole. Some tests in our sample even indicated a positive cor-
relation between female ownership and SME upgrading – probably due
to a selection bias (on experts’ recommendations, an above-average –
disproportionately successful – share of female entrepreneurs was se-
lected). In any case, the number of female entrepreneurs who regarded
their gender as an advantage in doing business was much higher than the
number of those who saw it as a disadvantage.
• Social capital did not appear to be a major factor for explaining differ-
ences between more and less successful SMEs in Egypt’s food-process-
ing, textiles and garments, or ICT sectors. Of course, personal relations
are helpful for entrepreneurs, but we did not find evidence for the
assumption that they are essential for SME upgrading in Egypt. How-
ever, the situation might be different in other economic sectors such as
tourism or construction, where a lot of anecdotal evidence exists about
the importance of wasţa (connections) for doing business in Egypt. 
Four factors turned out to be of medium importance for SME upgrading in
Egypt: (i) access to land, (ii) the availability of business development ser-
vices (BDSs), (iii) infrastructure, and (iv) corporate governance. A few
companies cited deficits in Egypt’s infrastructure as being responsible for
the general difficulty of SMEs in Egypt to upgrade, while access to land,
the availability of BDSs, and the nature of corporate governance were men-
tioned several times in explaining differences in the upgrading potential of
individual firms (see Table 8).
Our results were ambiguous regarding an SME’s formal status. Statistical
tests display a positive correlation to both growth and upgrading which is
not surprising. However, this statistical correlation is probably due to re-
verse causality, that is, informal companies that had grown or decided to
grow have sooner or later decided to formalise. Many owners of formal
and informal SMEs stressed that formalisation did not constitute a barrier
to growth. For smaller companies, the advantages of being formal did not
outweigh the disadvantages – although the opposite was true for larger
companies.
Markus Loewe et al.
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The age of an SME is obviously correlated with its likelihood to upgrade
although this correlation is non-linear, and it is not because of age. After an
SME is founded, it must first get settled and organised; normally it does not
yet have the capacity to expand much. The likelihood of upgrading is great-
est after this start-up phase, which may last one to four years, and then
diminishes steadily over time. If an SME does not upgrade during the first
five years after its start-up, it is unlikely to upgrade later. This is because an
SME either has what it takes to upgrade and uses this potential as soon as
possible – or it does not. An SME that does not upgrade early probably does
not have the potential to upgrade.
Our findings seem to hold for different sectors in Egypt, independent of
company size. We only provide evidence for the textiles and garments,
food-processing and software sectors. However, since there is no signifi-
cant variance in the results for these three sectors, they might also be valid
for other economic sectors in Egypt. Some statistical tests reveal that up-
grading may generally be easier in some sectors than in others, but this is
probably due to the fact that the Egyptian textiles and garments sector was
more affected by the economic downturn after the revolution than the food-
processing sector.
Most of these findings are in line with the results of the studies that DIE has
conducted in parallel on SME upgrading in India and the Philippines.
Human capital (quality education and training, work experience and inter-
national exposure, and investment in market information and human capi-
tal) and access to finance play are also significant for SME upgrading in
India and the Philippines, while gender, informality, regulation, infrastruc-
ture, taxation and customs are not – just as in Egypt (Tables 9 and 10).
The main differences seem to be that deficits in law enforcement do not sig-
nificantly affect SME upgrading in India and the Philippines, while – in
contrast to Egypt – the following factors do impact in one or both of these
countries: (i) social capital (networks), (ii) social origin (caste or region),
(iii) vertical inter-firm linkages (global value chains (GVCs)), (iv) horizon-
tal inter-firm linkages (clusters, only in India); (v) market orientation (only
in India), and (vi) portfolio diversification (only in the Philippines) (Ham-
pel-Milagrosa 2013; Reeg 2013a).
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Third, with regard to the regulatory environment, what most affects SMEs
in Egypt is the unpredictability and arbitrariness of law enforcement rather
than the cost and time needed for compliance. Entrepreneurs can never
know the outcome of an administrative or judicial process before it ends
because there is too much room for discretionary decisions taken by civil
servants and judges. This is particularly true for taxation, company regis-
tration, licensing, company inspections and competition control. SME own-
ers suffer from the arbitrary determination of the annual business tax. Some
owners cannot understand why they have to renew their business licence
every few years while others receive permanent licences. It is not necessary
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Table 9: Main constraints on SME upgrading in Egypt, India and  
the Philippines 
 Egypt India Philippines 
Entrepreneur  
characteristics 
– Entrepreneur’s 
low education 
and training  
– Risk aversion 
 – Entrepreneur’s 
low education 
and training  
Firm  
characteristics 
– High turnover 
and lack of 
skilled  
workers 
– Lack of  
market  
information 
– High turnover 
and lack of 
skilled  
workers 
– High turnover 
and lack of 
skilled  
workers 
– Lack of  
market  
information 
Inter-firm  
linkages 
 – Delay in 
payments by 
clients/buyers 
– Unstable 
relationships 
with suppliers 
Business  
environment 
– Difficulties 
accessing  
finance 
– Deficits in law 
enforcement 
– Difficulties 
accessing  
finance  
– Deficits in law 
enforcement 
– Difficulties 
accessing  
finance 
Source: for India: Reeg (2013a); for the Philippines: Hampel-Milagrosa (2013) 
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Table 10: Main factors in SME upgrading success in Egypt, India and 
the Philippines 
 
Considerable impact 
in all three countries 
No major impact in 
any of the  
three countries 
Divergent results 
Entre-
preneur  
charac-
teristics 
– Entrepreneur’s 
human capital 
(quality of  
education  
and work  
experience, 
international 
exposure) 
– Availability 
of finance 
– Motivation 
– Gender – Readiness to 
take risks 
(Egypt and 
Philippines) 
– Social origin 
(India and 
Philippines) 
Firm  
charac-
teristics 
– Employee  
welfare 
(training,  
incentives, 
working  
atmosphere,  
participation) 
– Market research 
– Degree of  
formalisation 
– Market  
orientation 
(only in India) 
– Portfolio  
diversification
(only in the 
Philippines) 
Inter-
firm 
linkages 
– GVCs 
(no evidence in 
Egypt) 
 – Social  
networks 
(India and 
Philippines) 
– Clusters 
(only in India) 
– Business  
organisations 
(only in the 
Philippines) 
Busi-
ness  
en- 
viron-
ment 
– Access to credit – Registration, 
licensing 
– Infrastructure 
– Taxation, customs 
– Market regulation 
– Corruption 
– Access to land
(Egypt and 
Philippines) 
– Political  
stability 
(only in the 
Philippines) 
Source: for India: Reeg (2013a); for the Philippines: Hampel-Milagrosa (2013) 
Comp rison of main success factors of SME
upgrad ng in Egypt, India and the Philippines
able 10: Main success factos for SME upgrading in Egypt, India a
the Philippines
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to comply with standards as long as small bribes are paid regularly to com-
pany inspectors, but personal connections are essential to acquire govern-
ment tenders. Egyptian SME owners do not consider lengthy procedures or
high fees to be problematic because they can bear the costs and waiting
times. But the insecurity that results from deficits in the rule of law prevents
them from developing their businesses.
Fourth, although vertical and horizontal linkages with other firms probably
would be important push factors for the upgrading efforts of Egyptian SME
owners, these are extremely reluctant to co-operate. Hardly any company
covered by our survey was integrated into a functional cluster or GVC –
which meant that we were unable to determine the effects of clusters or
GVCs on SME upgrading in Egypt. Many experts confirmed the hypothe-
sis that we had derived from theoretical literature (see Chapter 2): clusters
and GVCs are important conduits of upgrading. But we could not find evi-
dence either supporting or contradicting this hypothesis because we were
unable to find a relevant SME case.
This is probably because there is so little co-operation between enterprises
in Egypt. Hardly any of the SMEs in our sample co-operated with another
company in any meaningful way; most interviewees said that they were not
interested in co-operating. They all argued that they could never trust a con-
tract with an Egyptian – based on their own bad experiences or stories they
had heard from other businesspeople.
Once again, deficits in the rule of law appear to be the root of the problem.
Co-operation can be beneficial everywhere – as long as the terms are clear,
transparent and enforceable. A detailed contract and a fair arbitration au-
thority are necessary in case of disagreement. The judicial branch normal-
ly handles such arbitration, but in Egypt, entrepreneurs tend to avoid legal
proceedings of all kinds because they are so unpredictable.
Furthermore, the Egyptian educational system does not train people to co-
operate. Pupils are not encouraged to work in teams, which negatively af-
fects their readiness and ability to collaborate with others when they are
adults (Al-Ayouty 2011). The lack of training in teamwork in Egyptian
schools is probably not a matter of chance. Authoritarian political and reli-
gious leaders have never been interested in teaching the population why and
how to organise joint action: such knowledge could help an opposition get
organised and eventually overthrow the political and social order.
Markus Loewe et al.
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Fifth, the success of SMEs in upgrading depends on the combination of
the right factors. Just citing one or two isolated factors, such as access to
finance, a deregulated business environment or spending for research and
development (R&D), is not an explanation. Some factors, such as a bank
loan and the entrepreneur’s own capital or the entrepreneur’s access to
trained workers and their in-house training, are substitutes; other factors,
such as finance, workers and market information, are complements. Suc-
cessful SME upgrading depends on having access to all of the comple-
ments and being able to substitute missing factors (e.g. to compensate for
the lack of market information by conducting independent market re-
search) (Figure 13).
Structural constraints such as the lack of finance and law enforcement
make it possible for very few privileged entrepreneurs to upgrade: those
who have money, connections, good education, international experience,
land, relevant work experience, motivation and the readiness to accept
risks. While some structural constraints are insurmountable for all Egypt-
ian SMEs, some owners have the means to circumvent them. Those with
their own financial means need not depend on a bank loan, and those who
have international experience need not depend on export market informa-
tion. Those with money can bribe public officials in order to influence
their decisions on requests and submissions made by the company; those
who can train their own workers are not dependent on the availability of
well-trained labour.
5.1 Identification of the main determinants 
Our research findings suggest that the main determinants of SME
upgrading in Egypt include: (i) human capital (quality basic and voca-
tional education, quality work experience and international exposure),
(ii) ambition and risk readiness, (iii) HRD investment, (iv) market
research, (v) access to finance and (vi) law enforcement (in taxation, reg-
istration, licensing, company inspections and competition control).
We used three procedures to derive this result from our SME survey data.
First, we analysed the responses from SME owners about what they con-
sidered to be the main obstacles for upgrading in Egypt by counting the
number of companies that mentioned single factors. Second, we used
Markus Loewe et al.
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 103
quantitative tools to learn which factors explain why some SMEs in
Egypt were able to upgrade while most were not. Third, we applied a
qualitative approach to analyse the interviewees’ stories to discover how
the factors identified in the first and second steps are related, that is,
which are the initial factors and which are the results of the initial
factors.
Step 1: Identifying general obstacles to upgrading in Egypt (quantita-
tive analysis)
Our first step in the qualitative analysis identified seven factors that
largely account for the general difficulty of Egyptian SMEs to upgrade:
the lack of skilled labour, high prices of inputs, restrictive regulations,
unfair competition, widespread corruption (bribery and wasţa), lack of
finance and the post-revolution economic downturn.
Most SME owners had mentioned these factors when answering two
questions.
Open question: Figure 14 shows that when asked in general terms about
their main obstacles to growth, the SME owners mostly complained
about the lack of skilled labour (45 per cent), problems in accessing
finance (29 per cent), the economic downturn after the revolution (22 per
cent), high prices of inputs (18 per cent), regulation (15 per cent), and
deficits in worker motivation and loyalty (15 per cent). Other factors
were mentioned less often (by 10 per cent of the respondents or less).
Closed question:When the interviewees were offered a closed list of pos-
sible answers, most chose the post-revolution economic downturn (35
per cent), the lack of skilled labour (34 per cent) and petty corruption
(bribery and wasţa: 29 per cent) for their problems in upgrading
(Figure 15).
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
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Figure 14: Main obstacles to SME growth (open question) 
 
Comment: The figure presents the SME owners’ responses to Question 22 of the Question-
naire (see Annex B). No answers were suggested: interviewees simply said whatever came to 
mind. Therefore, multiple answers were possible (in practice, the maximum was 5). 
Source: Table A11a in Annex 
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Figure 15: Main obstacles to SME growth (closed question) 
 
Comment: The figure displays the SME owners’ responses to Question 26f of the Question-
naire (see Annex B). Interviewees were asked to select the three most important factors that 
influenced the firm’s growth (from a closed list of options). 
Source: Table A12 in Annex 
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Step 2: Identification of factors explaining differences in the likelihood of 
SMEs to upgrade (quantitative analysis)
Ten factors appear to explain why some SMEs in Egypt manage to upgrade
despite all the obstacles: the owner’s international exposure, work experience
and education, worker satisfaction and loyalty, product quality, owner’s use of
technology and market information, owner’s individual access to finance,
ambition and readiness to take risk. Upgrading also seems to be easier at cer-
tain locations and during a certain period in the history of an SME.
These are the conclusions from using various quantitative techniques to
analyse the data provided by our survey:
Open question: Just as we had asked SME owners about the main obstacles to
upgrading, we asked upgraders why they had managed to grow despite all the
obstacles, and non-upgraders why other companies were more successful in
upgrading despite the fact that they all faced similar obstacles. The most fre-
quent explanations given for the differences were: variations in product qual-
ity (mentioned by 26 per cent of the respondents), the entrepreneur’s ambition
(20 per cent) and the availability of finance (20 per cent) (see Figure 16).
Closed question: SME owners were also asked to identify the three factors
most likely to positively influence them to upgrade. The answers: the owner’s
work experience (45 per cent), the owner’s ambition (45 per cent), competition
(as an incentive to improve) (34 per cent), the use of technology and market
information (26 per cent), and the owner’s readiness to take risks (25 per cent)
(see Figure 17).
Comparison of the characteristics of gazelles, non-gazelle upgraders and non-
upgraders: Upgraders (especially gazelles) and non-upgraders differed sub-
stantially in several aspects. Proportionately more gazelle owners had univer-
sity degrees, international exposure and work experience in a larger firm in the
same sector than owners in the other two groups. They also had a high share
of workers with formal training (see Figure 18).
Markus Loewe et al.
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Figure 16: Main reasons for differences in SME upgrading ease in Egypt 
(open question) 
 
Comment: The figure displays the responses of SME owners to Question 26b of the Ques-
tionnaire (see Annex B). No answers were suggested; they said whatever came to mind. For 
that reason, multiple answers were possible (the maximum was 5). 
Source: Table A13a in Annex 
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Figure 17: Main reasons for differences in SME upgrading ease in Egypt 
(closed question) 
 
Comment: The figure displays the SME owners’ responses to Question 24 of the Question-
naire (see Annex B). Interviewees were asked to select the three factors that most influenced 
their firm’s positive growth (from a closed list of options). 
Source: Table A13a in Annex 
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T-tests for the divergence of means for gazelles, non-gazelle upgraders and
non-upgraders:This finding is underscored by the fact that the mean value for
these (and other) characteristics diverged markedly between upgraders and
non-upgraders, and between gazelles and non-gazelles. T-tests confirm that
this divergence is statistically significant for the SME owner’s gender, highest
level of education, work experience and international exposure, as well as the
company’s share of trained workers, age and location (see Table 11).
Regression analysis: Logit estimations point only to statistically significant
correlation of upgrading with the age of SMEs (at the 5 per cent level). In
addition, there is also a correlation between upgrading and the food-pro-
cessing sector but it is only significant at the 10 per cent level. Ordinary
least square (OLS) regression models indicate a correlation between the rel-
ative growth of an SME (in terms of the percentage growth of the number
of employees as the dependent variable) as well as the age of an SME and
its owner’s university education. No other independent variables are corre-
lated with upgrading in a statistically significant way (see Figure 19).
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Figure 18: Characteristics of gazelle upgraders and non-upgraders 
 
Source: Tables A17, A18, A19, A22, A23 and A24 
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Econometric analysis of EICS: Logit estimations using panel data from the
Egypt Investment Climate Surveys (EICSs) 2004 and 2008 provide addi-
tional evidence for a statistically significant correlation between upgrading
and investment in worker training and the existence of a specialised R&D
department (both at the 5 per cent level) , see Table C1 in Annex C). 
Being located in Al-Minya, Port Said or the Nile Delta (Gharbiyya, Shar-
qiyya and Minufiyya governorates) also has a statistically significant, pos-
itive effect on the likelihood of a company to upgrade (however, only at the
10 per cent level) – as compared with being located in Cairo (see Table C2
in Annex C).
Logit estimations using the EICS panel data similarly show a statistically
significant, negative correlation of upgrading with the textiles and gar-
ments sector and with confronting the most serious problems in ‘business
licensing’ (tables C3 and C4 in Annex C).
The EICS panel data also indicates that exporting is positively correlated
with upgrading (see Table C1 in Annex C). However, this finding is probably
the result of reverse causality because there must have been some upgrad-
ing before a company could export, and additional upgrading is more likely
to happen after some upgrading has taken place.
Step 3: Tracing intermediate factors to initial factors (qualitative analysis)
In the third step of our analysis, we applied qualitative techniques to check
which factors in upgrading that we had identified in Steps 1 and 2 are in
fact initial (independent) or intermediate variables. We reviewed the stories
told by the SME owners in order to draw causal chains and highlight the
factors at the beginning of these chains.
This analytical step (which is shown in Figure 20) revealed the following:
• The SME owner’s education, international exposure and work experi-
ence should be subsumed in their human capital. They are strongly inter-
dependent, for example, people with better education have greater
chances of getting a job in a leading firm (work experience) or being eli-
gible to study abroad for a year. At the same time, living abroad can be
an education in itself.  
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• Worker training in an SME is not an independent variable. It partly
depends on the availability of skilled labour on the national labour mar-
ket – and on the quality of the national educational and vocational train-
ing system. But employers can also provide on-the-job-training, while
other forms of human resource development (above-average wages,
good treatment, non-wage benefits such as day-care facilities, and trans-
parent and participatory decision-making in the company) encourage
well-trained workers to remain at the firm.  
• The motivation and turnover of labour in a company can similarly be
improved through human resource development.
• Product quality is not an independent variable either. Although many
upgraders attributed their success to product quality, their success pri-
marily resulted from the ambition and determination of the entrepre-
neurs, the skills and motivation of their workers and the use of technol-
ogy and market information, which was clearly linked again to the entre-
preneurs’ work experience and international exposure.
• Almost all the problems that plagued the entrepreneurs in state-business
relations (taxation, registration, licensing, company inspections and
competition control) stemmed from a more fundamental problem: sig-
nificant deficits in law enforcement. If, for instance, the regulation and
application of laws is not transparent and arbitrary, an SME owner can-
not estimate the effort that will be necessary to obtain a licence.
• The ambition of SME owners and their readiness to take risks are inter-
mediate factors –to a limited degree. They are dependent on other fac-
tors such as the SME owner’s education and access to finance. But to a
significant degree, these factors are givens (inherited or influenced by an
SME owner’s upbringing).
• Many interviewees cited the economic downturn in Egypt that followed
the 2011 revolution and the high prices of inputs for production (mainly
imported goods); these do not depend on other, more initial factors. For
that reason, they are portrayed in Figure 20 as both intermediate and ini-
tial factors. However, since both are difficult to influence or alter we do
not discuss them further here.
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Impact of the main determinants
Human capital includes quality basic and vocational education, quality
work experience and international exposure. It is one of the key factors for
SME upgrading in Egypt, where education and vocational training are gen-
erally of inferior quality. Schoolchildren do not learn to be creative and to
think analytically. They also lack the basics for proper vocational training
or useful tertiary education – which is why Egyptian workers’ educational
and training levels are generally low and why SME owners also lack the
cognitive and inventive skills needed to initiate upgrading.
On the other hand, some SME owners have benefited from superior educa-
tion, travelled abroad, attended a foreign school or got work experience at a
larger, successful firm in the same sector before starting their own busi-
ness. Such experiences give them a comparative advantage, which is why
these entrepreneurs are more likely than others to upgrade. 
Good education is also an important prerequisite for understanding that the
product quality, human resource development and market know-how are
crucial for the success of an enterprise as well as the ability to conduct
proper market research and human resource development (HRD). A good
education is also essential for accessing finance, which requires ‘financial
literacy’ (familiarity with different financial products and their strengths
and weaknesses, as well as application procedures) and the ability to draft
a business plan (which is required for a bank loan) (see Figure 20).
Human resource development covers in-house training, recruitment, incen-
tives for employees to remain at the firm, fair treatment by the employer and
the right to participate in the firm’s decision-making. It is another factor
that explains differences between SMEs in Egypt with respect to their like-
lihood of upgrading. HRD increases worker training and productivity, sat-
isfaction, motivation and loyalty to the firm, that is, workers’ inclination to
stay rather than to seek a job elsewhere. HRD improves the quality of prod-
ucts, the efficiency of production, workers’ acceptance of innovation and
overall output.
Market research is another important factor in upgrading because it en-
ables SME owners to identify market niches for their products, learn about
customer preferences, identify the necessary product quality and elaborate
adequate marketing strategies. Market research also raises SME owners’
awareness of the need to always respond to customer demand.
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Access to finance is another crucial factor in the general difficulty of Egypt-
ian SMEs to upgrade, as well as for related differences in Egypt. There are
many reasons why Egyptian SME owners have difficulty obtaining external
financing for their investments: the scarcity of funds in SME credit pro-
grammes, restrictive lending conditions at banks, the entrepreneur’s lack of
registered collateral, rigid bankruptcy legislation, etc. But in addition to the
lack of quality human capital in Egypt, there is another explanation for the
difficulties that SMEs in Egypt experience in upgrading. Some SME own-
ers have easier access to finance because they have their own funds, prefer-
ential access to informal credit, or registered collateral or connections
(wasţa) to bank lending officers.
Access to finance also helps SME owners to obtain other factors that are
crucial for upgrading such as international experience (foreign travel is
expensive), market research (travelling to trade fairs in Europe, America or
Asia is not cheap), quality (requires investments in the production pro-
cess), well-trained workers (expect higher salaries or may need in-house
training), the acceptance of risk (is easier with capital) or the ability to bribe
(to circumvent insecurities due to deficits in the rule of law).
Law enforcement: Deficits in the rule of law also help account for the gen-
eral difficulty of Egyptian SMEs to upgrade. Many owners complain about
major problems interacting with the public administration or judicial sys-
tem for typical state-business relations such as company registration, li-
censing, taxation, customs, company inspections, etc. While the costs and
time needed for these interactions are a burden for SME owners, they are
bearable. The real problem is the insecurity regarding the outcome of these
interactions. For many procedures, there are no clear legal standards and the
application of standards is not well monitored, leaving a lot of leeway for
public officials and judges. Decision-making by the public administration
and the judiciary is arbitrary, and entrepreneurs cannot know how much
time administrative and judicial procedures will take or how they will turn
out – unless they have the funds to bribe all the officials involved.
Arbitrariness in law enforcement also creates unfair competition between
enterprises: Some may be treated better than others, especially if they have
better connections or pay higher bribes. This phenomenon lowers the qual-
ity of the country’s infrastructure because SME owners can circumvent com-
pliance with standards by bribing inspectors. Corruption also affects public
finance as many entrepreneurs pay high bribes to reduce their tax rates.
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Finally, arbitrariness in law enforcement affects the readiness of SME own-
ers to co-operate with other companies. Very few Egyptian SMEs are linked
to the value chain (with clients) or within clusters (with competitors),
mostly because of the difficulty Egyptian owners have enforcing co-opera-
tion contracts. In Egypt there is no point in going to court to arbitrate con-
tracts because of the length and unpredictability of the outcomes.
5.2 Detailed findings for all factors   
As has been shown, variance in the upgrading potential of SMEs in Egypt
can largely be explained by differences in the entrepreneurs’ behavioural
characteristics such as ambition and risk acceptance, as well as in their fi-
nancial and human capital (and to a lesser extent, their social capital). Var-
iance in the upgrading potential of SMEs is partly due to differences in firm
characteristics such as the level of investment in market research and human
resource development (workers’ in-house training and incentives). Whether
or not an SME makes such investments largely depends on the owner’s
mind-set.
However, the fact that upgrading is generally difficult for SMEs in Egypt is
mainly due to the business environment – deficits in the availability of
finance and law enforcement (but not legislation and regulation, financial
and political stability or infrastructure). The inferior quality of education
and training in Egypt plays an equally important role. Formally, this factor
is an entrepreneur characteristic (the entrepreneur’s human capital) as well
as a firm characteristic (worker education and training). But it stems from
deficits in Egypt’s system of public education and vocational training,
which is an element of the business environment.
Below we present in detail our research results for all factors of SME up-
grading in Egypt: entrepreneur characteristics (Section 5.2.1), firm charac-
teristics (5.2.2), inter-firm linkages (5.2.3) and the business environment
(5.2.4).
5.2.1 Entrepreneur characteristics
According to our findings, human capital (quality basic and vocational ed-
ucation, work experience and international exposure), the availability of
finance (discussed below in connection with the business environment) and
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behavioural characteristics (ambition and the readiness to take risks) are
key determinants of SME upgrading in Egypt, while social capital and gen-
der are insignificant.
Human capital
Our findings show that differences in education, work experience and in-
ternational exposure largely explain why some Egyptian SMEs are better
able to upgrade than others. This result corresponds with the conclusions of
the DIE case studies in India and the Philippines.
Education: In our Egyptian sample, 59 per cent of the interviewees identi-
fied education and work experience as key factors for successful SME up-
grading (Table A14 in Annex). In fact, educational attainment differs con-
siderably between the upgraders (especially the gazelles) and the non-
upgraders. Of gazelle owners, 30 per cent hold master’s degrees compared
with only 3 per cent of the non-upgraders (Table A18a in Annex). Within
the textiles and garments sector, where 25 per cent of the gazelles hold mas-
ter’s degrees and none of the non-upgraders, the difference is especially sig-
nificant. There seems to be much less difference in the information and
communications technology (ICT) and food-processing sectors. All inter-
viewees in the ICT sector have master’s degrees, while in the food-process-
ing sector neither gazelles nor non-upgraders do. The t-test shows that
throughout the sample, the difference in educational attainment between
upgraders and non-upgraders is statistically significant at the 10 per cent
confidence level (Table 11). However, the quantitative analysis of the EICS
panel data did not produce evidence for a significant correlation between
the educational degree of SME owners and the upgrading of their compa-
nies (Table C1 in Annex C).
The quantitative analysis of our interviews illustrates how the education and
work experience of SME owners affects company upgrading. The owner of
an ICT upgrader saw these as prerequisites for being innovative and cre-
ative: “I have a university degree from the American University that
enables me to think innovative” (Software developer, Cairo, 29 February
2012). The executive director of another ICT upgrader stressed that supe-
rior education was essential for acquiring the know-how to run a business
in the ICT sector: “It is the win factor in our business” (Cairo, 29 February
2012). At the same time, many non-upgraders also stated that better educa-
tion would have helped them both run and upgrade their businesses. They
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requested public programs to help boost their management skills, technical
know-how and capabilities to conduct market research. The director of a
donor-funded BDS programme confirms:
“The number one reason why SMEs do not grow is that they lack knowl-
edge. All other issues like access to finance, infrastructure, etc. can be
solved.” (Alaa Fahmy, UNIDO Agriculture and Agro-Industries Technol-
ogy Center. Cairo, 22 February 2012)
Previous studies confirmed that most SME owners in Egypt have limited
education. On average, they attend school for only eight years; only 30 per
cent have completed their secondary education (El-Mahdi 2006, 29). 
More important than the quantity of education is the quality. Many gazelle
owners we interviewed had attended foreign or other private schools,
which are superior to Egyptian public schools. But this involves substan-
tial costs and is dependent on the entrepreneur’s family background and
financial situation:
“Being the son or daughter of a successful business person is also a suc-
cess factor. The children of business people can be educated abroad and
they have already a foothold in the business world.” (Jennifer Bremer,
American University in Cairo, 14 February 2012)
The lack of quality education constitutes not only a problem for individual
entrepreneurs but also for the general development of Egypt’s private sec-
tor. Many experts emphasised that the educational system suffers from sig-
nificant quality deficits and is therefore responsible for the widespread lack
of entrepreneurial spirit, management capacities and innovation potential
among Egyptian SME owners:
“There is a lack of creativity which is due to the education system. It does
not push talents, it does not teach you how to market ideas, how to become
a risk taker, how to transfer an idea to an output, how to get market infor-
mation.” (Mona Garf, Cairo University, 29 February 2012)
The need for educational system reform has been emphasised by Kirby and
Ibrahim (2011) as well as Parnell (1995), who compare the entrepreneurial
propensity of Egyptian with American and British students. Both studies
concluded that the Egyptian educational system stifles entrepreneurialism. 
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In 2010, according to the World Economic Forum, Egypt ranked 132nd
among 142 countries in mathematics and science, and 133rd with regard to
business schools (WEF 2010). The 2011 World Economic Forum (WEF)
Global Competitiveness Report, ranked Egypt’s educational system 135th
among 142 countries. Given that in 2010, Egypt’s capacity to innovate was
ranked 109th (WEF 2010), the figures from 2011 should come as no surprise.
Work experience: As important for SME upgrading as the other factors
cited above is quality work experience, which can be derived in four ways:
(i) working at the company of the father or other relative (often an uncle),
(ii) working at the lead firm or a large, well-established firm in the same
sector, (iii) working in a less well-established firm, or (iv) attending busi-
ness school. No one we interviewed had taken the fourth route. Our results
showed that by far the most useful experience is working at a lead firm or
another large and well-established firm in the same sector. While a recent
study41 by the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation confirmsthat working
for a family business tends to expose the would-be entrepreneur to tradi-
tional company structures and production modes, but it can also provide
technical know-how about business operations as well as the managerial
skills needed to steer the business through hard times.
Of our interviewees, 45 per cent considered work experience to be an im-
portant factor for differences in the success of Egyptian SMEs to upgrade.
This finding was confirmed by the fact that 60 per cent of the upgraders
interviewed had worked in another company in the same sector before start-
ing their own business – in contrast to 43 per cent of the non-upgraders. In
other words, among the successful upgraders, 76 per cent of the SME own-
ers had worked previously and 33 per cent had not (Table A17 in annex).
According to the t-test, this difference is statistically significant at the 10
per cent confidence level (see Table 11). 
In addition, 30 per cent of the gazelles stated that their main reason for start-
ing a business was that they had considerable work experience in the same
sector – in contrast to only 18 per cent of the non-upgraders (Table A14).
However, as with education, we found evidence that the quality of work
experience is more important than the work experience as such. Working
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for a relative or in just any small company in the sector has only limited pos-
itive influence on an SME owner’s upgrading potential. Experience as a
simple worker in production is not very helpful, either. In contrast, an entre-
preneur’s experience in an influential position in a foreign company, an
Egyptian exporter or another lead firm in the same sector is very helpful –
especially if the entrepreneur starts a firm that subsequently supplies that
lead firm. Several interviewees reported that they had greatly benefited
from such work because it enhanced their marketing skills, improved their
awareness of customer needs and preferences, provided them with infor-
mation about the structure of the sector, the characteristics of suppliers,
buyers and competitors, the requirements for exporting and important con-
tacts. A female food producer from the 6th of October City reported:
“I worked for a long time in a multinational company so I know the inter-
national language and the culture of the export business.” (Food producer,
6th of October City, 29 February 2012)
A producer of processed vegetables from Mahalla al Kubra similarly argued:
“The contacts I have from working for BEST Juices [the biggest juice pro-
ducer in the Middle East] are my success factor.” (Food producer, Mahalla
al Kubra, 15 March 2012)
International exposure: Having some kind of international exposure is also
relevant for SME upgrading. Of the upgraders interviewed, 70 per cent had
travelled abroad to study, or for professional or private reasons, but only 48
per cent of the non-upgraders had been abroad. According to a t-test, this
difference is statistically significant at the 5 per cent confidence level
(Table 11).
Although international exposure is supposed to be highly correlated with
the educational background of SME owners, it deserves separate analysis
because an SME owner’s educational attainment and international experi-
ence variously influence their potential to upgrade. An SME owner’s inter-
national experience can help the business by generating new business ideas,
providing information on export markets and marketing skills, as well as by
providing business contacts. This was substantiated by the qualitative and
quantitative analyses of our interviews. McCormick and Wahba (2002)
found that international exposure fosters entrepreneurship: the percentage
of entrepreneurs was significantly higher among migrants who had returned
to Egypt than among people who shared other similarities.
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One quarter of our interviewees cited foreign travel as an important source
of their business ideas (Table A26 in Annex); for upgraders the rate was
even higher (43 per cent). A textile producer from Cairo said: 
“I travel a lot to see what is new, I visit international trade fairs, I search
for new designs, colours and materials.” (Textile producer, Cairo, 17
March 2012)
Travelling abroad can also generate ideas regarding product innovation as a
channel for upgrading. A producer of goat cheese noted: 
“When my father was in Holland he visited a dairy-goat farm and he liked
the goat cheese. He thought to himself: Why should we not do the same
thing in Egypt?” (Food processor, Cairo, 29 February 2012)
Of the upgraders, 14 per cent said that travelling abroad was helpful for mak-
ing business contacts (Table A20 in Annex), which they considered impor-
tant for importing and exporting as well as for purchasing machinery:
“A key determinant of our success is that my father travelled to Spain and
brought back new machines. Without these new machines, I would not be
successful.” (Producer of processed vegetables, Tanta, 13 March 2012)
Social capital
Although social relations play a role in the upgrading of SMEs in Egypt, it
is difficult to assess the magnitude of their impact. Several SME owners
emphasised the importance of social relations for their success in upgrad-
ing, but most interviewees said that other factors were more important.
Social relations apparently matter in some areas and hardly at all in others;
their influence also varies considerably between different economic sec-
tors. They do not play much of a role in the three sectors we studied (tex-
tiles and garments, food processing and ICT), but it is likely that social re-
lations are more important for other sectors. 
According to our survey, social relations are especially important in state-
business relations. In Arab countries, social relations are often called
‘wasţa’ (‘connection’), which denotes the misuse of a position (in a com-
pany or the public administration) to help a friend or relative, or favourit-
ism (Loewe et al. 2007, 21). Well-connected entrepreneurs can use their
social relations with public officials, other entrepreneurs or influential peo-
ple to speed up procedures in the public administration or judicial system,
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reduce their costs or influence their outcome. The use of wasţa seems to be
very common practice in public tenders in Egypt:
“Government tenders are not won by the best product with the best price
but by the company that has wasţa.” (Textile producer, Cairo, 29 Febru-
ary 2012)
However, only a third of the SME owners covered by our survey admitted
to regularly using their wasţa. Most interviewees stated that wasţa may be
helpful but is rarely indispensable. This is in stark contrast to the findings
of a recent DIE study on Jordan (Loewe et al. 2007). Some observers hold
that wasţa is more of a problem in Jordan, while bribery is more problem-
atic in Egypt.42 Wasţa presumably plays a much more important role in
Egypt for medium- to large-sized companies and in other sectors than those
we studied.
In areas other than state-business relations, the role that social capital plays
on SME upgrading in Egypt is ambiguous. The parallel case studies con-
ducted in India and the Philippines reveal that social relations considerably
impact on many aspects that are relevant for SME upgrading: access to
finance, advice, know-how, emotional support, the provision of cheap
labour by family members, connections, child care, etc. In India, a distinc-
tion can be made between the impact of strong social ties (especially refer-
ring to the nuclear family) and weak social ties (more distant relatives,
neighbours, friends, etc.). In Egypt, however, only 19 of our interviewees
stated that social relations were significant for business, while four of these
stated that the effect of social relations was very negative. Only one inter-
viewee had received funding from a relative to finance business investments
(Tables A12, A14a and A28 in Annex).
This might be because personal relations can cause conflicts of private and
professional interests. A textile producer from Cairo, for instance, noted
that his father had felt obliged to employ his uncle in the family business.
But the uncle did not do a good job. 
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“Still, he is my uncle, so I could not tell him anything. It was a typical con-
flict between personal and professional interests. In other companies, you
can find many other cases where no separation is made between business
and family relations.” (Textile producer, Cairo, 7 March 2012)
Hardly any interviewees reported greatly benefiting from family or friends.
Some had been able to borrow small or moderate amounts of money when
they were insolvent but none mentioned receiving more substantial assis-
tance to operate the enterprise. 
This may be due to four reasons: First, entrepreneurship is not particularly
appreciated in Egypt. Many interviewees stressed that Egyptian culture
does not tolerate failure so people reject risky projects, and workers much
prefer stable wage employment even if it is low-paid. Second, in Egypt there
seems to be a lack of trust between people in general and businesspeople in
particular. Some observers believe that this is because many people have at
least heard how others were unable to recoup money they had lent to friends
and relatives, which is another expression of the difficulty of enforcing
legal claims in Egypt, as well as the limited predictability of the course and
outcome of judicial processes (Magdy 2012, 18). Third, businesspeople are
not accustomed to co-operating because they have never learnt to do so.
Even at school, pupils are taught to do their work alone rather than on teams
(Al-Ayouty 2011). Fourth, SME owners’ social networks may be weak:
While relatives and friends might be ready to provide support, like the own-
ers, they may lack capital, trained workers and good business ideas. This
indicates that the problem is the inferior quality of SME owners’ social net-
works, not that they do not exist.43
Behavioural characteristics
Our survey revealed two other personal qualities that are determinants of
SME upgrading in Egypt: ambition (motivation and dedication) and the
readiness to take risks. 
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Ambition: According to our interviews, ambition is one of the most impor-
tant factors for upgrading in Egypt, with 45 per cent of the respondents stat-
ing that variations in the ambition of owners was one of the main reasons
that some SMEs were more successful at upgrading than others (see Figure
17). For upgraders, the percentage was even higher: 55 per cent of the
gazelles identified ambition as a positive factor as compared with only 38
per cent of the non-upgraders (Table A13 in Annex). Of the gazelles, 35 per
cent identified ambition as the single most important factor positively
affecting their business – as compared with just 18 per cent of the non-
upgraders (Tables A14a and A14b in Annex). This finding coincides with
the results of the case studies on SMEs in India and the Philippines. 
Some SME owners explained that their motivation and dedication were
shown by their constant efforts to improve the business and products, and
by their persistence and efforts to overcome problems. A textile producer
from Cairo said: 
“My ambition is important. I am more persistent than many of my friends,
many of them closed their business in the last years.” (Textile producer,
Cairo, 15 March 2012)
One of the experts told us: 
“Some manage to grow because they are smart, well-qualified, and indi-
vidually skilled. And they are fighters, they continue even after having
failed two or three times.” (Mona Garf, Cairo University, 29 February
2012)
Risk acceptance:The readiness to take risks also plays an important role for
SME upgrading in Egypt. It is part-and-parcel of entrepreneurship, or as a
textile producer from Sharqiyya put it: 
“I produce a lot, hoping that Mother’s Day will trigger high demand. You
have to take risks to be successful.” (Textile producer, Sharqiyya, 8 March
2012)
A fourth of all SME owners – most of whom were upgraders – identified
risk acceptance as a factor, explaining that some entrepreneurs are more
successful in upgrading than others (Tables A13a and A14a in Annex). 
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
128 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
An entrepreneur’s readiness to accept risks is dependent on three factors: (i)
their individual exposure to risks, that is, the number and significance of
individual risks (probability and expected effect of risk occurrence); (ii)
their personal affinity for risks, which depends on the shape of the owner’s
individual function44 of utility on income; and (iii) their ability to manage
(prevent, mitigate or cope with) risks.
There can be significant differences between entrepreneurs with regard to
the first factor. Some are exposed to many major risks, while others are
exposed to fewer and less significant risks. However, many of the risks in
running a business – such as exchange rate fluctuations or increases in in-
put prices – are unavoidable and there is no way to insure against them. For
instance, a food producer from Cairo said that without his willingness to
take risks he would not have been able to export to Australia or Japan
(Cairo, 29 February 2012).
Regarding risk affinity, an expert said that on average, Egyptian entrepre-
neurs do not rank very high in terms of this personal characteristic.
“The main problem is culture! Companies in Egypt are underestimating
the importance of innovation. Also, they are no risk takers. They try to do
always the same thing again as they have learnt it rather than to do some-
thing new.” (Dalia Gamal, TIEC, 4 March 2012)
The third component of a person’s ability to accept risks – to manage risks
– is the only one that can be altered either by the individual or with outside
help. For example, the government can provide insurance against the most
serious risks for entrepreneurs (theft, fire, input-price fluctuations, bad
weather, etc.). Our findings show that insurance is not an important factor
in SME upgrading in Egypt (see Section 5.2.4), but this may be due to the
fact that neither the market nor the government offers the kind of insurance
products that SME owners need to withstand their main risks.
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In principle, entrepreneurs can diversify their risks by widening their product
range or serving different markets (e.g. the domestic and foreign markets).
However, we did not find evidence that these steps significantly impact SME
upgrading in Egypt. The DIE parallel case studies reveal that portfolio diver-
sification has had a significant positive effect on SME upgrading in the
Philippines but ambiguous results in India – though market diversification
did help Indian SMEs to upgrade (Hampel-Milagrosa 2013; Reeg 2013a). It
is possible that most of our SMEs were too small to sufficiently diversify
their portfolios or offer their products on more than one market.
As long as entrepreneurs can neither prevent their risks nor mitigate them
(by insurance or diversification), their risk-management capacity mostly
depends on their own background risk, i.e. the assets that they can use to
cope with risks. Poor people are obviously much more vulnerable to spe-
cific risks than rich people. Unfortunately, however, we could not find evi-
dence for this correlation because we were unable to retrieve reliable data
regarding the wealth of the entrepreneurs we interviewed.
We did, however, find evidence that the arbitrary application of laws by
public officials in Egypt strongly affects Egyptian SME owners’ readiness
to accept risk. Deficits in the rule of law are a major source of risk for
SMEs, and reduce an owner’s willingness to accept additional risks. Many
interviewees cited these deficits as the reason for their reluctance to inno-
vate and take new, often unknown, risks.
Gender
Our results did not provide evidence that female entrepreneurs face more
difficulties than male entrepreneurs in upgrading their companies. Some
female SME owners even emphasised that they had some advantages over
their male competitors.
Our sample included 15 SMEs owned by women (Table A5 in annex), mak-
ing the share of female entrepreneurs 19 per cent, just a bit shy of their share
of all SME owners in Egypt (20 per cent). Only five female interviewees –
three of them upgraders – identified their gender as an important factor for
their business – and four of them considered it to have a positive effect on
their potential to upgrade. Only one female entrepreneur stated that being a
woman constituted a challenge to doing business in Egypt.
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A female textiles producer from Cairo said: 
“I can motivate my staff. People think: You are a woman – you can make
a factory? Wow! Clients are impressed. I try to change the mentality of my
culture.” (Textiles producer, Cairo, 4 March 2012) 
Other female entrepreneurs from the textiles and garments sector stated that
it was easier for women to run a company in their sector because they know
more about marketing and fashion.
Some female interviewees said that women entrepreneurs are often con-
fronted with gender-specific challenges. However, these challenges appear
as soon as a woman considers starting a business and not just when she tries
to upgrade her company. They are due to widespread concerns among both
among men and women in Egypt about women’s participation in economic
activities. Egyptian society is very conservative, with values and norms that
favour a strict distinction between the functions of men and women in the
economy and the society. 
For instance, many men forbid their wives to work outside the family home,
which means that some married female entrepreneurs can only run the busi-
ness from home. The female owner of a food-processing company in Giza
told us that despite this restriction she had been able to found a company
that prepares pre-cooked meals. The company started with three employees
and now employs around 30 workers to supply Egyptian and foreign retail
chains like Carrefour.
Some women entrepreneurs also said that they did not have enough social
contacts to grow their businesses or that they felt hindered by a lack of self-
confidence. One female textiles producer from Cairo said that the opportu-
nity to meet and talk with other women entrepreneurs was helpful and
encouraging. 
“At the beginning I was afraid because it is harder for women to do busi-
ness – especially in manufacturing and if you want to create something.
Then I started to visit the meetings of the Businesswomen of Egypt 21
association and I saw that other ladies do the same.” (Textiles producer,
Cairo, 13 March 2012)
Some of our experts maintained that there is no structural discrimination
against women in Egypt’s legal framework. Nevertheless, many female
entrepreneurs have difficulty combining business and family. Being held
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responsible for the family also affects their readiness to take risks: they tend
to be more conservative in their investment and business decisions because
they worry about the consequences of business failure for their families. Of
course, the way women are raised also affects their entrepreneurial spirit.
“Women tend to be more conservative than men. We are raised to be fear-
ful. We do not like to take risks because we have been taught to think about
the consequences of our doing for our family and children. Our culture is
not permitting us to go into business.” (Amany Asfour, Egyptian Business
Women Association, 14 February 2012)
These findings are confirmed by quantitative analyses of our sample and
the EICS panel data. In our sample, the share of women entrepreneurs is
much higher (28 per cent) among the upgraders than among the non-
upgraders (13 per cent). According to the t-test, this difference is statisti-
cally significant at the 5 per cent confidence level (Table 11). However, this
difference could be a result of selection bias because we selected an above-
average share of female-owned SMEs on the recommendations of experts
who are more aware of comparatively successful companies than those who
have failed to upgrade. This bias came about because of concerns that we
would not be able to find enough female-owned SMEs and asked represen-
tatives of several women’s business associations to suggest one or two of
their members for interviews. The regressions that we ran with the EICS
panel data from 2004 and 2008 did not provide any evidence for a statisti-
cally significant correlation between an SME owner’s gender and the firm’s
upgrading success (Table C1 in Annex).
5.2.2 Firm characteristics 
Two firm characteristics appear to be particularly important for the upgrad-
ing efforts of SMEs in Egypt: (i) knowledge and innovation management in
general (and market research in particular) in addition to (ii) HRD. Both
have emerged as the main characteristics for upgrading SMEs in India and
the Philippines as well. In Egypt, other factors such as corporate gover-
nance or the firm’s location, size, age or sector also play roles, but they are
less significant. A firm’s degree of formality tends to result from its success
in upgrading rather than to affect it, while the role of portfolio and market
diversification is ambiguous, although it appears to significantly impact
SME upgrading in the Philippines and India (Hampel-Milagrosa 2013;
Reeg 2013a).
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Knowledge and innovation management
Knowledge and innovation management, which includes both market and
technological research, plays an important role in SME upgrading. 
In Egypt, the lack of reliable market information forces private enterprises
to conduct their own market research (El-Megharbel 2008, 6). However,
many SME owners do not have the necessary capacities. Most of our inter-
viewees – upgraders and non-upgraders – reported conducting some mar-
ket research, but that of the upgraders generally appeared to be more
sophisticated than that of the non-upgraders, who mostly researched online,
on television or by observing competitors. In contrast, many upgraders got
new product ideas at international fairs or exhibitions as well as from for-
eign travel, or by constantly soliciting customer feedback. A food processor
told us:
“Most of the new recipes that I introduce in my butchery are from my cus-
tomers, for example, from a well-known restaurant here in Cairo, ‘Swiss
Restaurants’.” (Food processor, Cairo, 7 March 2012)
A Cairo producer of goat cheese said:
“Staying in regular contact with our clients helps us a lot to keep our high-
level quality and to improve and further develop our products.” (Food pro-
ducer, Cairo, 29 February 2012)
A producer of sweets described his strategy:
“I needed to do market research so I went to cafes and restaurants. I
thought a lot about what I can do to serve my customers. Then I recog-
nised that 90 per cent of the restaurants in Egypt outsource deserts and I
saw the need for a high-quality product.” (Sweets producer, Cairo, 26
March 2012)
There are various reasons why many non-upgraders do not conduct proper
market research: some are unaware of its importance, while others lack the
proper skills or budget.
“We conducted a field study and the SMEs told us that their main problem
is that they do not know how to get market information.” (Mona Garf,
Cairo University, Giza, 19 February 2012)
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SME owners’ success in upgrading similarly depends on their investments
in technological research, and product and process development – a finding
that is in line with the results of the case studies on SME upgrading in India
and the Philippines (Reeg 2013a; Hampel-Milagrosa 2013). The results of
our econometric estimations that were run with the EICS panel data showed
that an SME with a specialised R&D department was more likely to grow
than one without: the correlation coefficient was very high and the correla-
tion was statistically significant at the 5 per cent confidence level. But the
estimations did not provide evidence that the use of foreign technology pos-
itively influences the likelihood of SMEs to grow (Table C1 in Annex).
Earlier studies reported that most SME owners in Egypt lack adequate
knowledge and innovation management. El-Mahdi (2006) and Hattab
(2008), for example, showed that SME owners in Egypt invest very little
in R&D.
Macro data indicated that the whole country spends only about 0.2 per cent
of its gross domestic product (GDP) on R&D, which is not only far below
the average of EU countries (1.8 per cent of GDP) but also below the aver-
age spending of MENA countries (0.3 per cent) (UNESCO 2010, 259).
Large-scale R&D projects are very rare in Egypt, and private R&D spend-
ing is very low (Stevenson 2010, 238). National experts reported a negligi-
ble transfer of knowledge and technology from universities and public
research centres to new and growing firms (Hattab 2008). According to the
WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report, Egypt ranked 106th of 142 coun-
tries with regard to company spending on R&D (WEF 2011).
This problem may be at least partly due to the fact that Egypt is – to some
degree – a rentier economy: Its significant natural resources (energy, the
Suez Canal, etc.) give it easy access to foreign income (see Section 3.1).
According to the first Arab Human Development Report (UNDP / AFESD
2003), rentier economies tend to exploit available raw materials and for-
eign expertise rather than build up domestic knowledge capabilities. While
this strategy generates quick and easy returns, creating know-how within
the country requires considerable effort, time and money. That is why ren-
tier economies encourage spending and acquisition – and a mind-set that is
rarely interested in the risk-taking that is part of innovative entrepreneurial
activity (UNDP / AFESD 2003).
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Human resource development
Investment in human resources is another major determinant of SME up-
grading in Egypt. Almost half of the company owners identified the lack of
skilled labour and the high turnover of trained workers as major obstacles
to doing business in Egypt. Firms that were able to make up for this deficit
through an effective HRD strategy were significantly more likely to up-
grade than others. Training for workers, the creation of incentives for them
to remain at the firm and their integration into the decision-making
processes were major factors of success for SME upgrading efforts. All
these factors were also identified in the case studies on SME upgrading in
India and the Philippines (Reeg 2013a; Hampel-Milagrosa 2013).
Our SME survey indicated that in Egypt the lack of and high turnover of
skilled workers is the most serious challenge for both SME upgraders and
non-upgraders: 35 per cent of our interviewees identified it as the single
most important constraint on doing business while 45 per cent considered
it to be among the four biggest constraints. Firms with more than 20 em-
ployees complained about this issue the most: 71 per cent – in comparison
with just 31 per cent for companies with fewer than 10 employees (Table
A11 in Annex). 
Other empirical studies support our findings. According to the EICS panel
data, 51 per cent of owners of all formalised SMEs viewed the Egyptian
workforce’s low level of education and training to be one of their main con-
straints (Enterprise Surveys 2004/ 2008), while the WEF Global Competi-
tiveness Report 2010–2011 ranked the lack of skilled labour as the second
most serious constraint on doing business in Egypt (WEF 2011). A study
commissioned by the Egyptian Ministry of Finance (MoF 2008) also con-
cluded that SME owners found it difficult to keep qualified and commit-
ted workers.
Lack of skilled workers: The lack of skilled labour is mainly due to Egypt’s
inferior educational system and the mismatch between school and university
curricula regarding the knowledge that employers require (El-Megharbel
2008, 6). According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011, Egypt
ranked 135th among 142 countries regarding the quality of its educational
system and 131st with regard to the quality of staff training (WEF 2011).
Many graduates have skills that the private sector does not need. Many busi-
ness people therefore rely on better skilled, but more expensive, expatriates
(Malik 2011). Mohamed Youssef from the Ministry of Finance confirmed: 
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“Education is really an important issue. For example, university gradu-
ates enter the labour market and expect to find good jobs, but the market
does not need engineers, it needs technically trained workers.” (Mohamed
Youssef, Ministry of Finance, Cairo, 16 February 2012)
High worker turnover: The lack of well-trained workers is the main reason
for the high turnover of labour in Egyptian SMEs. Since there are not
enough properly trained workers on the market, many companies try to
poach well-trained workers from their competitors by offering a marginal-
ly higher wage that many workers gladly accept. This creates competition
between firms in the recruitment of skilled labour.
The share of SME owners who considered the lack of and high turnover of
skilled workers in Egypt to be among their main constraints was almost
equal among upgraders (47 per cent) and non-upgraders (43 per cent). It
was a bit lower only for gazelles (37 per cent) (Table A11a in Annex).
Training of workers: Still, worker training accounted for differences in
upgrading success. At 25 per cent of the gazelles at least 50 per cent of the
workers had formal vocational training per cent, while this was true for a
mere 6 per cent of the non-upgraders (Figure 18). Similarly, at 25 per cent
of the upgraders at least 20 per cent of all workers had formal vocational
training – which was true for only 5 per cent of the non-upgraders. This dif-
ference is statistically significant at the 5 per cent confidence level (Table
11). The results of the econometric estimations that we ran with the EICS
panel data confirmed this finding. The share of workers in a company with
formal vocational training correlated positively with the company’s likeli-
hood to upgrade between 2004 and 2008; this correlation was statistically
significant at the 5 per cent confidence level (Table C1 in Annex C). 
The SME owners in our sample themselves also viewed worker training as
one of the main factors why some SMEs were more successful in upgrad-
ing than others. Among the gazelle owners, 40 per cent identified this as
one of the most important reasons for their success while 18 per cent of the
non-upgrader owners considered that other firms were more successful be-
cause their workers were better trained (Table A14a in Annex).
The quantitative analysis of our interviews explained this seeming contra-
diction: All SMEs in Egypt suffer from the lack of trained workers on the
labour market, but some manage to solve this problem and upgrade. We
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found that upgraders are better able to attract trained workers, train un-
trained workers and keep skilled workers at the firm than non-upgraders.
Several SME owners – mostly upgraders – sent their workers to specialised
training. Since 2005, numerous commercial training institutes have offered
short-term training courses that are very generously subsidised by the
Industrial Modernization Center (IMC). Many manufacturing companies
have taken advantage of these courses, thereby creating a stable and reliable
source of income for the training institutes.
Most of our SME owners, however, have not taken advantage of this oppor-
tunity. Many said that the IMC-subsidised training courses were not useful
because the content was geared to the needs of medium-sized to large,
rather than micro to small, enterprises. The SME owners also did not want
many workers to be absent from work for several weeks at a time. They
maintained that they could not afford to continue paying them if they were
not actually working on-site.
Many SME owners have instead offered in-house training for their work-
ers. Some of them claimed that providing on-the-job training was an effec-
tive strategy – not only for improving workers’ skills but also for boosting
their loyalty to the firm, that is, to keep the workers:
“Most of my employees come directly after graduating. I mostly train them
in-house. The turnover of my employees is not very high. Most of my
employees stay for long time because I give them the training. I have a
good personal relationship with them and I sometimes pay them extra
money as incentive.” (Software producer, Cairo, 29 March 2012)
The owner of a leading firm in the food sector confirmed:
“Our vision was, and is, to grow within the company. We wanted the peo-
ple we employ to grow. Wadi Food has the concept to start with employ-
ees without experience and then train them. This is the strength of the Wadi
Group. This creates loyalty to the company. Wadi has its own training sys-
tem in firm. This is our success strategy.” (Khalil Nasrallah, Wadi Food,
Cairo, 27 February 2012)
Other SME owners, however, stated that it was useless to train workers, and
recounted their bad experiences with worker training: After the training was
finished, the workers had left for another firm in the same field (often a
direct competitor), which offered higher wages or better career prospects:
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“Trained workers are a big problem. Graduates come fresh out of school
or university and know nothing. We have to teach them and when they are
finally trained, they leave the company.” (Food processor, 6th of October
City, 6 March 2012)
Many SME owners are reluctant to train their workers at all – “fearing that
the trained employees will move on to competitors”. (Natalija El-Hage,
GTZ, 28 March 2010) They would prefer to have untrained workers rather
than invest in their training and lose them shortly thereafter.
We did in fact find ample evidence that training workers bears consider-
able risks – especially for women who tend to stop working once they get
married or give birth, and who sometimes also leave the firm to do agricul-
tural work during the harvesting season. The risk is especially problematic
in sectors such as ICT where former employees take the firm’s ‘intellectu-
al property’ with them… in some cases, to competitors. 
Incentives for workers: Some SME owners concluded that they needed to
do more than just train their workers – that it might be more important to
provide incentives for trained, motivated and capable workers by allowing
them to participate in the organisation of production and marketing pro-
cesses. Upgraders in particular described their HRD strategy as an effec-
tive instrument against high worker turnover. This view is in line with the
results of the case studies on SME upgrading in India and the Philippines
(Reeg 2013a; Hampel-Milagrosa 2013).
One way to build loyalty among workers is to offer above-average pay, and
a textiles producer from Cairo pays not monthly but weekly, adding monthly
premiums for workers who fulfil certain criteria such as showing up on time
every day.
A software producer confirmed: 
“Extra money and good relations seems to be a factor to keep people.”
(ICT business owner, Cairo, 29 March 2012)
Some entrepreneurs share the additional profits from a new product or an
improved production or marketing process with their workers as a reward
for their good ideas or extra effort. 
Other entrepreneurs offer non-wage benefits such as free private health in-
surance, meals or transportation to work. Or they make it possible for fe-
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male workers to bring their children to work by setting up a small day-care
centre at the firm.
In order to attract and keep female workers, SME owners also must deal with
the fact that many fathers or husbands forbid them to work outside the home.
Some companies relied on the ‘putting-out system’, which was common in
some rural regions of Europe at the beginning of the industrial revolution. In
Egypt, this is particularly widespread among informal textile companies that
are women-owned. The company owners hire a very limited number of
workers to work in the factory with formal employment contracts and out-
source much of their production to female home workers, who do all their
work at home. Factory owners deliver the raw materials to where the women
live and collect the finished products. Home workers are paid ‘by the piece’,
that is, a certain amount for each satisfactorily finished piece of work. This
practice helps employers prevent a big turnover of female employees and
allows home workers to combine work and family. Homework is not practi-
cal, however, when large machinery is required for production.
Good working atmosphere: Some interviewees stated that a pleasant work
environment or good treatment suffices to improve workers’ loyalty.
“Since my employees are already trained, I want to retain them, because
this is better for the quality of my product. That is why I have to be patient
with them.” (Textile producer, Cairo, 25 March 2012)
In this context, one interviewee stressed that he was one of the few employ-
ers in town who did not beat his workers. (!)
Worker participation: Another element of human resource development is
participation. Some upgraders encouraged their employees to give feed-
back to managers and submit ideas for improving products or production
processes. Some entrepreneurs even let their workers participate in deci-
sion-making, for example, in reorganising the firm’s production processes.
Mohammed Hameed from the Textile Development Center maintained that
such a strategy was not easy in a cultural setting where top-down decision-
making is the norm. He emphasised how crucial it is for successful
upgraders to not just train their workers: employers must improve their
management skills in order to attract and retain well-trained workers.45
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Some entrepreneurs, however, admitted having installed cameras in the fac-
tories in order to constantly monitor their workers – instead of creating
incentives for them. 
Corporate governance 
Several SME owners and experts emphasised that weaknesses in corporate
governance compound the difficulties that Egyptian SME owners have in
upgrading. They noted that most companies in Egypt are still ‘one-man-
shows’, meaning that the family business is run by just one family member
– the patriarch – who has complete authority. One expert put this approach
into words: “This is my company, and I do not want anybody else to man-
age it!” (Ahmed El Sayed, NILEX, Cairo, 28 February 2012). The firm’s
strong hierarchical organisation is rooted in the highly patrimonial nature of
Egyptian society: vertical structures and decision-making processes. Seg-
ments, rather than classes, are the main objects of identification, and deci-
sions are taken in an authoritarian top-down, rather than a participatory, way.
In contrast, some upgraders highlighted the positive role of decentralised
decision-making and teamwork as a main factor in their success. One stat-
ed that teamwork was good for business because everyone could rely on the
others, with each person performing the tasks they were most suited.
Another upgrader stressed the importance of the division of labour within
the company:
“We work in a team, together we can do it. I have a rather small turnover
in staff: they stay. I invest in my team. I now have planning, accounting,
HR.” (Textile producer, Cairo, 04 March 2012)
Corporate governance affects the upgrading of SMEs in Egypt in three
ways. First, it paves the way for obtaining external finance from investors
or through an initial public offering. Second, good corporate governance
leads to the introduction of improved internal control systems, which result
in more accountability and higher profitability – for instance, by minimis-
ing losses due to fraud. Third, conflicts between owners and mid-level
managers can be reduced by corporate governance structures (Abou El-
Fotouh 2009).
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Location 
Our results show that both the geographical and structural dimensions of the
location can affect an SME’s upgrading potential – even though not all that
much. This finding coincides with the results of the DIE case studies on
SMEs in India and the Philippines (Reeg 2013a; Hampel-Milagrosa 2013).
Geographical dimension of the location: Both in our sample and that of the
EICS, the share of upgraders was higher in some governorates and lower in
others. As much as 61 per cent of the companies in the Nile Delta (the Ghar-
biyya and Sharqiyya governorates) were found to be upgraders, but only 42
per cent of the companies in ‘Greater Cairo’ (Cairo and Giza, see Table A3
in Annex). Furthermore, 44 per cent of the SME owners in Greater Cairo
that identified their location as an important factor for upgrading stated that
it had a positive impact on business, while 56 per cent said that it had a neg-
ative impact. Only 44 per cent of our interview partners in Gharbiyya and
31 per cent of those in Sharqiyya believed that their location negatively
influenced the business.
However, the t-test showed that these differences are not statistically signif-
icant and could be due to a selection bias. A considerable number of inter-
view partners in Greater Cairo were selected by walking through the streets
(see Section 4.3.2), but that method was not used to find most of the SMEs
in the Delta. There, most SMEs were selected from enterprise registries and
other company lists, which meant that almost all of them were formal. 
Interestingly, the econometric analysis of EICS panel data provided addi-
tional evidence that upgrading is slightly easier for SMEs outside Greater
Cairo – especially in the Gharbiyya and Sharqiyya governorates. In all speci-
fications of the logit estimations, the coefficients for Sharqiyya (and Al-
Minya) were slightly positive, with the correlation found to be statistically
significant (in some specifications even at the 1 per cent confidence level,
with the governorate of Cairo as the reference category in all cases). The
coefficients for Gharbiyya were also positive, but there the correlation was
found to be statistically significant in only two specifications (those with
upgrading as the dependent variable) and not in the two others that had
gazelle upgrading as the dependent variable (see Table C2 in Annex).
In contrast to these results, several experts on private-sector development in
Egypt were convinced that upgrading is more difficult outside Cairo and
Alexandria because business development services (BDSs) are more ac-
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cessible in the two metropolitan areas than elsewhere. This contradiction
could be explained by the fact that BDSs are not a very important factor for
upgrading in Egypt (see Section 5.2.4). 
Structural dimension of the location: Other aspects of the location of SMEs
also seem to play limited roles in upgrading. For example, the qualitative
analysis of our SME owners’ interviews revealed that some locations – even
in the same town – are more accessible by public transport than others,
which reduces the employees’ costs and commuting time, as well as the risk
of arriving late because of heavy traffic.
The social milieu at a firm’s location seems to be a factor in its upgrading
potential. Particularly owners of small shops mentioned that their location
not only determined the quantity but also the kinds of customers. Some
SME owners stated that being located in a neighbourhood with low pur-
chasing power constituted a relevant constraint for the business. 
“I can only sell at a low price, because the income level of my clients is
low.” (Producer of sweets, Cairo, 28 March 2012) 
Our quantitative analysis provided some evidence that being located in an
industrial zone could impact positively on an SME’s upgrading potential. In
our sample, the SMEs that are located in an industrial zone are all up-
graders; according to the t-test, this correlation is statistically significant at
the 5 per cent confidence level (Table 11). 
The econometric analysis of the EICS supports this finding. It shows that
between 2004 and 2008, being located in an industrial zone was positively
correlated with becoming a gazelle (though not with becoming an upgrad-
er); this correlation is statistically significant at the 5 per cent confidence
level (Table C1 in Annex).
However, the correlation could be due to reverse causality because it is
unusual for an SME to be located in an industrial zone. An SME only moves
to an industrial zone once it has outgrown its original location – usually in
a town or village – because it is more difficult to hire workers in the zones. 
Other studies have shown that SMEs in urban areas have more potential to
upgrade than those in rural areas. El-Mahdi (2006), for example, showed
that the owners of SMEs in urban areas (about half of all SMEs in Egypt)
are wealthier, a fact that she interprets as an indicator of their business suc-
cess. The share of manufacturing SMEs, which tend to be more innovative
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than trade or services SMEs, is slightly higher in urban than in rural areas
(El-Mahdi 2006). Our sample did not address this issue because it included
very few rural SMEs.
Our research also did not provide evidence on the possible impact of being
located in a geographical cluster. In our sample 16 SMEs were located in
areas that were home to many similar SMEs: nine of them were upgraders
and seven were non-upgraders. According to the t-test, this difference is not
statistically significant (Table 11).
Size
Our findings were rather ambiguous with regard to the significance of an
SME’s size. A total of 28 entrepreneurs stated that a firm’s size affects its
upgrading potential: 19 said that the size of their own company had a posi-
tive impact, and seven said that the size of their company was a constraint
(Tables A12 and A14a in Annex). However, both groups included enter-
prises from all size brackets, meaning that the result is inconclusive.
Small firms might suffer more than others from lack of finance: 34 per cent
of the companies with fewer than 10 employees complained about difficul-
ties accessing finance, while the share was only 13 per cent for companies
with more than 20 employees (Table A11b in Annex). This correlation could
be due to reverse causality since it is easier for companies with access to
finance to grow and they might have grown before being interviewed.
Small firms may have more problems with state-business relations such as
registration, licensing, taxation or company inspections. The qualitative
analysis of our SME sample suggests that large companies are more able to
bribe public officials thus avoiding administrative red tape.
Some interviewees also associated large company size with a higher budg-
et for worker training which in turn had a positive effect on the SME’s up-
grading potential. At the same time, however, larger companies seemed to
suffer more than smaller ones from the lack of trained workers. Of the
SMEs with at least 20 employees, 71 identified the lack as a major obsta-
cle, while only 31 per cent of companies with fewer than 10 employees did.
Likewise, 26 per cent of the companies with at least 20 employees com-
plained about the high turnover of workers compared with 3 per cent of the
companies with fewer than 10 employees (Table A11b in Annex). It might
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be more difficult for an Egyptian company to attract and retain a large num-
ber of trained workers than a small number of them.
Some SME owners stated that small companies have more problems than
big ones in obtaining access to government support services, finance and
land. In our sample, 13 per cent of the companies with more than 20 em-
ployees identified the lack of land for production as a major constraint, but
only 3 per cent of the SMEs with less than 10 employees did (Table A11b
in Annex).
In any case, the initial size of a company does not seem to have any impact
on its upgrading potential. We found no evidence for a correlation in either
our SME sample or in the EICS panel data (Tables A8 and C1 in Annex).
The gazelles in our sample started their businesses with an average of seven
employees, while non-upgraders began with an average of eight.
Age
While younger SMEs are more likely to upgrade, this correlation is proba-
bly not the result of a direct causality. On average, upgraders in our SME
sample were younger than non-upgraders (11 as opposed to 18 years in
operation), and the gazelles were the youngest of all (8 years) (Table A3).
According to the t-test, this correlation is statistically significant at the 5 per
cent confidence level (Table 11).
However, this does not indicate a direct causality between age and an SME’s
upgrading potential. The only clear impact of age on an SME is that upgrad-
ing is especially difficult during its first two to four years of operation. After
starting up, a company must first establish itself on markets and organise
production. Only then can it attempt to innovate and expand. Most
upgraders in our sample had grown between the fifth and the tenth years of
their existence. A company that does not upgrade during this five-year
period is highly unlikely to do so later.
This might be because a company that has the potential to upgrade will do
so as soon as possible after the critical start-up phase. It could upgrade again
later, too, but it is unlikely to wait 10 years to first attempt to upgrade. Young
SMEs may be either upgraders or non-upgraders, but old SMEs are very
likely to be non-upgraders because older firms that have successfully
upgraded tend to be larger than the firms we studied. Therefore, the age of
an SME would not have a direct impact on its likelihood to upgrade.
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Apart from this, the age of an SME did not correlate with many other in-
dependent factors. Old firms (at least 15 years in operation) complained
more often about the lack of skilled labour than young firms (fewer than 10
years). The respective shares were 52 and 32 per cent in our sample (Table
A11b in Annex). However, the difference could result from differences in
the size of the companies (see above) because old firms tend to be larger
than young firms.
In contrast, young firms seemed to suffer more than older firms from the
lack of a marketing strategy. The share of interviewees who complained
about this problem was 11 per cent for young firms and 0 per cent for old
firms (Tables A11b and A13b in Annex).
Sector
According to our research, an Egyptian SME’s economic sector has little
impact on its upgrading potential. This astonishing finding contrasted with
the findings on SMEs in India and the Philippines (Reeg 2013a; Hampel-
Milagrosa 2013). Our results probably would have been different if we had
focused on other economic sectors in Egypt such as tourism, trade or agri-
culture. For the three sectors that we studied, however, we found neither a
significant correlation between the sector and an SME’s potential to up-
grade, nor did we find significant differences in the upgrading trajectories
of SMEs in different sectors (i.e. how they innovated and grew).
The only tangible result showed that there were slightly fewer upgraders in
the textiles and garments sector than in the food-processing or ICT sectors.
In our sample, the share of upgraders was 40 per cent in the textiles and gar-
ments sector compared with 65 and 55 per cent in the other two sectors
(Tables A18b and A18c in Annex). According to the t-test, this difference is
statistically significant at the 10 per cent confidence level (Table 11). Like-
wise, our logit estimation based on the EICS panel data revealed that
between 2004 and 2008, upgrading was particularly difficult for SMEs in
the textiles and garments industry, the correlation being statistically signif-
icant for gazelles at the 5 per cent confidence level (Table C3 in Annex).
But even this result must be interpreted with caution. Most probably, the
poor performance of SMEs in the textiles and garments sector should be
attributed to the fact that this sector had long suffered from structural defi-
cits. Between 2004 and 2008 it declined in relative terms, then was the
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hardest hit by the post-revolution economic collapse. In our sample, 31 per
cent of the textiles and garments producers identified Egypt’s 2011 eco-
nomic downturn as one of their main obstacles, compared with only 12 per
cent of the food processers and 9 per cent of the software developers. The
textiles and garments sector had suffered the most from fierce competition,
mainly from Chinese companies: 12 per cent of the textiles entrepreneurs
mentioned it, and almost none of the food-processing or ICT sectors (Table
A11b in Annex).
At the same time, we found hardly any other major differences in the char-
acteristics of the SMEs in the three sectors we studied. Producers of tex-
tiles and garments suffered disproportionately from the post-revolution eco-
nomic downturn and from international competition. Food processors com-
plained more than the others about red tape in state-business relations,
while ICT companies suffered more from widespread bribery than SMEs in
the other two sectors (Table A11b in Annex).
Informality
We found no evidence that informality is a constraint to SME upgrading
in Egypt. Informal SMEs cannot grow beyond a certain size. The thresh-
old is not clear-cut, but once an SME has a certain number of employees
it becomes more and more difficult to shirk economic regulations. How-
ever, entrepreneurs are free to formalise whenever they consider formality
to be beneficial. Informality is not about being caught in a growth trap; it
is a rational decision that is taken because the disadvantages of formality
outweigh its advantages. However, when an SME grows, the advantages of
formality may eventually outweigh the disadvantages – leading the SME
owner to formalise the business. Although this may be difficult in some
countries, in Egypt it is not. This finding is in line with the results of the
DIE case studies on India and the Philippines (Reeg 2013a; Hampel-Mila-
grosa 2013).
For our survey, we used a company’s tax registration as the indicator of its
formality status. In practice, the formalisation of a company involves sev-
eral steps including registering the company, licensing its production pro-
cesses, registering the land, registering the workers’ social security, etc.
Some enterprises have gone through some of these procedures but not all of
them – so that different degrees of formality and informality coexist. How-
ever, all the experts confirmed that the most important element of formal-
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ity is getting a tax identification number (tax ID). Only one other indicator
is used in other studies: the registration of a company’s workers with
Egypt’s National Social Insurance Organisation. We tried to categorise
SMEs using this criterion, too, but had the impression that tax-ID informa-
tion about was more reliable.
Unfortunately, our sample included only 13 informal SMEs, or companies
without tax registration (Table A21 in Annex), 10 of which were non-
upgraders, while three had upgraded and remained informal (between four
and eight other companies had been informal in 2007 and had formalised
since then in order to be able to upgrade). Three informal companies were
micro enterprises, nine were small enterprises and one was a medium-sized
enterprise (with 60 employees). Eleven enterprises were active in the tex-
tiles and garments sector and two in the food sector. Women owned four
enterprises and men nine.
Eleven owners of informal companies identified their company’s formality
status as a major advantage in doing business. While seven of them con-
sidered their firm’s informality to be a disadvantage, four considered it to
be an advantage (Tables A12 and A14a in Annex). It is impossible to say
whether informality hinders or fosters SME upgrading in Egypt.
An informal textiles manufacturer from Cairo stressed that for him, infor-
mality was a handicap:
“It is difficult to get the tax identification number, especially the papers. I
perceive being informal as something bad. I am worried all the time that
inspectors [will] come and close my business. Inspectors from the insur-
ance came before and I needed to bribe them.” (Textiles producer, Cairo,
28 March 2012)
Other SME owners added that informal companies had difficulty export-
ing their products, participating in government tenders and getting loans.
Experts also mentioned the lack of access to finance, public services and
civil-society organisation programmes as the main disadvantages – a find-
ing confirmed by other studies, such as Galal (2011).
Several experts mostly attributed many SME owners’ decision to not for-
malise to the high costs of formalisation and the limited advantages of a for-
malised SME:
Markus Loewe et al.
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 147
“Another problem is the costs of formality and the lack of benefits of for-
mality. The social costs an employer has to pay for formal employees (e.g.
insurance) are very high (sometimes 40 per cent of wages). The benefits of
formalisation are very low because the courts do not work properly and
access to finance is not so important for SMEs because they do not get
capital from banks anyhow.” (Jennifer Bremer, American University of
Cairo, 14 February 2012)
Portfolio diversification
None of our research instruments provided clear evidence in response to
the question about whether diversification or specialisation was more con-
ducive for SME upgrading in Egypt. Several upgraders attributed their
success to their specialisation strategy. At some point in time, they had de-
cided to limit production to a single product or to very few products,
focusing on what they could produce best or what no competitor was pro-
ducing in the same way (i.e. a product for a niche market). Several SME
owners confirmed that the high quality of their products was because of
their specialisation:
“In general, in Egypt, most companies offer the whole range of products
and they are not as successful as we are. We specialise in a certain kind of
software and our specialisation helps us to be the best in the sector. This
is also the reason why big companies like Microsoft work with us.” (Soft-
ware producer, Cairo, 26 March 2012)
At the same time, however, we also realised that many upgraders were un-
able to sustain their results because they had not sufficiently diversified
their risks after upgrading. Many companies in our sample had upgraded
before 2007 and then crashed because of external shocks (such as the arri-
val of foreign competitors from China or other countries, the global finan-
cial crisis in 2008–2009 or Egypt’s post-revolution economic downturn).
Diversification might have helped these companies mitigate the impact of
external shocks.
DIE’s parallel case studies indicate that a diversified portfolio seemed to be
a major factor of SME upgrading in the Philippines while the results for
India on this issue are at least as ambiguous as those for Egypt (Hampel-
Milagrosa 2013; Reeg 2013a).
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Market orientation
We found no evidence about whether domestic or export market orienta-
tion is better for SME upgrading in Egypt. Our sample included successful
exporters and producers that focused on the domestic market and non-
upgraders that were producing for the domestic market, as well as others
that produced for the world market. 
The logit estimation that we ran with the EICS panel data from 2004 and
2008 displayed a statistically significant correlation between the upgrading
of SMEs and their export orientation. SMEs that mostly targeted the do-
mestic market tended to grow more slowly than other companies. Howev-
er, this correlation could be due to reverse causality because on average,
successful upgraders have fewer difficulties conquering export markets
than non-upgraders.
The case studies on SMEs in India and the Philippines revealed that export
orientation was a major success factor for upgraders in India while in the
Philippines it had no major impact on the likelihood of SMEs to upgrade
(Reeg 2013a; Hampel-Milagrosa 2013).
5.2.3 Inter-firm linkages 
Our research confirmed earlier studies that had found that institutionalised
co-operation between Egyptian SMEs was rare. Very few of the companies
covered by our survey were integrated into GVCs or clusters, so we were
unable to draw any conclusions on the effects of such vertical or horizontal
linkages on SME upgrading. 
Many experts insisted that such linkages could significantly benefit all part-
ners involved while also supporting the efforts of Egyptian SMEs to
upgrade. They considered that the reluctance of Egyptian SMEs to inte-
grate into GVCs and clusters was a major factor for their difficulties in
upgrading and sustaining the upgrade.
The parallel case studies in India and the Philippines concluded that inte-
gration into GVCs is one of the main factors for successful SME upgrad-
ing. Clusters have also had a significant positive effect on SME upgrad-
ing in India (but much less so in the Philippines) (Reeg 2013a; Hampel-
Milagrosa 2013).
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Value chains
Our interviews with SME owners did not provide clear evidence about the
impact of value chain integration on SME upgrading in Egypt. However,
this is because we did not find enough vertically linked SMEs to study, not
because of weak effects. Only one company reported that it was integrated
into a GVC while a few said that they were subcontracting for other firms,
which were only supplying the local market (i.e. they were integrated into
value chains but not global value chains). 
The picture remained equally inconclusive when we looked at all the com-
panies working within global production networks. We had 13 such SMEs:
five gazelles, two non-gazelle upgraders and six non-upgraders. The t-test
confirmed no statistically significant correlation (Table 11).
The statements of our interviewees were also ambiguous. Some stated that
they benefited from being integrated into domestic value chains:
“I produced for the Cairo Cotton Center before. I was subcontractor and
I learnt a lot about mass production which is important for my export
activities.” (Textile producer, Cairo, 4 March 2012)
However, others were less satisfied:
“One obstacle for me is being in a value chain because a lot of profit goes
to the factory I am producing for.” (Textile producer, Cairo, 29 March
2012)
Several experts stressed that the lack of vertical linkages between smaller
and larger firms in Egypt constitutes an obstacle for SME upgrading:
“We have to promote these linkages [...] because the large provide know-
how, technology, introduce international standards and guarantee market
access. On the other hand, small firms can provide parts at a low price. It
is a win-win situation.” (Mona Garf, Cairo University, Giza, 19 February
2012)
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These expressions are in line with the findings of other empirical studies.
Al-Ayouty (2010) and UNCTAD (2010) found evidence that some Egyp-
tian SMEs considerably benefited from being integrated into a GVC.46 The
significance of their results is limited, however, because their studies did not
compare the vertically linked SMEs with a control group – SMEs that were
not part of a GVC but were otherwise similar. The SMEs that were analysed
in the two studies might have developed positively without being integrated
into GVCs.
El-Mahdi and Osman (2003) confirmed that only a very few Egyptian
SMEs were effectively integrated into GVCs. 
Our own research suggests that this phenomenon at least partly results from
deficits in enforcing contracts and the law. Many SME owners stressed that
they had no interest in establishing vertical linkages with other firms: 
“I want to make all my production steps on my own […] because there are
always a lot of problems with suppliers.” (Textile producer, Cairo, 6
March 2012)
Representatives of lead firms in the food processing and textiles and gar-
ments sectors expressed the same view. They said that their companies
made most of the production steps on their own because it was impossible
to find suppliers to provide products with the requisite quality, reliability
and compliance.
“We do vertically integrate in order to have 100 per cent control but this
diversification in production steps is very costly. The future lies in spe-
cialisation.” (Helmy Abouleish, Sekem Group, Cairo, 5 March 2012)
This view is supported by the findings of El-Haddad (2008) who, refer-
ring to the Egyptian garments sector, argued that entrepreneurs were
reluctant to integrate into value chains because of three concerns: (i) the
quality of inputs bought from other firms, (ii) the timely delivery of
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tional upgrading through linkages between the Egyptian textiles and garments firms as a 
result of their integration into GVCs governed by large European buyers. A study by 
UNCTAD (2010) found that the relationship between Microsoft and its medium-sized 
partners in Egypt led to the latter’s channel upgrading. The co-operation enabled them to 
enter international markets and expand their scope of business. However, software is a 
rather atypical industry.
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inputs and (iii) the buyers’ failure to pay. Her interviewees expressed a
strong preference for integrating all the production steps (spinning, weav-
ing and knitting) into their own companies in order to control quality and
timeliness (El-Haddad 2008, 18). At the same time, some had even tried
to move downstream into retailing because of their bad experiences with
corporate customers’ attitudes towards paying. Some clients had delayed
paying for years or simply had never paid. The judicial system was no
help: some cases took several years, and it was never clear how they
would turn out.
“Finally the verdict was that the defendant could not be located. In any
case, it’s either the defendant pays or he is put in jail. I don’t benefit if he
is in jail. All I want is my money back. And even if I get my money back
the value is greatly discounted. So owning my own stores seemed like the
only solution to me.” (Garments producer in Cairo, quoted by El-Haddad
2008, 22)
Clusters
Much the same is true for the integration of SMEs into clusters: We did
not find any evidence for the impact of horizontal linkages on SME
upgrading because no company in our sample was a member of an effec-
tive functional cluster. Although 16 companies were located in geograph-
ical clusters they did not co-operate in any way with other companies in
the cluster. The clusters were just local concentrations of mostly uncoor-
dinated economic activities of the same type, meaning that the SMEs in
these clusters did not benefit from either external effects or joint action.47
We interviewed 32 SME owners who said they co-operated with similar
companies, but in most of these cases, co-operation was limited to
exchanging raw materials as needed, helping repair machinery or out-
sourcing parts of large orders when one firm’s production capacities were
too small. Only two SME owners reported exchanging information with
other owners, and one interviewee mentioned joint business activities
(Table A25 in Annex). Ongoing interaction or information exchange
seems to be rare in Egypt.
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This result has been confirmed by many other studies.48 Stochierro (2002)
analysed 28 areas of concentration of SMEs from the same manufacturing
sub-sector in Cairo and Alexandria and found that almost all were just geo-
graphical clusters, that is, areas of concentration without regular co-oper-
ation or linkages between the SMEs, and only two were functional clusters.
UNDP and AFESD (2003), IMC (2005) and Van Dijk (2001) reached sim-
ilar conclusions.49
In our sample, several SME owners stated that mistrust caused them to be
disinterested in any kind of co-operation with similar companies:
“I do not want to co-operate because they are my competitors.” (Textiles
producer from Cairo, 22 March 2012)
As in the case of GVCs, SME owners’ aversion to co-operating contrasted
sharply with the convictions of many experts of private-sector develop-
ment in Egypt, who consider clusters to be helpful tools to promote SME
upgrading:
“For SMEs to be successful in the food-processing sector, clustering is an
important factor. It means clustering of SMEs, but also large firms, busi-
ness development services and institutions for quality standards.” (Nihal
El-Megharbel, Ministry of Local Development, 19 February 2012)50
The representative of a big Egyptian bank who had worked in SME lend-
ing for a long time confirmed that the lack of functional clusters was main-
ly due to what Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) characterised as “low
trust and poor contract enforcement mechanisms”.
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48 Exceptions include powerful clusters such as the furniture cluster in Damietta, the ICT 
cluster in Smart Village near Cairo, the marble and granite cluster in Sha’a El Te’aban, 
the leather manufacturing cluster in Robiky, the honey cluster in Al-Minya, handicraft 
clusters in Siwa and Upper Egypt, and the textiles and garments cluster in Mahalla al-
Kubra (Loewe 2013, 28).
49 The first Arab Human Development Report addressed this problem (UNDP / AFESD
2003, 101). A review of the Egyptian food-processing sector also pointed out that the
entrepreneurs recognised the need for technological improvements, but did not take col-
lective action into consideration in order to facilitate SME upgrading (IMC 2005, 25 and
152). Van Dijk (2001) similarly emphasised that the SMEs he analysed in 10th of
Ramadan City were not fully exploiting the advantages of local concentration. The clus-
ter appeared to be merely geographical, not a site for collective efficiency.
50 See also: El-Megharbel 2008, 8.
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“Clusters do not work in Egypt because people do not trust each other.
They could only work if there was a third party involved that is able to cre-
ate trust within the cluster. I know the cluster approach has been very suc-
cessful in other countries! But I do not see the same for Egypt at the time
being...” (Yasser Zaher, Banque du Caire, Cairo, 26 April 2012)
Another reason is that businesspeople never learnt to co-operate. At school,
they were not encouraged to work in teams. Pupils in Egypt are socialised
to be lone fighters (Al-Ayouty 2011), while political and religious authori-
ties have little interest in teaching people how to conduct joint action – and
possibly organise an opposition.
“Teamwork: co-operating with others, learning from others. Entrepre-
neurs are not used to do so. This can be traced back to the education sys-
tem in Egypt.” (El Bedawy, Ahmed, Endeavour. Cairo, 26 February 2012)
And again, several experts stress that the existence of clusters would help
SMEs in Egypt to upgrade:
“Clusters are more important than the business environment. The compa-
nies in a cluster have better conditions. I think being in a cluster can really
accelerate your growth. You can create economies of scale, reduce the
price of inputs, work together in transport, share machines, and jointly
benefit from vocational schools. And you have the opportunity to buy out
your less successful neighbour and grow” (Heba Handoussa, economist.
Giza, 29 February 2012)
Formalised business networks
We found no evidence of an impact of formalised business networks on
SME upgrading, although a quarter of the SMEs in our sample reported
being integrated into such networks. The share of SME owners belonging
to any kind of business association was found to be only slightly higher
among gazelle upgraders (29 per cent) and non-gazelle upgraders (32 per
cent) than among non-upgraders (18 per cent) (Table A26 in Annex). Ac-
cording to the t-test, the difference is not statistically significant (Table
11). It may well be due to reverse causality because seven of the up-
graders that belonged business associations at the time of the interview
had not belonged to any business association five years earlier, that is,
they applied for membership only after they had successfully upgraded
(Table A26 in Annex).
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None of the upgraders in our sample identified membership in a business
association as a major reason for their success. Very few interviewees be-
lieved that membership in an Egyptian business association benefited them
in any way.
In contrast, Abdel-Latif and Nugent (1995) found evidence that small-gar-
ments producers’ affiliation with a garments export association enabled
them to reach economies of scale in the marketing phase and thereby over-
come crucial cost barriers for exportation (Adel-Latif / Nugent 1995, 13 f.).
However, our findings were completely in line with the results of the DIE
case studies on SME upgrading in India and the Philippines, where busi-
ness associations also have no impact on SME development (Reeg 2013a;
Hampel-Milagrosa 2013).
5.2.4 Business environment
Two elements of the business environment are among the chief determi-
nants of SME upgrading in Egypt: access to finance and the rule of law.
Apparently, the economic downturn that followed the revolution in 2011
also severely impacted the upgrading prospects for SMEs. It was, however,
a one-time shock whose effects hopefully will soon be overcome. Many
SMEs were sorely affected by the rise in the price of inputs, which is, how-
ever, a normal challenge in business and can hardly be averted. Numerous
entrepreneurs also suffered from unfair competition, government regula-
tions and petty corruption, but most such problems stem from deficits in the
rule of law.
Second-tier factors in SME upgrading include access to land, the availabil-
ity of BDSs and infrastructure (mainly transportation).
We could not find evidence of the effects of any other elements of the busi-
ness environment – the trade regime, access to insurance, rates of inflation
and exchange.
Access to finance
Finance is one of the main determinants of SME upgrading in Egypt. The
problems that SME owners faced in accessing credit, leasing, insurance and
other financial products largely explain the general difficulty of Egyptian
SMEs to upgrade. However, these problems were only partly due to deficits
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in the supply of finance; many of them were also due to deficits on the
demand side (borrowers’ lack of collateral or financial illiteracy, SME own-
ers’ incompetence in developing a business plan, etc.). Nor do deficits on
the supply side of the financial market explain why some SMEs more eas-
ily upgrade than others. The difference is partly due to the fact that suc-
cessful owners have their own funds (savings, inheritance, etc.) rather than
to differences in access to credit.
According to our SME survey, deficits in accessing finance were the se-
cond largest constraint for SME owners in Egypt. In our open question, 29
per cent of the interviewees identified it as one of their main challenges and
20 per cent in our closed question (i.e. when we presented a list of possible
answers) (Figures 15 and 16, Tables A11a and A12 in Annex).
SME owners regarded the availability of finance as a major factor for suc-
cess, with 20 per cent of them identifying it as one of the five most impor-
tant factors for differences in the likelihood of SMEs to successfully
upgrade. However, when speaking about finance, most respondents were
referring to their own funds rather than bank loans. In response to our
closed question, only 9 per cent of the interviewees gave access to finance
as one of the four most important explanations for successful upgrading.
The share was considerably higher among the gazelles (20 per cent) than
among the non-upgraders (8 per cent) (Figures 16 and 17 and Tables A13
and A14a in Annex).
Other studies confirm these results – for example El-Megharbel (2008, 6). An
Egyptian Banking Institute study reported that 58 per cent of the SME own-
ers interviewed considered their difficulty in accessing finance to be the most
important constraint on the firm’s development. El Kabbani and Kalhoefer
(2011) found that access to finance was problem number two for Egyptian
SME owners in general and problem number one for micro enterprises.
Our results did not provide clear evidence regarding the impact of access to
finance on SME upgrading. Only a small portion of our SME owners had
received formal loans. The share was higher among upgraders (5 out of 40)
than among non-upgraders (1 out of 40) but the difference resulted from
reverse causality: None of the upgraders had got a formal loan prior to their
successful upgrading, which means that their success was why they were
able to get a bank loan – not a result of having received one (Table A28
in Annex). 
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The results of our econometric analysis of the EICS panel data were equal-
ly ambiguous. Accordingly, “having a bank loan” had a positive effect on
the likelihood of SMEs to upgrade, which is statistically significant at the
10 per cent confidence level. At the same time, “having a bank loan” nega-
tively correlates with “being a gazelle upgrader”. But this correlation is not
statistically significant (Table C1 in Annex).
This finding is in line with other studies. Stone and Badawy (2011) also
found no evidence for any significant correlation between access to fi-
nance and the growth of Egyptian SMEs between 2004 and 2008. El Mahdi
and Osman (2003) were unable to show that bank loans positively impacted
employment creation in Egyptian SMEs.
The difference between upgraders and non-upgraders is whether the SME
owner has their own financial means: 76 out of 78 interviewees in our sam-
ple said that their personal funds were among the main sources of funding
(two did not answer the question). At the same time, only six SME owners
said that bank loans were their main source of funding, while seven men-
tioned informal credit, three mentioned supplier credit and only one men-
tioned a loan from a relative (Table A28 in Annex). Most SME owners had
no access to sources of finance besides their own funds, which suggests that
more affluent SME owners have greater upgrading potential. In contrast to
India and the Philippines, in Egypt relatives or friends tended to grant only
small loans because of weaker social ties (see Section 5.2.1). For many
entrepreneurs informal loans were too expensive – as in most countries –
while accessing formal credit appeared to be difficult.
This finding is in line with the conclusions of other studies. According to
El-Hawary (2007), 93 per cent of the initial capital stock of Egyptian SME
owners was their personal equity capital. Formal and informal loans con-
tributed just 3.5 and 2.6 per cent, while about 2 per cent came from rela-
tives or friends (El-Hawary 2007, Table 3.3); 78 per cent of all Egyptian
companies have never applied for a bank loan. Formal or informal loans are
the main source of finance for only 5 per cent of Egyptian SME owners,
while 83 per cent do not have either an overdraft facility or a line of credit
(ibid., 69).
Such difficulties in accessing finance are due to both supply- and demand-
side factors.
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Supply side: On the supply side, the Egyptian financial system is rigid, with
retail banking that is well developed and corporate banking that is under-
developed.51 Banks prefer to lend to the government or other institutional
borrowers, which is “such an effortless and lucrative line of business to the
nation’s lenders that the private sector – with the exception of the blue chips
– has been crowded out of the credit market” (OBG 2012, 86). Although
this trend has accelerated since the revolution, with the fiscal deficit widen-
ing to more than 10 per cent of GDP, it had already been well established
before the revolution when the loan-to-deposit ratio stood at about 52 per
cent and, as a result, banks were providing only about 20 per cent of all new
investment finance in Egypt (El-Hawary 2007). Of course, this particularly
affected SMEs because with the high concentration of banking services
there was no incentive for lending institutions to be active in the market of
micro and small loans.
Many observers have argued that Egyptian banks are also overcautious and
try to avoid the risks associated with lending to private borrowers (e.g. El-
Hawary 2007, 70). The total volume of domestic bank lending to the private
business sector does not exceed a third of bank assets (CBE 2011). 
There are three reasons for this risk aversion: (i) high demand by the gov-
ernment and the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) for credit, (ii) limited com-
petition in the banking sector and (iii) the increase in non-performing loans
extended by Egyptian banks between 1990 and 2010. At least partly due to
lenders’ difficulties getting Egyptian courts to enforce their financial
claims, this increase caused Egyptian banks to demand more collateral for
loans. According to El-Hawary (2006, 71), in 2005 the average collateral
required for a loan amounted to about 130 per cent of the loan. Some
observers have pointed out that banks generally did not bother to screen
their borrowers’ business plans and just insisted on getting collateral.
At the same time, Egyptian banks preferred to lend to large and mature
firms. Traditionally, only microfinance institutions have provided loans to
SMEs. Banks started lending to SMEs only in 2005 when some domestic
public banks turned to smaller clients. However, instead of taking stock of
the new clients, they simply applied the conventional business model,
which was tailored to corporate lending and evaluation standards.
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“They were not at all aware of the differences between small and large
companies. They had no idea how to deal with SMEs. They did not even
speak their language and promised much too much. After a while the
banks realised that many SMEs failed in repaying their loans. One of the
reasons was that these had not been well informed about the products and
the involved risks. In addition, many companies still had their experience
with PBDAC in mind, which had extended loans to virtually everyone
without ever asking for loan repayment.” (Yasser Zaher, Banque du Caire,
Cairo, 26 April 2012)
As a result, large enterprises have continued to enjoy better access to fi-
nance than SMEs (Abdel-Kader 2006; EBI 2010). With only 7.5 per cent of
all private-sector credit directed to SMEs, the ratio of liabilities to SMEs’
fixed assets has also been very low (9 per cent) (Abulata 2011, 3 and 7).
Information about how many SMEs in Egypt apply for loans but are
rejected is contradictory: one study postulated a rejection rate of 66 per cent
(EBI 2010, 21), while another put it at only 25 per cent (Abulata 2011, 6).
In any case, there are various reasons for Egyptian banks’ reluctance to ex-
tend loans to SMEs. One is that many SME owners are unable to formulate
a proper business plan, provide adequate collateral and submit all the doc-
uments required for a bank loan (see below). 
Another reason is that since many banks still perceive SME lending as a rel-
atively unprofitable endeavour, they do not invest in the necessary skills and
systems. Since competition in the corporate banking segment is still weak,
there are few incentives for banks to look for additional profit centres such
as SME lending, where many more contracts have to be made to generate
the same amount of profit made from medium to large borrowers.52
Furthermore, bankers are not interested in SME financing. As one public
official put it,
“Bankers want to make big business, not deal with small fishes.” (Ahmed
Hassan, Industrial Training Council, Cairo, 21 February 2012)
SME lending has been perceived as a rather risky business instead of a strat-
egy for diversification. This lack of interest can also be traced to the lack of
market information about SMEs and the resulting absence of systems to deal
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with them. Market studies could investigate which type of SME – in terms
of sector, size or location – might be an interesting target group (Poldermans
2011, 7). There are few of the structures, processes or staff capacities needed
to evaluate SMEs through risk assessments – or to monitor them after loan
disbursal. Businesses with alternative business models such as those in the
ICT sector particularly suffer from this lack. An ICT business owner from
Cairo lamented that “they [the bankers] are just accountants, they do not
read ideas” (ICT business owner, Cairo, 29 February 2012).
Banks have been particularly reluctant to lend to SMEs in the textiles and
garments industry which is highly exposed to external shocks such as ab-
rupt declines in exports, sudden decreases in export prices and steep in-
creases in input prices.
Demand side: However, Egyptian SME owners’ difficulties accessing fi-
nance are also because of their own deficits. When we asked SME owners
why they had not taken out a bank loan, only 12 per cent said that the bank
had refused their request. The others had not even tried – 13 of them be-
cause they were afraid of the consequences of failing to repay, 12 because
the interest rates were too high, nine because of religious convictions, eight
because they did not need money, five because they had no collateral, three
because they were unable or unwilling to do all the necessary paperwork
and seven for other reasons. The shares were almost equal for upgraders and
non-upgraders (Table A29 in Annex).
Thus the first factor on the demand side is entrepreneurs’ fears of not be-
ing able to repay bank loans. This fear has been fuelled by Egyptian legis-
lation that stipulates very severe sanctions for credit default and makes no
distinction between private and corporate property, making the owner fully
liable for the company. Should a company fail to repay a loan, all the
owner’s private assets could be confiscated to compensate the creditor. It is
also common practice for banks to require borrowers to sign an undated
check for the balance of the loan as additional security because they can-
not be sure of gaining control over the collateral. Instead of calling in the
loan, the bank could just date the check and present it for payment, in which
case the borrower risks being jailed for passing a bad check.53
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A cheese producer from New Maadi commented, 
“I thus have to guarantee myself for any credit that I take for the company.
When I fail, I not only lose my invested capital but also my personal cap-
ital.” (Cheese producer, Cairo, 29 February 2012)
The representative of a businesswomen’s association said,
“There is no division between corporate and private equity. If you go
bankrupt, you go to jail. That is why many people fear risk-taking so
much. Think about an expansion of the business, it is a risk. Many people
decide not to grow therefore.” (Amany Asfour, Egyptian Business Women
Association, Cairo, 14 March 2012)
A second factor is Egyptian SME owners’ financial illiteracy. They lack
know-how about the strengths and weaknesses of various financing op-
tions, how and where to get them, how to apply for them and how to use
them (Terpstra 2012a; Terpstra 2012b). 
Many micro and small entrepreneurs cannot even fill in credit request forms
or provide financial documentation about their businesses. To take out
loans, SME owners must show the bank three years of financial state-
ments, but many SME owners have no clue about proper accounting.
Abulata (2011, 3) estimated that 75 per cent of all SME owners lack the
most basic financial reports. 
Start-ups, which by definition cannot prove three years of proper account-
ing, must submit a business plan instead. However, Yasser Zaher from the
Banque du Caire says that most start-ups in Egypt do not know how to for-
mulate a good business plan:
“The majority of entrepreneurs in Egypt lack awareness and know-how.
Many believe that the banks will write their business plans and that all
what they have to do themselves is to have a good idea...” (Yasser Zaher,
Banque du Caire, Cairo, 26 April 2012)
A third demand-side factor is that SME owners consider Egyptian banks’
interest rates for credit to be too high. According to Yasser Zaher, before the
revolution SMEs with sales of less than EGP 10 million per year had to pay
annual interest rates of about 13 per cent, which was not much more than
what SMEs in peer countries pay for small bank loans. However, since the
Egyptian revolution, SME owners have had to pay around 30 per cent per
Markus Loewe et al.
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
annum.54 Several SME owners in our sample said that even 8 or 10 per cent
was too much.
A fourth factor is that for religious reasons, some SME owners flatly refuse
to pay interest. For them, Islamic Finance could be an alternative because it
involves no formal interest, usually by building equity (mušāraka: the bank
buys a share of the borrowing firm) or by combining sale and target pur-
chase (murābaħa: a collateral item is sold to the bank and is bought back
later at a predetermined, higher price). However, in contrast to countries
such as Malaysia or Pakistan, Islamic Finance is rather underdeveloped
in Egypt. 
A fifth factor is that many SME owners generally mistrust banks and there-
fore would never request loans.
A sixth factor is that many SME owners cannot provide any collateral, and
even when they can, banks often refuse it. On one hand, it is difficult for
banks to seize collateral other than real estate (e.g. machines or valuables)
even if they theoretically have the right to do so. On the other hand, many
bank employees lack the skills needed to assess proposed collateral.
Law enforcement
Many SME owners have difficulties with licensing, taxation, customs clear-
ance, inspection or public tendering, as well as with competition, corruption
and the protection of property rights. While these areas are diverse, the rea-
son they present difficulties to SME owners is not: in the overwhelming
majority of cases, their problems stem from deficits in the rule of law.
Government regulation and bureaucracy: Entrepreneurs in Egypt still face
significant obstacles because of government regulation and bureaucracy, as
is emphasised by many studies such as the World Bank Doing Business
reports. These studies show that between 2004 and 2011, Egypt made con-
siderable progress in several fields. For example, the number of adminis-
trative steps involved in starting a business was reduced from 10 to six, the
duration of the procedure dropped from 22 days to seven and its cost from
105 to 16 per cent of per capita income. The minimum amount of start-up
capital required was also reduced from 740 per cent of per capita income to
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virtually zero (World Bank 2012a). But the reports also stress that private-
sector development remains hampered by overregulation and red tape and
that Egypt still has much progress to make – especially regarding construc-
tion permits, power connection, tax payment (see below), property registra-
tion and company liquidation (World Bank 2012a).
This view was confirmed by several of our experts, who reported that ad-
ministrative procedures still took a lot of time and money – especially for
obtaining licences and approval for exports and imports or to close a busi-
ness. As Mohamed Abo Elwafa of USAID stated, 
“You can register a business in 48 hours but it takes 48 years to get out of
it.” (Mohamed Abo Elwafa, USAID, 21 February 2012)
Government bureaucracy was identified as one of their main challenges by
24 per cent of the SME interviewees (and as many as 35 per cent of the
SME owners in the food sector) (Table A12 in Annex). One SME owner
even went as far as to employ one person to handle administrative issues,
while some informal companies stated that the jungle of regulation kept
them from formalising: the procedures just seemed too complicated.
However, the main problem that SME owners had with administrative pro-
cedures was not the costs and time involved, but rather the impossibility of
accurately assessing the costs in time and money, and knowing what the
outcome would be. A lot of time, money and effort must be invested with-
out knowing whether this will suffice or whether the applications, requests
and registrations will finally be approved. Either the public administration
has not issued clear guidelines about the procedures, or the guidelines have
not been well communicated – leaving public officials too much leeway for
discretion when taking decisions.
In other words, entrepreneurs experienced great insecurity with regard to
the outcome of their interactions with the state. SME owners suffered es-
pecially because they did not have enough financial reserves to surmount
very negative outcomes. Normally, they do not have the connections
(wasţa) to the government or high-ranking public officials that bigger firms
have to help speed the procedures and influence their outcome. Yousif and
Humphrey (2008) showed that firms with good connections to the govern-
ment – mostly larger enterprises – needed far less time and money for all
official documentation to be processed. Likewise, a study commissioned by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD
Clara Brandi et. al.
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2010b) found that SMEs required twice the time as larger enterprises to
obtain business basics such as construction permits.
Taxation: In the field of taxation SMEs suffer above all from deficits in the
rule of law, that is, from the existing rules not being uniformly applied.
Several studies have described the Egyptian tax system in critical terms.
According to the Doing Business Report 2012 on the ease of paying taxes,
Egypt ranks only 145th worldwide and last in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region. Data from the Enterprise Survey 2008 of the Inter-
national Finance Corporation (IFC) show that 55 per cent of all small firms
considered tax rates to be a major constraint for business in Egypt but only
a minority of medium-sized and large firms (IFC 2008).
According to our findings, however, taxation is not among the most critical
factors for SME upgrading in Egypt. Less than 8 per cent of our intervie-
wees considered it to be a major obstacle (Table A11a in Annex). 
Most SME owners complained that tax rates were arbitrarily calculated –
not that they were generally too high or that the procedures too complicat-
ed or to too time-consuming. While some entrepreneurs apparently bene-
fited from tax reductions, others paid far too much. A producer of sweets
from Tanta55 reported that the tax official had levied an extremely high tax
by simply estimating the company’s profit on the basis of its production
during a one-day visit instead of consulting the books and basing the tax on
turnover. Other interviewees confirmed that this is common practice, mean-
ing that visits by tax officials during periods of high production (e.g.
Ramadan for the food-processing sector) result in unreasonable taxes. 
A high-ranking employee of a large Egyptian bank confirmed:
“The tax administration rapes SMEs in particular. For companies with
sales below EGP 1 million per annum, tax officers are required to estimate
actual income. And nobody controls them – with the effect that their esti-
mations are completely arbitrary. And it is not about the legal tax rate. The
tax rate is flat. It was lowered over the years from 40 to 20%. And com-
panies with sales below EGP 200,000 per annum are currently completely
freed from taxes.” (Yasser Zaher, Banque du Caire, Cairo, 26 April 2012)
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
55 Interview with a producer of sweets, Tanta, 13 March 2012.
164 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Tax officials often ask SME owners to pay a bribe to lower the tax
demanded:
“Some big companies pay the whole wage of some tax officers just to
lower their tax burden. And of course, you better bribe tax officers than to
pay the tax amount that they charge you! I know a pious Muslim who
refused to pay any bribe. He ended up paying taxes three times a year and
each time much too much, given his real income.” (Yasser Zaher, Banque
du Caire, Cairo, 26 April 2012)
Some SME owners criticised the high tax burdens for start-ups that create
incentives for companies to remain informal. A meat processor from Belbis
who had been granted a tax holiday during his start-up phase, emphasised
how important this concession had been for the development of his firm.
Without it, he could not have competed with foreign companies.56
Quality standards: Deficits in law enforcement also affect the SMEs’ com-
pliance with standards, including quality standards. Yet the enforcement of
quality standards is important for improving products made in Egypt –
which in turn increases the export capacity of Egyptian enterprises. Re-
strictive quality standards automatically eliminate enterprises that do not
produce in accordance with them (e.g. health standards), thereby increas-
ing the market share for enterprises that do comply. In the ICT sector in par-
ticular, the fact that intellectual property rights are not enforced causes
firms to curtail their investments in new products.
Competition:Although competition with other companies does not seem to
be a main constraint for SME upgrading in Egypt, it does concern a con-
siderable number of companies. This is partly due to increasing competition
from abroad, but it is mostly due to deficits in law enforcement.
In our SME sample, competition was considered to be a moderately impor-
tant factor for upgrading: 13 per cent of the entrepreneurs considered it to
be a major constraint to their growth, with the share substantially higher
among gazelles (21 per cent) than among non-upgraders (8 per cent) (Table
A12 in Annex). At the same, 34 per cent of all interviewees identified com-
petition as a positive factor, arguing that it created an incentive for them to
continue to improve their products and production (Table A14a in Annex).
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Some SME owners complained of foreign competition, which had risen in
recent years because of globalisation and Egypt’s liberalisation of foreign
trade. Companies in the sewing and weaving sub-sector felt especially chal-
lenged by producers from China and Turkey. Mohamed Hameed from the
Textile Development Centre argued that SME owners were less and less
able to offer their products at the prices of imported products because the
small quantities that they produced did not allow for economies of scale.57
Their sole advantage was knowing the Egyptian market and the preferences
of Egyptian consumers better than their foreign competitors. In our sample
12 per cent of the textiles and garments producers complained about the
threat of cheap imports compared with only 4 per cent of the food
processers and none of the software developers (Table A11b in Annex).
The majority of complaints, however, focused on “unfair competition” by
other Egyptian firms: (i) large firms that used their good connections
(wasţa) to influential people to get advantageous legislation and regula-
tions and preferential treatment from the public administration, as well as
(ii) small informal firms that could produce more cheaply than others be-
cause they did not comply with many standards, pay taxes or make social
insurance contributions for their workers.
In our survey, software developers in particular complained about unfair
competition from big and well-connected companies. A total of seven of our
interviewees – four from the ICT sector – cited unfair competition as a
problem. They emphasised that some of the big suppliers in the sector were
often able to win bids by using their personal relations (wasţa) and bribing
public officials or employees of their clients.
Unfair competition is alleged to constitute an even more serious challenge
for SME owners in other sectors than the three we studied. Several studies
have shown that – at least in the past – large firms with good connections
enjoyed preferential treatment in many segments of the Egyptian economy,
making it difficult for other companies to compete. The WEF (2008) con-
firmed that past governments had hampered a competitive environment in
many economic sectors by issuing operating licences to a limited number of
firms selected on the grounds of good connections rather than performance.
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Moreover, until recently the Egyptian Competition Authority simply did not
supervise some sectors (Loewe 2013, 30).
Finally, some interviewees complained of competition from small and in-
formal companies, which are able to produce at lower prices and ignore in-
tellectual property rights (e.g. on designs). Textiles producers recounted
how some of their employees had left the firm and opened their own infor-
mal workshops – using designs from their former employer. 
“We suffer very much from unfair competition by small, informal compa-
nies. They copy our products, and we cannot do much against it. In addi-
tion, they can produce their products much cheaper than we do because
they pay no tax, pay no fees for registration and licensing, pay no social
insurance contributions, etc.“ (Textiles producer, Cairo, 7 March 2012)
Petty corruption: Bribery is very widespread among businesspeople in Egypt
– especially in interactions with the state. Although bribery lowers a pro-
ducer’s profit margin it did not seem to be a major constraint for SME upgrad-
ing in the three sectors covered by this study (things may have been very dif-
ferent in other sectors) and wasţa played an even more limited role. But cor-
ruption is only possible because of the lack of law enforcement in Egypt.
The SME owners are compelled to pay bribes on many occasions: when
registering their business, at licensing, when dealing with tax authorities
and during inspections (e.g. health inspections): 
“To get my papers done was very difficult. There were many inspections,
always someone coming, bothering me so that I am forced to pay bribes
because I have no wasţa.” (Textile producer, Cairo, 8 March 2012)
A survey conducted in 2009 with 800 Egyptian SME owners about their
experience with corruption supported the finding that SME owners were
confronted with bribery in various fields (CIPE 2009), with bribes most
needed to formalise a company: 42 per cent of the SME owners reported
having paid bribes during the business registration and licensing, 29 per
cent while operating the business (ibid., 7, 13 and 25).
The level of corruption differed substantially between sectors. According to
El-Hawary (2007, 73), extra-legal payments made by SME owners ranged
from 15 per cent of the total costs of establishing, registering and licensing
an accounting business to almost 90 per cent for computer accessories and
electronic appliances stores. The level was high (80 – 90 per cent) in the
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three sectors covered by our survey (ibid., Table 3.4). Nevertheless, only
about 6 per cent of our SME owners identified bribery as one of their
main constraints (Table A11a in Annex). Apparently, most can afford the
bribes that are exacted. 
“Bribery is a problem but I can overcome it because I am able to pay.”
(Textiles producer, Cairo, 8 March 2012)
At the same time, 27 per cent of the companies in the software industry
admitted that bribery was a factor in the success of their business, which
was not the case for any companies in the textiles and garments or food-pro-
cessing sectors (Table A13b in Annex).
Wasţa in contrast seems to be much less widespread than bribery (see “So-
cial networks” in Section 5.2.1).
Input prices
A large number of interviewees emphasised that recent increases of input
prices considerably challenged many Egyptian SME owners. The share was
only slightly higher among non-upgraders (20 per cent) than among
upgraders (16 per cent) (Table A11a in Annex). However, we did not further
examine this factor because it became apparent that the SME owners were
referring to normal fluctuations in the prices of raw materials and primary
products, which we consider to be a standard challenge for enterprises in
every country and in every size bracket.
Effects of the revolution
There is considerable evidence that the political instability and economic
downturn in Egypt following the January 2011 revolution have significant-
ly constrained the ability of SMEs to grow. The revolution and its political
and economic effects were identified by 28 out of 80 SME owners as one
of the most important challenges for their businesses (Table A12 in An-
nex). The sector most sorely struck was the textiles and garments industry:
31 per cent of the SME owners from this sector identified the revolution and
its effects as a major problem for their company, compared with only 20 per
cent in the food-processing and ICT sectors. At the same time, non-
upgraders suffered more than upgraders: 43 per cent of the non-upgraders
cited the revolution and its effects as a major challenge compared with on-
ly 21 per cent of the upgraders.
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The revolution had various effects on SMEs. The most important one was
a stark drop in domestic demand. Both private and public consumptive
spending decreased significantly because everyone was fearful of Egypt’s
future political and economic situation. One donor representative even
said: “The country has no money anymore.” (Giovanna Ceglie, UNIDO,
15 February 2012)
On average, exporting companies were less affected by the revolution than
those producing for the local market, which shows that exportation can be
a strategy for diversifying risk.
Another effect was the deterioration of security in the streets in the after-
math of the revolution. Strikes and the disruption of public transportation
prevented workers going to work during the revolution, and even months
later, workers did not feel as safe on their way to work as they did before
the revolution, and sometimes preferred to stay at home. Some SME own-
ers even reported that lorries transporting their products to vendors had
been robbed on the streets several times. As a consequence, since the revo-
lution many SME owners have reduced their investments or moved to
smaller or safer places of production.
A third effect of the revolution was that the political apparatus was only
partially operative between the revolution in winter 2011 and the presi-
dential elections in spring 2012. During this period, the government hesi-
tated to take any major decisions before a new, democratically elected gov-
ernment took over. As a consequence, some of the most serious problems
were not tackled.
“The government is not in a decision-making mode at the time being.”
(Steven Lee, freelance consultant, 17 February 2012)
A fourth effect was the interruption of several SME-support programmes.
The interim government challenged every institution that had been estab-
lished by the last government under Mubarak, the “businessmen ministers
cabinet”.
“The big problem is that since the revolution they [those responsible for
IMC funding] stopped their funds. We face a huge financial burden now,
since they are defaulting on their contract. We relied on the credit com-
mitments.” (ICT business owner, Cairo, 29 February 2012)
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However, the revolution has also had some positive effects for SME devel-
opment. Several interviewees confirmed that many government officials
had become friendlier, more honest and more accountable. 
“They [the public officials] now feel that they have to follow the rules
more than before...and are now more afraid to be punished for misbehav-
iour.” (Mohammed Youssef, Ministry of Finance, 16 February 2012) 
Some observers even believed that the new government was more interest-
ed in SMEs.
“Now the government is more concerned about enterprises. But so far they
do not know what is important.” (Mohamed Kassem, World Trading Com-
pany, 22 February 2012)
Access to land
Many SMEs in Egypt suffer from the lack of appropriate land for produc-
tion although this factor is not among the main determinants of upgrading
for most firms (Table 8). More than 10 per cent of the SME owners in our
sample identified it as one of their main obstacles to growth (Table A11a in
Annex). Likewise, when SME owners were asked what kind of support they
would like from the government or other institutions, 14 wanted better
assistance in getting “access to land”, which was the third most frequent
answer to the question – after access to credit and worker training (Table
A15 in Annex). 
This result is in line with the findings on SME upgrading in the Philip-
pines; access to land was not a significant factor in the DIE case study on
India (Table 10).
For Egyptian gazelles in particular, limited access to land seems to consti-
tute a serious constraint to growth: 21 per cent identified it as a major ob-
stacle compared with just 5 per cent of the non-upgraders (Table A11a in
Annex); 44 per cent of the gazelles wanted assistance for accessing land as
compared with only 11 per cent of the non-upgraders. This finding can be
explained by the obvious fact that a fast-growing company needs more land
than a stagnating one.
Only a certain amount of land is available in Egypt for industrial produc-
tion because agricultural land may not be used for industrial purposes. At
the same time, the share of land used for housing is expanding quickly at
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the expense of land used for both agricultural and industrial production.
Industrial companies can only expand production in a so-called ‘industrial
zone’, established by either the state or a private investor (Loewe 2013, 71).
The processes of getting a permit to create an industrial zone and of getting
a piece of land in an industrial zone are heavily regulated, time-consuming
and cumbersome. The state-owned industrial zones are managed by the
Industrial Development Authority (IDA), which sells plots of land at sub-
sidised rates – to those who fulfil certain criteria. While certain segments of
the zones are reserved for specific sectors, enterprises that already own land
in the zone have priority (Loewe 2013, 36). 
This means that SME owners that want to upgrade are particularly hin-
dered because they tend to be located in towns or villages rather than in
industrial zones. Most of the time, in order to expand, they have to move.
Since it is more difficult for SME owners to obtain a plot of land in an in-
dustrial zone, medium-sized companies – which usually are already locat-
ed in industrial zones – find it easier to expand than do SMEs. The Social
Fund for Development (SFD) has bought some land in industrial zones
from the IDA for micro and small companies, but far too little for all the
SME applicants. Furthermore, most of the SFD-acquired land is not attrac-
tive to SME owners. For example, hardly any land is available for them in
the Delta.58
Once again, deficits in the rule of law seem to create serious problems for
applicants. It is not at all clear whether the criteria listed above are effec-
tively applied when land in an industrial zone is to be allocated. According
to a textiles producer, “it is like a lottery whether you get one” (Textiles
producer, Zagazig, 25 March 2012).
Infrastructure
To some degree, inadequate transportation facilities also impact on SMEs
in Egypt. While this does not account for differences in the likelihood of
SMEs to upgrade, it does obstruct their development in general. Only 4 per
cent of our interviewees identified infrastructure as a major constraint for
their businesses (Table A11a in Annex), while more than five times as
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many, or 22 per cent, said that they benefited considerably from Egypt’s
infrastructure (Table A14 in Annex). Nevertheless, several SME owners
mentioned that they and their employees suffered a lot from the lack of pub-
lic transportation as well as from frequent traffic jams – particularly in
Greater Cairo. In addition, some emphasised the inferior quality of roads,
both in Cairo and in the countryside. 
Other infrastructure elements, such as the provision of power, water, sani-
tation, telecommunications and Internet, are insignificant for SME upgrad-
ing. Power outages are the only minor exception. They affect SMEs more
than large firms, because the former rarely have their own backup genera-
tors.59 These findings are supported by other empirical studies on Egypt
(AfDB 2009; Hattab 2008; OECD 2010b).
Business development services
Business development services (BDSs) are another second-tier factor of
SME upgrading in Egypt, where they seemed to be further developed than
in India or the Philippines. This fact might explain why they were consid-
ered relevant by a significant portion of SME owners in Egypt but not in the
other countries (Table 11). In our sample, 24 per cent of the interviewees
stated that they had received some kind of BDS (financial or technical) dur-
ing the previous five years (Table A27 in Annex). This share is high but not
necessarily representative for all SMEs in Egypt. It could be biased by our
sample selection, in which several SME owners were recommended by rep-
resentatives of organisations that offer BDSs. Our sample also included a
limited number of informal companies, which probably make up some 40
per cent of Egyptian SMEs but are not eligible for most of the BDSs offered
by the state. The high share of BDS recipients nevertheless allows us to con-
clude that access to BDSs seems to have a fairly positive impact on the like-
lihood of SMEs to upgrade. 
Of the gazelles we interviewed, 35 per cent had benefited from BDSs dur-
ing the previous five years (20 per cent from financial BDSs and 15 per cent
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59 In 2008, 53 per cent of large enterprises owned generators compared with only 5 per cent 
of small ones (IFC 2008, 14). The IFC infrastructure indicator “per cent of firms owning 
or sharing a generator” is not included in the Egypt Country Profile (2008) but is con-
tained in the associated dataset downloadable at http://enterprisesurveys.org/Custom
Query/egypt.
from technical BDSs), compared with only 6 per cent of the non-upgraders
(3 per cent of them received financial and 3 per cent technical BDSs) (Table
A27 in Annex). In the case of financial BDSs, reverse causality is improb-
able, because all the upgraders that benefited from such services during the
previous five years had also benefited from BDSs more than five years ear-
lier. In the case of technical BDSs, reverse causality is possible but unlikely.
None of the upgraders that benefited from technical BDSs during the pre-
vious five years had benefited from them more than five years earlier. But
this is not surprising because almost all the BDS programmes that are in
place today had not yet existed five years ago.
When the SME owners in our sample were asked to select which BDSs
they would like to have, most selected credit (38 per cent), followed by
access to new markets (34 per cent), worker training (26 per cent), or help
finding workers (23 per cent). Only a few preferred consultancy (17 per
cent) or assistance in building up business networks (11 per cent) (Table
A16 in Annex).
BDSs provided by the government are not well regarded. Claiming that the
government services were inadequate, 10 per cent of all SME owners stat-
ed that they did not ask for any BDSs (Table A15 in Annex). Some referred
to their bad experiences with public BDS programmes such as the Industrial
Modernisation Centre (IMC). One company had worked for several weeks
on an application for a consultant’s fee to be financed by the IMC before
learning that the support programme had been discontinued. Likewise, a
study of 160,000 firms in four governorates conducted between 2005 and
2006 by the Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC) revealed that
mistrust of the government was the main reason why micro and small enter-
prises (MSEs) did not apply for SFD loans.60 The belief that the IMC and
other providers of BDSs favour large companies is widespread among SME
owners. Nihal El Megharbel from the Ministry of Local Development
agreed that in the past, governmental BDSs primarily had been offered to
large companies, which were supposed to create employment and help
SMEs in the long run. However, the SMEs never “took off ”.61 In contrast,
Natalija El Hage from German Technical Co-operation (GTZ) confirmed
60 Khaled El Gahreni, Egyptian Stock Exchange, Cairo, 19 February 2012.
61 Nihal Megharbel, Ministry of Local Development, Cairo, 19 February 2012.
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that a large share of government BDSs are still extended to large compa-
nies, but explained that most SME owners simply lack the skills to put their
problems into words and apply for the right kind of support.62
Other studies have stated that because the official budget of BDSs for
SMEs is miniscule it might not suffice to foster SME upgrading (Hattab
2008; El Dahshan / Tolba / Badreldin 2010, 21). 
Three different Egyptian government institutions provide BDSs to local
SME owners: 
• The Social Fund for Development (SFD), which has assets amounting to
EGP 2 million, supports MSEs. But most of its budget is allocated to
micro loans, meaning that little is available for non-financial BDSs such
as technical support and training, which are important for upgrading.
• The General Authority for Investment and Trade Zones (GAFI), which
has assets of more than EGP 2 million, supports SMEs but also has a
limited budget. It provides non-financial BDSs and operates a private
equity fund for SMEs.63
• The Industrial Modernisation Centre (IMC) has the largest budget, and
provides financial and non-financial BDSs to SMEs in the manufactur-
ing sector. Officially, it targets both medium and large companies, but it
seems to focus on large domestic exporters and their suppliers – to the
detriment of SMEs.
Each of these institutions focuses on one segment of SMEs, but none of
them really accompanies SME owners in their efforts to upgrade from the
category of a micro to a small or from a small to a medium-sized enterprise
(Loewe 2013). According to Mohamed Zakaria from the Egyptian Banking
Institute, Egypt lacks a clear strategy for SME development:
“The SFD, GAFI, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry for Trade and
Industry are all players in SME promotion but they work on isolated
islands.” (Mohamed Zakaria, Egyptian Banking Institute, Cairo, 21 Feb-
ruary 2012)
62 Natalija El Hage, GTZ, Cairo, 18 May 2012.
63 GAFI’s non-financial services include mostly training and support for accessing finance.
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Trade policy
Egypt’s foreign trade regime is not relevant to SME upgrading. Exporting
and importing have become comparatively easy as a result of Egypt’s lib-
eralisation of foreign trade over the past two decades. Only four SME own-
ers in our sample stated that Egypt’s current cross-border trade regime rep-
resents an obstacle for them (Table A11a in Annex). According to the World
Bank’s Doing Business Report, Egypt’s foreign trade regime has the accept-
able rank of 64th out of 183 economies (World Bank 2012e).
Monetary stability
Inflation and the exchange rate also are not significant factors for SME
upgrading in Egypt. None of the SME owners mentioned inflation as a
major obstacle for their business, and only four expressed concerns about
the exchange rate.
Access to insurance
Our findings suggest that access to insurance is irrelevant for SME upgrad-
ing. None of our interviewees referred to it to explain either differences in
the likelihood of Egyptian SMEs to grow or the general difficulty of SMEs
in Egypt to upgrade. Very few SME owners in our sample had any kind of
private insurance (fire, theft or liability), which could indicate that the
insurance sector in Egypt is still relatively small and underdeveloped.64
But it also might show that entrepreneurs do not yet understand which kinds
of insurance – old age, health, life or investment failure – would be helpful.
Normally, insurance is the best means for mitigating an entrepreneur’s risks
and stabilising business income. Since many entrepreneurs perceive inse-
curity as a problem in many business areas (finance, exportation, develop-
ment of commodity and final-product prices, transportation, co-operation
with other firms, interactions with the state, political developments, etc.)
and many SME owners are highly risk-averse (see Section 5.2.1), appropri-
ate insurance contracts might be an effective means of supporting SME
owners’ efforts to upgrade (Salah-Ahmed 2012).
64 In 2005, annual premiums did not exceed 0.8 per cent of GDP, compared with an inter-
national average of 9 per cent. Similarly, Egypt’s USD 11 per capita spending for insur-
ance is low (ERF / IDLM 2004, 51; Robalino 2005, 39). 
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6 Policy recommendations
Our results show that the likelihood of small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) to upgrade in Egypt largely depends on the entrepreneur, which con-
trasts somehow with much of the recent literature on doing business. All
Egyptian entrepreneurs suffer from multiple deficits in the business frame-
work: the lack of quality education, skilled workers, relevant market infor-
mation, a proper innovation system, finance and law enforcement – as well
as a lack of confidence among the entrepreneurs themselves. Nevertheless,
upgrading does occur. We discovered many successful SME owners who
had found ways to circumvent these obstacles. This manoeuvrability
requires personal qualities such as ambition, creativity, flexibility and per-
sistence, which to a considerable degree an entrepreneur either has or does
not have, and can only be developed through the influence of parents, friends
and teachers. Our interview partners were alluding to these qualities when
they repeatedly emphasised ‘motivation’ as being the key to their success.
At the same time, however, the successful upgraders generally had favour-
able starting conditions:
• They had savings or an inheritance which allowed them to invest without
a bank loan, attend private school, travel abroad to get international expe-
rience, take risks without threatening their personal well-being and spend
for market research and research and development (R&D). They also were
able to pay bribes to influence the outcome of administrative procedures.
• They had received better education which impacted on the quality of
their market research and R&D, had better chances to work at other
firms, thereby gathering relevant experience, and were better able to
elaborate a promising company strategy (including portfolio diversifica-
tion and market orientation), identify suitable finance products for their
company, write a business plan and keep the books. They were also able
understand the central role human resource development plays in the
motivation and loyalty of workers and the development of a firm.
• They had more social capital – they knew more (and more influential)
people in business, politics and the public administration. This helped
them find workers, get credit, identify good markets, and influence reg-
ulation and decision-making by the public administration and judicial
system (even if this factor is much less important in Egypt than in India
and the Philippines).
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Structural constraints mean that only a small number of privileged entre-
preneurs can upgrade. Only SME owners with money, good education, con-
nections, international experience, land, and relevant work experience have
good chances of succeeding, while most lack these means of circumventing
the numerous structural constraints.
Such inequality of opportunity prevails because Egypt lacks sufficient ser-
vices to help the excluded majority to upgrade: quality schools, including
business schools, quality vocational training courses, adequate external fi-
nance (credit, leasing, insurance, etc.), open access to market information,
an effective national innovation system and others.
SME promotion in Egypt requires a much more systemic approach – one
that is better coordinated and harmonised than that currently taken. Policy-
makers should not only look at the business environment or individual en-
trepreneurs or enterprises. They should also consider how to best impart
what SME owners need – including finance, skilled labour, technology and
business ideas, market information and security (see Figure 13). This could
be done through the business environment, business networks, enterprise
promotion or the promotion of individual entrepreneurs. .
In other countries, where global value chains (GVCs) are common, they
provide SME owners with at least some of these services. International
partners help their national SME suppliers with training, credit and tech-
nology, and provide the market information that SME owners need to oc-
casionally redefine their product portfolio. But the role of GVCs in Egypt
is negligible.
The government of Egypt should extend and improve the business devel-
opment services listed above that donor groups could support. This is not
just about creating equal opportunities. Rather, in order to overcome the
phenomenon of the ‘missing middle’, Egypt needs more SMEs to upgrade
and sustain their upgrading success. As Chapter 3 shows, a greater number
of medium-sized companies would help reduce some of Egypt’s most viru-
lent economic problems: limited economic growth, widespread unemploy-
ment and underemployment, rising poverty, insufficient economic diversi-
fication, low export rates, etc.
We recommend that the Egyptian government target five of the six areas
that our research has revealed to be the main determinants of SME upgrad-
ing in Egypt: (i) human capital (quality basic and vocational education,
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quality work experience and international exposure) (ii) human resource
development, (iii) market research, (iv) access to finance and (v) law en-
forcement (see Chapter 5). We do not recommend action targeting the sixth
area – entrepreneurs’ ambition or motivation and risk readiness – because
we do not know how, in the short term, these factors could be shaped by the
government of Egypt or other actors.
6.1 Human capital
Improving Egyptian entrepreneurs’ human capital is probably the corner-
stone of any strategy for supporting SME owners’ efforts to upgrade. Hu-
man capital is the prerequisite for innovation, investment and financial lit-
eracy, as well as for understanding how HRD, customer orientation, quali-
ty and market research help firms upgrade. 
Three approaches have priority: (i) enhancing the quality of Egypt’s formal
educational and training system, (ii) increasing entrepreneurial know-how
and (iii) enabling young entrepreneurs to get work experience and travel
abroad.
First, Egypt must overhaul its entire educational and training system. It
does not principally suffer from low attendance, but rather from the inferior
quality and irrelevance of the curriculum. The educational system should
focus on learners’ creativity, critical thinking and analytical capabilities
instead of pure knowledge transfer. It should build the foundations for more
entrepreneurial spirit and thinking among future generations, and also teach
and encourage teamwork.
Second, entrepreneurs must be able to more easily acquire the professional
skills that they need. This could start in school, with basic economic and
business know-how being made part of the curriculum in all secondary
schools. To help those wishing to start a business, management/business
schools that focus on applied business knowledge and managerial know-
how should be opened. At Egyptian universities, economics and business
administration should adopt a more practical approach; it is now far too the-
oretical and irrelevant to professional life. The government should establish
more SME incubators at universities, technical schools and research institu-
tions. It could also organise competitions for business plans like the Junior
Business Association of Jordan has started to do more than five years ago.
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Third, the government should help young people get international and work
experience, perhaps by promoting student exchange programmes to foster
innovative and entrepreneurial thinking in future entrepreneurs, and help
them develop international networks. It should facilitate – and in some sub-
jects even require – internships in firms. The government should also con-
tinue to underwrite SME owners’ trips to international fairs and business
conferences.
6.2 Human resource development (HRD)  
In order to improve the human resources of Egyptian SME owners, three
goals must be pursued: (i) a better trained workforce, (ii) entrepreneurs’
heightened awareness of the importance of HRD and (iii) support for SME
owners’ HRD efforts.
First, the training of the Egyptian workforce needs to be generally im-
proved. In the long run, Egypt must develop a comprehensive vocational
training system for a broad range of professions that most blue-collar work-
ers could attend before starting to work. First steps in this direction have
already been taken, including the Mubarak-Kohl-Initiative. However, the
Kohl-Mubarak-Initiative has only reached a tiny group of trainees. Experi-
ence has shown that it will take a very long time to train a reasonable share
of workers entering the labour market and that very few private enterprises
are ready to participate in vocational training for labour-market entrants and
bear some of the costs. However, without practical teaching in private-sec-
tor factories, vocational training remains theoretical and superficial. The
number of employers in a vocational training system will expand very
slowly without meaningful government participation. (In Germany, too,
factory owners must regularly be entreated to provide apprenticeship posi-
tions.)
Given this limitation, the Egyptian government should expand in parallel
the outreach of short-term training courses, which could more quickly in-
crease the number of workers who have had at least some training. In re-
cent years the IMC has been pursuing this strategy – encouraging provid-
ers of private-sector training, awarding certificates of quality and subsidis-
ing worker training at eligible SMEs. While the subsidies may have been a
bit too generous, the strategy has basically been sensible, and very benefi-
cial to many of the SMEs we surveyed.
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Second, the government should raise SME owners’ awareness of the im-
portance of human resource development (HRD) and corporate govern-
ance issues. It could co-operate for this purpose with chambers of com-
merce and industry and business associations, which could in turn inform
their members. More SME owners need to understand that HRD is essen-
tial to boost their employees’ motivation and loyalty, especially those that
are better trained and skilled. 
Third, SME owners should be supported in their HRD efforts and be taught
about corporate governance issues. The government and other relevant
actors might consider offering (or at least subsidising) managerial courses
for SME owners to teach them to evaluate the skills and training deficits of
applicants and employees. At this point, only a few private consulting firms
offer HR training courses, most of which are too expensive for SME own-
ers. Courses on HRD should also be made part of the curriculum at public
universities.
6.3 Market research
In order to reduce the costs of market research for Egyptian SME owners
and better inform them about domestic and export markets, the govern-
ment of Egypt should consider (i) instructing them about the importance of
demand orientation, (ii) providing free information about markets and re-
cent market developments as well as about the offer of Egyptian SMEs, (iii)
supporting SME owners in their own market research and (iv) fostering co-
operation with international firms.
First, more SME owners need to understand that success requires them to
orient production to customer needs, wants and demands, which requires
in-depth knowledge of the market, that is, information on potential con-
sumers in various regions, countries and social groups, as well as on their
competitors. While such awareness can be raised through campaigns and
management courses, it would also be possible to integrate courses on mar-
kets into school and university curricula.
Second, the government could fund a specialised unit at a centre of re-
search or information that would be charged with gathering and publishing
all relevant information on domestic and export markets, as well as pro-
ducing in-depth sector analyses of both the demand and the supply sides.
The unit could be located either in the Central Agency for Public Mobili-
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zation and Statistics (CAPMAS) or the Information and Decision Support
Center (IDSC), both of which already have a lot of data on market trends
and experience editing statistical data. The Egyptian Technology Transfer
and Innovation Centers (ETTICs) and various chambers of commerce
should be encouraged to contribute data to the new market information sys-
tem, whose database could also provide information on available technolo-
gies for SME owners and a directory of SMEs in different branches – so as
to facilitate horizontal and vertical co-operation.
Third, the government should assist SME owners’ market research efforts,
for example, by expanding support for those who wish to attend interna-
tional fairs and exhibitions.
Fourth, SME owners should be encouraged and supported in their efforts to
integrate into global value chains. Another possibility would be to promote
franchising from international firms. Both of these forms of co-operation
provide SME owners with more security to sell their products and the
know-how necessary for selling on international markets.
6.4 Access to finance
The difficulties SME owners have in accessing finance are largely due to
information asymmetries between them and the financial institutions,
which lead to adverse selection and moral hazard. On the one side, finan-
cial institutions have difficulty judging which customers will respect fi-
nancial contracts while customers are unable to convince them of their cred-
itworthiness. Such information asymmetry results in adverse selection that
could at least be partially avoided by SME owners providing better infor-
mation about their firms and by financial institutions enhancing the screen-
ing of customised products. On the other side, lenders are also not able to
force borrowers to respect their financial obligations or to prevent them
from engaging in inappropriate risks once the loan has been disbursed
(moral hazard) – a different kind of asymmetry that could be mitigated by
providing incentives to the borrower to act in the financial institution’s
interest.
The Egyptian government should do what it can to (i) reduce these infor-
mation asymmetries. In addition, it might consider increasing banks’ in-
centives to (ii) lend to SME owners and to (iii) diversify their product port-
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folio. And it should also (iv) scrap the draconian punishments in Egypt’s
bankruptcy law for failing to repay a loan.
First, the government should start an initiative to educate borrowers and
improve SME owners’ financial literacy. The state might consider provid-
ing (or at least financing) training courses for SME owners to help them
prepare better financial statements and business plans because to prove
their trustworthiness when they apply for loans, they have to provide banks
with insight into the company’s economic position. The government could
also make efforts to raise the financial literacy of the general population –
for example, by including teaching modules on entrepreneurship and basic
financial education in the secondary school curriculum. In addition, it could
publish information on the pros and cons of various financial products and
the borrowing conditions of various financial institutions. Finally, the gov-
ernment could expand GAFI’s Cairo consultancy services which currently
only inform SME owners about various financial products and where they
are available. The General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI)
officers have found that many SME owners ask for finance when they actu-
ally need non-financial business development services (BDSs) in order to
be able to upgrade. 
At the same time, the government should strengthen the banks’ capacity to
screen customers by proposing courses in SME lending to bank officers
who often do not know much about SMEs and become overly cautious with
loan provisions after reviewing a company’s books and business plans. The
government should also move faster to establish a registry of ownership and
possession of movable assets at I-Score, which operates like the German
credit bureau, SCHUFA, enabling SME owners to prove that they own
enough collateral for a bank loan while also preventing them from simulta-
neously taking out loans from several banks.
Second, the government should create incentives for banks to increase their
SME lending. One incentive could be the establishment of a new institution
that offers credit guarantees to SME owners in order to enhance competi-
tion in this segment and make guarantees more attractive to borrowers by
lowering prices and enhancing quality.
The government could also transform one of its own banks into a special-
ised SME bank or set up an SME programme to provide funds for micro
and small credits extended by commercial banks the way banks in Germa-
ny make loans available using KfW Development Bank funds.
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In addition, the government should consider issuing more bank licences.
The financial sector has recently been liberalised and opened to foreign
credit institutes. But there are still only 29 banking institutions in Egypt,
and the Central Bank of Egypt is extremely reluctant to issue new licences
on the grounds that it can barely supervise the existing banks. More per-
sonnel might enable the Central Bank to monitor more banks, which would
increase competition in the financial sector and eventually force some
banks to search for new market niches. Perhaps some banks would consider
specialising in the SME market segment.
The government should simultaneously enact a microfinance law authoris-
ing the establishment of commercial microfinance institutions (MFIs) and
also support the efforts of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to
transform into commercial MFIs. 
Third, the government should encourage banks to develop and publicise
new and innovative products such as Islamic Finance, leasing contracts, pri-
vate equity, credit insurance and other kinds of micro-insurance products
(Salah-Ahmed 2012). Islamic Finance products, which officially do not
bear interest, might be particularly helpful because they allow SME owners
who refuse normal credit for religious reasons to still borrow money.
Micro-credit insurance would be helpful because it provides additional
security to the bank against repayment failures. Leasing and private equity
can help SME owners who need longer-term financial products.
Fourth, the Egyptian government should review the bankruptcy law, which
condemns a person who presents a bad check to prison. This draconian
sanction, used by banks to pressure borrowers to repay their loans, dis-
courages entrepreneurs from taking out loans. Once banks have additional
securities, this current practice could be averted.
6.5 Law enforcement
The lack of law enforcement in Egypt is mostly due to insufficient checks
and balances within and between governmental institutions. It is sympto-
matic of states that are governed by neo-patrimonial authoritarian regimes,
which use the lack of accountability to interpret the legislation in the re-
gime’s favour. Reforms aimed at strengthening the rule of law are rarely
effectively implemented in authoritarian states. 
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Egypt’s new regime just might make an earnest attempt to re-establish the
rule of law. Its biggest challenge will be to strengthen the accountability of
public officials at all levels.
Basically, there are two ways to make progress towards this goal: (i) provide
incentives for public officials to comply with laws and guidelines and (ii)
increase monitoring of public officials and sanctions for non-compliance.
First, the government should provide incentives for government officials to
comply with existing laws and regulations, for example by providing
monthly awards for the officials who are most responsive to citizens’ de-
mands. It could also use the revenues that accrue from letting go redundant
state employees to raise the salaries of exemplary officials.
Second, the government should raise the accountability of public officials
by improving the mechanisms for monitoring. This could start by publish-
ing or otherwise making accessible the relevant laws, decrees and guide-
lines so that citizens can evaluate the public administration’s practice. The
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology should increase
its efforts to introduce elements of e-government and to expand ICT solu-
tions to all public services. E-procurement and e-tendering should be pro-
moted to help eliminate the need for bribes and the effectiveness of wasţa.
At the same time, independent bodies should assess the performance of all
government departments, thereby increasing transparency in decision-making
and finally, whistle-blowing should be encouraged as a means of identify-
ing individuals in the public administration who are corrupt or frequently
violate the rules.

German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 185
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Bibliography 
Abdel-Kader, K. (2006): Private sector access to credit in Egypt : evidence from 
survey data, Cairo: Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (Working Paper 
111) 
Abdel-Latif, A. / J. Nugent (1995): Export promotion policies : transaction costs 
and export channel choices in Egypt, paper presented at the 70th Western 
Economic Association International Conference in San Diego, California, 
5–9 July 1995, online: http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~nugent/papers/exportegypt.pdf 
 (accessed: 20 Dec. 2011) 
Abou-El-Fotouh, H. (2009): Importance of corporate governance for SMEs; 
online: http://www.articlesbase.com/small-business-articles/importance-of-
corporate-governance-for-smes-917533.html (accessed: 17 Apr. 2012) 
Abulata, N. (2011): Egypt : access to finance for SMEs, presentation held at the 
multi-country workshop on “Support for Euro-Mediterranean Industrial 
Co-operation on Access to Finance”, Milan, 13–15 December 2011; online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taiex/dyn/taiex-events/library/detail_en.jsp? 
EventID=47134 (accessed: 14 Apr. 2012) 
AfDB (African Development Bank) (2006): Arab Republic of Egypt – Social Fund 
for Development : micro and small enterprises support project : appraisal 
report, Tunis 
– (2009): Egypt private sector country profile 2009, Tunis
Al-Ayouty, I. (2010): Textile global commodity chains : efficiency and industrial 
upgrading in Egypt, Cairo: Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (Work-
ing Paper 160) 
– (2011): Decent work attainment and labour productivity : a sample survey of
textile firms in Egypt, Cairo: Egyptian Center for Economic Studies 
(Working Paper 162) 
– (2012): Research and development as potential driver of Egypt's pharmaceutical
industry, Cairo: Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (Working Paper 
172) 
Altenburg, T. / J. Meyer-Stamer (1999): How to promote clusters : policy expe-
Uiences from Latin America, in: World Development 27 (9) 1693–1713 
186 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
Altenburg, T. / U. Eckhardt (2006): Productivity enhancement and equitable devel-
opment : challenges for SME development, Vienna: United Nations In-
dustrial Development Organization; online: http://www.unido.org/file 
admin/user_media/Publications/Pub_free/Productivity_enhancement_and_
equitable_development_summary.pdf (accessed: 20 Dec. 2011) 
Aref, A. (2012): Empowering SMEs, in: Business Today Egypt 18 (6), 62–63 
Aterido, R. / M. Hallward-Driemeier / C. Pages (2007): Investment climate and 
employment growth : the impact of access to finance, corruption and 
regulations across firms, Washington, DC: Inter-American Development 
Bank (Research Department Working Paper 626) 
Audretsch, D. / M. Feldman (1996): R&D spillovers and the geography of in-
novation and production, in: The American Economic Review 86 (3), 630–
640 
Ayyagari, M. / A. Demirgüç-Kunt / V. Maksimovic (2006): How important are 
financing constraints? : the role of finance in the business environment, 
Washington, DC: The World Bank (Policy Research Working Paper 3820) 
– / – / – (2011): Firm innovation in emerging markets : the role of finance, govern-
ance, and competition, in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
accepted manuscripts, 1–70 
Bair, J. / G. Gereffi (2001): Local clusters in global chains : the causes and 
consequences of export dynamism in Torreon’s Blue Jeans industry, in: 
World Development 29 (11), 1885–1903 
Banerjee, A. / E. Duflo (2008): Do firms want to borrow more? : testing credit 
constraints using a directed lending program, Cambridge, Mass.: Institute 
of Technology (Department of Economics Working Paper 02-25) 
Bank, A. / Richter, T. (2010): Neopatrimonialism in the Middle East and North 
Africa : overview, critique and alternative conceptualization : paper 
presented at the workshop “Neopatrimonialism in Various World Regions” 
23 August 2010, Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies 
Beck, T. (2007): Financing constraints of SMEs in developing countries : evidence, 
determinants and solutions : paper presented at the Korean Development 
Institute’s 36th Anniversary International Conference “Financing Inno-
vation-oriented Business to Promote Entrepreneurship”, Seoul, April 2007; 
online: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-research-
groups/center/staff/beck/publications/obstacles/financingconstraints.pdf 
(accessed: 3 Jan. 2012) 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 187
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Beck, T. / A. Demirgüç-Kunt (2006): Small and medium-size enterprises : access to 
finance as a growth constraint, in: Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (11), 
2931–2943 
Beck, T. / A. Demirguc-Kunt / V. Maksimovic (2002): Financial and legal con-
straints to firm growth – does size matter?, Washington, DC: The World 
Bank; online: http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2784.html (accessed 25 
Nov. 2011)  
– / – / – (2005): Financial and legal constraints to growth : does firm size matter?
in: Journal of Finance 60 (1), 131–177 
Beck, T. et al. (2000): Financial structure and economic development : firm, 
industry, and country evidence, Washington, DC: The World Bank (Policy 
Research Working Paper 2423)  
– (2006): The determinants of financing obstacles, in: Journal of International
Money and Finance 25 (6), 932–952 
Becker, G. (1964): Human capital : a theoretical and empirical analysis, with 
special reference to education, 1st ed., Chicago, Ill.: The University of 
Chicago Press  
Begley, T. / D. Boyd (1987): Psychological characteristics associated with per-
formance in entrepreneurial firms and smaller businesses, in: Journal of 
Business Venturing 2 (1), 79–93 
Belitz, H. / M. Schrooten (2008): Innovationssysteme : Motor der Wirtschaft, in: 
Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 77 (2), 5–10 
Bennett, R. / P. Robson (2000): SME growth : the relationship with business advice 
and external collaboration, in: Small Business Economics 15 (3), 193–208 
Berner; E. / G.M. Gomez / P. Knorringa (2008): Helping a large number of people 
become a little less poor : the logic of survival entrepreneurs : paper 
presented at the UNU-WIDER project workshop on Entrepreneurship and 
Economic Development, 21–23 August 2008, Helsinki: UNU WIDER. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2009): BTI 2010: The Bertelsmann Transformation Index : 
Egypt country report, Gütersloh 
Bhattacharjee, A. et al. (2002): Macro economic instability and business exit : 
determinants of failures and acquisitions of large UK firms, London: 
London Business School (Accounting Subject Area Research Paper Series 
02-034); online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID311 
240_code020522600.pdf?abstractid=311240&mirid=3 (accessed: 10 Jan. 
2012) 
188 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
Bosch, F. van den / H. Volberda / M. de Boer (1999): Coevolution of firm ab-
sorptive capacity and knowledge environment : organizational forms and 
combinative capabilities, in: Organization Science 10 (5), 551–568 
Brach, J. (2010): Technological readiness in the Middle East and North Africa : 
implications for Egypt, Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area 
Studies (Working Paper 155) 
– (2011): Ägypten in der Reformkrise : Politischer Umbruch ohne wirtschaftliches
Konzept, Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA 
Focus Nahost 10/2011) 
– / M. Loewe (2010): The global financial crisis and the Arab world : impact,
reactions and consequences, in: Mediterranean Politics 15 (1), 45–71 
Butler, A. / J. Cornaggia (2011): Does access to external finance improve pro-
ductivity? : evidence from a natural experiment, in: Journal of Financial 
Economics 99 (1), 184–203 
Cai, H. et al. (2009): Microinsurance, trust and economic development : evidence 
from a randomized natural field experiment, Philadelphia, Pa.: Penn 
Institute for Economic Research (Working Paper 09-034) 
Caniels, M. / H. Romijn (2003): Dynamic clusters in developing countries : col-
lective efficiency and beyond, in: Oxford Development Studies 31 (3), 
275–292 
CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) (2006): The final 
results of census 2006, Cairo 
– (2008): Annual bulletin of industrial output in public sector firms 2008/2009,
Cairo 
– (2009): Annual bulletin of industrial output in private sector firms, Cairo
CBE (Central Bank of Egypt) (2011): Annual Report 2010/2011, Cairo 
Cichon, M. / W. Scholz (2009): Social security, social impact and economic per-
formance : a farewell to three famous myths, in: P: Townsend (ed.), 
Building decent societies : rethinking the role of social security in devel-
opment, Geneva: International Labour Organization, 80–98 
CIPE (Center for International Private Enterprise) (2009): Business environment 
for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Egypt and SMEs’ 
interaction with government agencies : 2009 survey on corruption, Cairo 
Coface (2011): Coface Finance Egypt– Yearbook 2010/11, Cairo: Coface Egypt 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 189
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Cohen, W. / D. Levinthal (1989): Innovation and learning : the two faces of R & D, 
in: The Economic Journal 99 (397), 569–596 
Collier, P. / M. Duponchel (2010): The economic legacy of civil war : firm level 
evidence from Sierra Leone, New York: UNU WIDER 
Correa, P. / A. Fernandes / C. Uregian (2008): Technology adoption and the 
investment climate : firm-level evidence for Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, Washington, DC: The World Bank (Policy Research Working Paper 
4707) 
Court, J. / D. Osborne (2006): Independent evaluation of the SMEPOL project : 
impact, lessons and options for replication, London: Overseas Devel-
opment Institute  
Delmar, F. / J. Wiklund (2008): The effect of small business managers’ growth 
motivation on firm growth : a longitudinal study, in: Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice 32 (3), 437–457 
De Mel, S. / D. Mckenzie / C. Woodruff (2008): Who are the microenterprise own-
ers : evidence from Sri Lanka on Tokman v. de Soto, Bonn: Institute for 
the Study of Labour (IZA Discussion Papers 3511)  
– / – / – (2009): Innovative firms or innovative owners : determinants of innovation
in micro, small, and medium enterprises, Bonn: Institute for the Study of 
Labour (IZA Discussion Papers 3962) 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. / T. Beck / P. Honohan (2008): Finance for all? : policies and 
pitfalls in expanding access, Washington, DC: The World Bank 
Demmelhuber, T. (2007): The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its 
implementation in the Southern Mediterranean : the case of Egypt, Bonn: 
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung 
Dessus, S. / A. Suwa-Eisenmann (1998): Trade integration with Europe : export 
diversification and economic growth in Egypt, Paris: OECD Development 
Centre 
Dijk, M. van (2000): Beyond the informal elephant : competitiveness of micro and 
small enterprises in the MENA region : paper submitted to the Economic 
Research Forum (ERF), Seventh Annual Conference, Amman, Jordan, 
26-29 October 2000; online: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary? 
doi=10.1.1.195.9672 (accessed: 15 Jan. 2012) 
190 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
– (2001): Export potential of SMEs in Southern Mediterranean countries :. a case
study of a cluster of SMEs in Egypt in the light of the FTA between the 
SMC and the E : paper presented to the Second Conference of the Forum 
Euro-Mediterranéen des Institutes Économiques (FEMISE), Marseille, 29–
30 March 2001; online: http://www.femise.org/PDF/Dijk_MP_0301.pdf 
(accessed: 20 Dec. 2011) 
Djankov, S. et al. (2002): The regulation of entry, in: The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 67 (1), 1–37 
Dollar, D. / M. Hallward-Driemeier / T. Mengistae (2005): Investment climate and 
firm performance in developing economies, in: Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 54 (1), 1–31 
Dunn, E. et al. (2006): Lessons learned on MSE upgrading in value chains : a 
synthesis paper, Washington, DC: United States Agency for International 
Development (Microreport 71) 
EBI (Egyptian Banking Institute) (2010): Access to finance : forms of financing for 
SMEs in Egypt, Cairo 
– (2012): SME data base – macro level data, Cairo; statistics online: http://
www.sme-egypt.org/Pages/smedb.aspx (accessed: 10 Apr. 2012) 
Economic Commission for Africa (2004): Governance profile of Egypt : measuring 
and monitoring progress towards good governance in Africa, Addis Ababa 
ECORYS-NEI (2005): Egyptian processed food sector review, Rotterdam; online: 
http://www.imc-egypt.org/studies/FullReport/Egyptian%20Processed%20 
Food%20Sector%20Development%20Strategy_EN.pdf (accessed: 15 Apr. 
2012) 
EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit) (2011): Country report : Egypt, London 
El Araby, S. / Irgens. C. (2005): Investigating the applicability of adopting HACCP 
system in Egyptian food processing industry organizations, Ostrava: Tech-
nical University of Ostrava 
Elbers, C. / J. Gunning / B. Kinsey (2003): Growth and risk : methodology and 
micro evidence, Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute (Discussion Paper 03-
068/2)  
El Dahshan, M. / A. Tolba / T. Badreldin (2010): Enabling entrepreneurship in 
Egypt : towards a sustainable dynamic model, Alexandria: Entrepreneurs 
Business Forum Egypt (BFE) 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 191
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
El-Haddad, A. (2008): Vertical integration in the Egyptian garment industry : an 
economic and institutional analysis, Cairo: University (Economics Depart-
ment Research Paper Series 30) 
El-Hawary, D. (2007): Doing small business, in: Egyptian National Competitive-
ness Council (ed.), Taking the next big step : the 4th Egyptian com-
petitiveness report, Cairo, 67–84 
El Kabbani, R. / C. Kalhoefer (2011): Financing resources for Egyptian small and 
medium enterprises, Cairo: German University of Cairo (Working Paper 
28) 
El-Mahdi, A. (2006): MSEs potentials and success determinants in Egypt : special 
reference to gender differentials, Cairo: Economic Research Forum 
(Femise Research Report 0418) 
– (2010): Poverty and informality : a restraining or constructive relationship?,
Cairo: Economic Research Forum (Working Paper 569) 
El Mahdi, A. / M. Osman (2003): An assessment of the effectiveness of small and 
micro-enterprise finance in employment creation, Cairo: Economic Re-
search Forum (Working Paper 0313) 
El-Megharbel, N. (2008): TadcƯmu-t-tarƗbuĢi bayna-l-munša’Ɨti-ú-úaƥƯrati wa-l-
mutawassiĢati wa-l-munša’Ɨti-l-kabƯrati fƯ-ú-úinƗcati-l-miúriyya [Strength-
ening the linkages between the small and medium enterprises and the large 
enterprises in the Egyptian industry], Cairo: Egyptian Center for Economic 
Studies (Working Paper 140) 
Enterprise Surveys (2004/2008): Egypt, Arab Rep._2004_2007_panel.dta [panel 
micro data set of two rounds of private enterprise survey conducted by the 
Social Research Center of the American University in Cairo on behalf 
and with the funding of the World Bank and under the auspices of the 
Egyptian Ministry of Investment in 2004 and 2008], Washington, DC; 
online: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org (accessed: 1 Feb. 2012) 
ERF / IDLM (Economic Research Forum / Institut de la Méditerranée) (2004): 
Egypt country profile : the road ahead for Egypt, Cairo, Marseille 
Evans, D. (1987): The relationship between firm growth, size, and age : estimates 
for 100 manufacturing industries, in: The Journal of Industrial Economics 
35 (4), 567–581 
Evans, D. et al. (2006): Assessing regional trade agreements with developing 
countries : shallow and deep integration, trade, productivity, and economic 
performance, Brighton: University of Sussex 
192 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
Fafchamps, M. (2001): Networks, communities and markets in sub-Saharan Africa, 
in: Journal of African Economies 10 (2), 109–142 
Fisman, R. / J. Svensson (2007): Are corruption and taxation really harmful to 
growth? : firm level evidence, in: Journal of Development Economics 83 
(1), 63–75 
GAFI (General Authority for Investment) (2010): Textiles and ready-made garments : 
invest in Egypt: Egypt’s key sectors; online: http://www.gafinet.org/ 
English/SectorsValuePreposition/Textiles%20value%20proposition2010.pdf 
(accessed: 2 Feb. 2012) 
Galal, A. (2011): Egypt post January 2011 : an economic perspective, Cairo: Eco-
nomic Research Forum (Policy Perspective 03) 
– (2002): The paradox of education and unemployment in Egypt, Cairo: Egyptian
Center for Economic Studies (Working Paper 67) 
Gatti, R. / I. Love (2006): Does access to credit improve productivity? : evidence 
from Bulgarian firms, Washington, DC: The World Bank (Policy Research 
Working Paper 3921) 
Gereffi, G. (1999): International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel com-
modity chain, in: Journal of International Economics 48 (1), 37–70 
Gibbon, P. / S. Ponte (2005): Trading Down : Africa : value chains and the global 
economy, Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press 
Gibson, T. / H. Stevenson (2011): High impact gazelles : should they be a major 
focus for SME development?, Washington, DC: International Finance 
Corporation 
Ginsburg, H. (2012): Wege aus dem Tal : Ägypten, in: Wirtschaftswoche 28/2012 
Giuliani, E. / C. Pietrobelli / R. Rabellotti (2005): Upgrading in global value 
chains : lessons from Latin American clusters, in: World Development 33 
(4), 549–573 
GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbeit) (2006): Value 
chain analysis : cotton textile industry, Cairo; online: http://www.psdp-
egypt.info/libDetails.asp?subcatid=38&catid=29&pg=l (accessed: 01 Feb. 
2012) 
Goedhuys, M. / L. Sleuwaegen (2010): High-growth entrepreneurial firms in Africa : 
a quantile regression approach, in: Small Business Economics 34 (1), 31–51 
Goldmark, L. (1999): The financial viability of business development services, in: 
Small Enterprise Development 10 (2), 4–16 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 193
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Greenwood, A. (1999): Gender issues in labour statistics, in: International Labour 
Review 138 (3), 273–286 
Grimm, M. / P. Knorringa / J. Lay (2012): Constrained gazelles : high potentials in 
West Africa’s informal economy, The Hague: Institute of Social Studies 
(Working Paper 537) 
Hallward-Driemeier, M. / S. Wallsten / L. Xu (2006): Ownership, investment 
climate and firm performance : evidence from Chinese firms, in: Eco-
nomics of Transition 14 (4), 629–647  
Hampel-Milagrosa, A. (2013): Micro and small enterprise upgrading in the 
Philippines : the role of entrepreneur, enterprise, networks and the business 
environment, Bonn: DIE, forthcoming 
Hattab, H. (2008): Global entrepreneurship monitor : Egypt entrepreneurship re-
port 2008, Cairo: Industrial Modernisation Centre; online: http:\\www. 
gemconsortium.org/national_reports.aspx (accessed: 30 Dec. 2011) 
Hausman, A. (2005): Innovativeness among small businesses : theory and pro-
positions for future research, in: Industrial Marketing Management 34 (8), 
773–782 
Hausmann, R. / B. Klinger / R. Wagner (2008): Doing growth diagnostics in 
practice : a ‘mindbook’, Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Devel-
opment (Working Paper 177) 
Hefnawy, A. (2007): The Role of small manufacturing enterprises in sustainable 
regional development : ismailia governorate as a case study in Egypt, 
Dresden: Technical University of Dresden (Dissertation); online: 
http://www.qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/1693/1166550723
533-5822.pdf (accessed: 30 Dec. 2011) 
Helmy, O. (2009): ICT services without borders : an opportunity with Egypt?, 
Cairo: The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (Working paper 150) 
– (2012): Skill demand polarization in Egypt, Cairo: The Egyptian Center for
Economic Studies (Working Paper 169) 
Heritage Foundation (2011): The index of economic freedom, Washington, DC 
Hofstede, G. (1980): Culture’s consequences : international differences in work-
related values, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Humphrey, J. (2003): Opportunities for SMEs in developing countries to upgrade 
in a global economy, Geneva: International Labour Organization (SEED 
Working Paper 43) 
194 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
Humphrey, J. / H. Schmitz (2000): Governance and upgrading : linking industrial 
cluster and global value chain research, London: Institute of Development 
Studies (Working Paper 120) 
Humphrey, J. / H. Yousif (2008): The investment climate in Egypt : institutions or 
relationship as conditions for sustainable reform? Paris: Agence Française 
de Development (Working Paper 66) 
IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) (2009): Egypt : small-
holder contract farming for high-value and organic agricultural exports, 
Rome 
IFC (International Finance Corporation) (2004): Enterprise surveys : Egypt 
country profile 2004, Washington, DC 
– (2007): Enterprise surveys : Egypt country profile 2007, Washington, DC
– (2008): Enterprise surveys : Egypt country profile 2008, Washington, DC
ILD / ECES (Institute of Liberty and Democracy / Egyptian Center for Economic 
Studies) (2004): Proposals to integrate the extralegal sector into main-
stream economic activity, Cairo 
IMC (Industrial Modernisation Centre) (2005): Egyptian processed food sector 
review, Cairo; online: http://www.imc-egypt.org/studies/FullReport/Egyptian 
%20Processed%20Food%20Sector%20Development%20Strategy_EN.pdf 
(accessed: 20 Dec. 2011)  
Kaplinsky, R. / J. Readman (2001): Integrating SMEs in global value chains : 
towards partnership for development, Vienna: United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization 
Kaplinsky, R. / J. Readman / O. Memedovic (2009): Upgrading strategies in global 
furniture value chains, Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization 
Kappel, R. (2007): Das Wachstum von Unternehmen und seine Relevanz für 
Armutsreduktion, in: H. Bass et al. (eds.), Ökonomische Systeme im 
Wandel der Weltwirtschaft, Berlin: LIT-Verlag, 229–245 
Kheir-el-Din, H. (2005): Productivity performance in developing countries : Egypt, 
Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, mimeo 
King, R. / R. Levine (1993): Finance, entrepreneurship and growth : theory and 
evidence, in: Journal of Monetary Economics 32 (3), 513–542 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 195
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Kirby, D. / N. Ibrahim (2011): Entrepreneurship education and the creation of an 
enterprise culture : provisional results from an experiment in Egypt, in: 
International Entrepreneurship Management Journal 7, 181–193 
Kishimoto, C. (2004): Clustering and upgrading in global value chains : the 
Taiwanese personal computer industry, in: H. Schmitz (ed.), Local enter-
prises in the global economy : issues of governance and upgrading, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 233–264 
Klapper, L. (2006a): Entrepreneurship : how much does the business environment 
matter?, in: Viewpoint 313, 1–4 
Klapper, L. (2006b): Export financing for SMEs : the role of factoring, Wash-
ington, DC: The World Bank (Trade Note 29) 
Knorringa, P. (1995): Economics of collaboration in producer-trader relations : 
transaction regimes between market and hierarchy in the agra footwear 
cluster, India, Amsterdam: Free University 
Knorringa, P. / J. Meyer-Stamer (1999): New dimensions in local enterprise co-
operation and development : from clusters to industrial districts, in: 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (ed.), 
ATAS Bulletin XI : new approaches to science and technology co-
operation and capacity building, Geneva, 1–25 
Knorringa, P. / H. Schmitz (2000): Learning from global buyers, in: Journal of 
Development Studies 37 (2), 177–205 
Koellinger, P. (2008): Why are some entrepreneurs more innovative than others, 
in: Small Business Economics 31, 21–37 
Krause, M. et al. (2010): Formalisation and business development in Mozambique : 
how important are regulations? Bonn: DIE (Studies 53) 
Laffont, J. (1998): Competition, information, and development : paper prepared for 
the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20–21 April 1998; online: http://bbs.cenet.org.cn/uploadimages/ 
200451218432651506.pdf (accessed: 6 Jan. 2012) 
Lall, S. (1999): Competing with labour : skills and competitiveness in developing 
countries, Geneva: International Labour Organization (Discussion Paper 
31)
196 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
Lee, J. / J. Chen (2000): Dynamic synergy creation with multiple business ac-
tivities : toward a competence-based business model for contract manu-
facturers, in: R. Sanchez / A. Heene (eds.), Theory development for com-
petence-based management : advances in applied business strategy, 
Stanford, Calif.: JAI Press, 209–228 
Lee, K. / T. Temesgen (2009): What makes firms grow in developing countries : an 
extension of the resource-based theory of firm growth and empirical 
analysis, in: International Journal of Technological Learning, Innovation 
and Development 2 (3), 139–172 
Levine, R. (1997): Financial development and economic growth : views and agen-
da, in: Journal of Economic Literature 35 (2), 688–726 
Lester, R. (2011): The insurance sector in the Middle East and North Africa : 
challenges and development agenda, Washington, DC: The World Bank 
(Policy Research Working Paper 5608)  
Liedholm, C. / D. Mead (1991): Dynamics of enterprises : research issues and 
approaches, Bethesda, Mich.: Michigan State University (Gemini Working 
Paper 12) 
Loewe, M. (2001): Social security in Egypt : an analysis and agenda for reform, 
Cairo: Economic Research Forum (Working Paper 200024) 
– (2009): Soziale Sicherung, informeller Sektor und das Potenzial des Kleinstver-
sicherungsansatzes, Baden-Baden: Nomos 
– (2010): Soziale Sicherung in den arabischen Ländern : Determinanten, Defizite
und Strategien für den informellen Sektor, Baden-Baden: Nomos 
– (2012): Großes Potenzial, schlechte Umsetzung : Wie das Land die Produktivität
seiner Ökonomie verbessern kann, in: Internationale Politik März/April 
2012, 4–11 
– (2013): Industrial policy in Egypt 2004–2011, Bonn: DIE, forthcoming
Loewe, M. et al. (2007): The impact of favouritism on the business climate : a 
study on wasĠa in Jordan, Bonn: DIE (Studies 30) 
Magdy, A. (2012): Entrepreneurial ecosystems, in: Business Today Egypt 18 (6), 
16–17 
Maksimovic, V. / M. Ayyagari / A. Demirgüç-Kunt (2007): Firm innovation in 
emerging markets : the roles of governance and finance, Washington, DC: 
The World Bank (Policy Research Working Paper 4157) 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 197
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Malik, A. (2011): The economics of the Arab spring : the region’s dependence on 
natural resources has prevented the emergence of a strong private sector, 
Doha: Aljazeera Online; online: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opin 
ion/2011/10/20111010142425419849.html (accessed: 20 Oct. 2011) 
Marks, M. (2010): Wirtschaftstrends Ägypten Jahreswechsel 2010/11, Berlin: 
Germany Trade and Invest 
Matzke, T. (2011): Wachstumspolitik für eine reiche Minderheit : zu den sozio-
ökonomischen Hintergründen der ägyptischen Revolution, Tübingen: Eber-
hard Karls Universität 
McClelland, D. (1961): The achieving society, New York: The Free Press 
MCIT (Ministry of Communications and Information Technology) (2012): Maps of 
Egypt; online: http://www.mcit.gov.eg/Egypt_Maps (accessed: 14 Apr. 2012) 
McCormick, B. / J. Wahba (2002): Return international migration and geographical 
inequality : the case of Egypt, Southampton: University, mimeo; online: 
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/34546/1/barry%20mccormick%20and%20jacklin
e%20wahba.pdf (accessed: 30 Jun. 2012) 
McPherson, M. (1996): Growth of micro and small enterprises in Southern Africa, 
in: Journal of Development Economics 48, 253–277 
Mead, D. / C. Liedholm (1998): The dynamics of micro and small enterprises in 
developing countries, in: World Development 26 (1), 61–74 
Merton, R. (1995): A functional perspective of financial intermediation, in: Fi-
Qancial Management 24 (2), 23–41 
Meyer, G. (2001): Survival strategies of small-scale manufacturing in Cairo during 
structural adjustment : results from a long-term study, Cairo: Economic 
Research Forum (Working Paper 2021) 
– (2008): Survival strategies of small-scale manufacturing in the informal
settlements of Greater Cairo : results from a long-term study : paper pre-
sented to the international symposium “Exchanging global and Egyptian 
experience in dealing with informal areas within the wider urban man-
agement context”, Cairo, 14–15 October 2008 
MFTI (Egyptian Ministry for Trade and Industry) (2012): QIZ Egypt; online: 
http://www.qizegypt.gov.eg/About_QIZ.aspx (accessed: 20 Jan. 2012) 
MoF (Ministry of Finance) (2005): Enhancing opportunities for SME leasing, 
Cairo 
– (2008): The path to growth : experience of Egyptian entrepreneurs, Cairo
198 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
Morris, S. et al. (2001): The growth and transformation of small firms in India, 
Oxford: University Press 
Mostafa, M. (2005): Factors affecting organizational creativity and innovativeness 
in Egyptian business organizations : an empirical investigation, in: Journal 
of Management Development 24 (1), 7–33 
Nadvi, K. (1999): Collective efficiency and collective failure : the response of the 
Sialkot surgical instrument cluster to global quality pressures, in: World 
Development 27 (9), 1605–1626 
Nasr, S. (2008): Access to finance and economic growth in Egypt, Washington, 
DC: The World Bank 
Navas-Alemán, L. (2011): The impact of operating in multiple value chains for 
upgrading : the case of the Brazilian furniture and footwear industries, in: 
World Development 39 (8), 1386–1397 
Nawaz, F. (2008): Corruption and resource distribution in neopatrimonial systems, 
Berlin: Transparency International 
Nichter, S. / L. Goldmark (2009): Small firm growth in developing countries, in: 
World Development 37 (9), 1453–1464 
OBG (Oxford Business Group) (2012): The report : Egypt 2012, Oxford 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (1996): Oslo 
manual : the measurement of scientific and technological activities : pro-
posed guidelines for collecting and interpreting technological innova- 
tion data, Paris; online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/61/2367580.pdf 
(accessed: 19 Jan. 2011) 
– (2004): Fostering an entrepreneurial business environment for firm creation and
SME growth in the MENA region, Paris; online: http://www.oecd.org/data 
oecd/12/54/20167784.pdf (accessed: 15 Nov. 2011) 
– (2009): Policy roundtables : competition policy and the informal economy, Paris;
online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/47/44547855.pdf (accessed: 15 
Nov. 2011) 
– (2010a): Business climate development strategy : phase 1 policy assessment :
Egypt : dimension III-3 : access to finance, Paris 
– (2010b): Business climate development strategy : phase 1 policy assessment :
Egypt : dimension III-1 : infrastructure, Paris 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 199
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
– (2010c): Competitiveness and private sector development : Egypt business cli-
mate development strategy, Paris; online: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ 
finance-and-investment/competitiveness-and-private-sector-development-
egypt-2010_9789264087408-en (accessed: 19 Oct. 2011) 
– (2010d): Competition, state aids and subsidies : contribution from Egypt, Paris
Omran, M. (2008): Access to finance for SMEs through the stock exchange in 
Egypt : conceptual framework and policy implications, Cairo: Cairo & 
Alexandria Stock Exchanges (Occasional Paper 3)  
Parnell, J. (1995): Examining the impact of culture on entrepreneurial propensity : 
an empirical study of prospective American and Egyptian entrepreneurs, 
in: Academy of Entrepreneurship Journal 1 (1), 39–51 
Poldermans, R. (2011): Expanding Egypt's banking frontiers : the future of SME 
banking in Egypt : turning ripples into waves, Cairo: Central Bank of 
Egypt, Egyptian Banking Institute 
Porta, R. / A. Shleifer (2008): The unofficial economy and economic development, 
Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research (Working 
Paper 14520)  
Porter, M. (2008): On competition, updated and expanded edition, Boston, Mass.: 
Harvard Business School Publishing 
Putnam, R. (2001): Bowling alone : the collapse and revival of American com-
munity, New York: Simon and Schuster 
Qayyum, M. (2012): Revolutionary business : rethinking entrepreneurship in the 
Middle East, in: Sada 26 January 2012, Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment; online: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/01/26/re 
volutionary-business/96km (accessed: 15 Apr. 2012) 
Qualmann, R. (2002): Why don't they innovate? : explaining diverse SME adjust-
ment strategies after an external shock, in: M. van Dijk (ed.), Innovation 
and small enterprises in the third world, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
166–186 
Rabellotti, R. (1999): Recovery of a Mexican cluster : devaluation bonanza or col-
lective efficiency?, in: World Development 27 (9), 1571–1585 
Radas, S. / L. Božiü (2009): The antecedents of SME innovativeness in an emerg-
ing transition economy, in: Technovation 29 (6–7), 438–450 
200 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
Radwan, S. / W. Lotfy (2008): Small and medium investment (SMI) : a window of 
opportunity for Egypt, Cairo: General Authority for Investment and Trade 
Zones 
Rahaman, M. (2011): Access to financing and firm growth, in: Journal of Banking 
& Finance 35 (3), 709–723 
Rauch, A. / M. Frese (2000): Psychological approaches to entrepreneurial success : 
a general model and an overview of findings, in: European Journal of 
Work and Organizational Psychology 16 (4), 353–385 
Reeg, C. (2013a): Micro, small and medium enterprise upgrading in India : learn-
ing from the success cases, Bonn: DIE, forthcoming 
– (2013b): Latecomer entrepreneurship and enterprise upgrading in developing
countries, Bonn: DIE, forthcoming 
Robalino, D. (2005): Pensions in the Middle East and North Africa : time for 
change, Washington, DC: The World Bank 
Rocha, R. et al. (2011): The status of bank lending to SMEs in the Middle East and 
North Africa region : the results of a joint survey of the Union of Arab 
Banks and the World Bank, Beirut, Washington, DC: The Union of Arab 
Banks, The World Bank 
Roll, S. (2010): Ägypten auf dem Weg zur „Familienrepublik“ : Parlaments- und 
Präsidentschaftswahlen und die Erbfolge im Präsidentenamt, Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP-Aktuell 04) 
Rothwell, R. / M. Dodgson (1991): External linkages and innovation in small and 
medium-sized enterprises, in: R&D Management 21 (2), 125–138 
Rotter, J. (1966): Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of 
reinforcement, in: Psychological Monographs 80 (1), 1–2 
Salah-Ahmed, A. (2012): Cairo has a long way to go to realise potential, in: 
Financial Times 11 October 2012 
Salsecci, S. et al. (2008): Egypt : growth potential and business opportunities, 
Turin: Intesa Sanpaolo 
Sanabel (The Microfinance Network of Arab Countries) (2010): Arab microfinance 
regional report : an industry update, Giza 
Schiffer, M. / B. Weder (2001): Firm size and the business environment : world- 
wide survey results, Washington, DC: International Finance Corporation 
(Discussion Paper 43) 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 201
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Schmitz, H. (1997): Collective efficiency and increasing returns, Brighton: Institute 
for Developing Studies (Working Paper 50) 
– (1999): Global competition and local cooperation : success and failure in the
Sinos valley, Brazil, in: World Development 27 (9), 1627–1650 
– (2000): Does local co-operation matter? : Hvidence from industrial clusters in
South Asia and Latin America, in: Oxford Development Studies 28 (3), 
323–336 
– (2004): Globalized economies : introduction, in: H. Schmitz (ed.), Local enter-
prises in the global economy : issues of governance and upgrading, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1–19 
– (2006): Learning and earning in global garment and footwear chains, in: The
European Journal of Development Research 18 (4), 546–571 
Schumpeter, J. (1964): The theory of economic development, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press 
SFD (Social Fund for development) (2009): Mobilizing Egyptian micro and small 
enterprises in Egypt 2009–2013 : national strategy for micro and small 
enterprise development and blueprint for initiatives, Cairo 
Shane, S. (2003): A general theory of entrepreneurship : the individual-opportunity 
nexus, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 
Shanmugam, K.R. / S.N. Bhaduri (2002): Size, age and firm growth in the Indian 
manufacturing sector, in: Applied Economics Letters 9 (9), 607–613 
Singh, A. (2002): Competition and competition policy in emerging markets : 
international and developmental dimensions, Geneva: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (G-24 Discussion Paper 18); 
online: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2418_en.pdf (accessed: 6 
Jan. 2012) 
Slater, R. et al. (2009): Social protection, rural livelihoods and economic growth : 
the case of cash transfers in Malawi, Ethiopia and Bangladesh, in: 
P. Townsend (ed.), Building decent societies : rethinking the role of social 
security in development, 1st ed., Geneva: International Labour Organiza-
tion, 274–289 
Sleuwaegen, L. / M. Goedhuys (2002): Growth of firms in developing countries : 
evidence from Côte d’Ivoire, in: Journal of Development Economics 68 
(1), 117–135 
202 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
Soto, H. de (1989): The other path : the invisible revolution in the third world, New 
York: Harpercollins Publisher 
Stamm, A. (2004): Wertschöpfungsketten entwicklungspolitisch gestalten : Anfor-
derungen an Handelspolitik und Wirtschaftsförderung : Konzeptstudie, 
Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit; online: 
http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/%28ynDK_con 
tentByKey%29/ENTR7C3KCJ/$FILE/Wertsch%C3%B6pfungsketten%20
entwicklungspolitisch%20gestalten.pdf (accessed: 6 Jan. 2012) 
Stevenson, L. (2010): Private sector and enterprise development : fostering growth 
in the Middle East and North Africa, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing  
Stiglitz, J et al. (2006): Stability with growth : macroeconomics, liberalization, and 
development, New York: Oxford University Press 
Stochierro, A. (2002): Euromed cooperation on SME clustering : who, where and 
what? : paper presented to the Third Mediterranean Social and Political 
Research Meeting, Workshop 10 on “Industrial districts and local clusters: 
An alternative pattern of development and economic integration in the 
Mediterranean”, Florence, 20–24 March 2002; online: http://www.cespi.it/ 
STOCCHIERO/paperClusterMed.pdf (accessed: 20 Dec. 2011) 
Stone, A. / L. Badawy (2011): SME innovators and gazelles in MENA : educate, 
train, certify, compete!, Washington, DC: The World Bank (MENA 
Knowledge and Learning Quick Note Series 43/4) 
Tambunan, T. (2011): The impacts of trade liberalization on Indonesian small and 
medium-sized enterprises, Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (TKN Policy Paper); online: http://www.iisd.org/tkn/pdf/ 
impact_trade_lib_indonesia.pdf (accessed: 7 Jan. 2012) 
Tan, H. / G. Batra (2003): SME technical efficiency and its correlates : cross-
national evidence and policy implications, Washington, DC: The World 
Bank; online: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/74068/china/ 
readings/oct30/tan30engl.pdf (accessed: 7 Jan. 2012) 
Tanzi, V. (1998): Corruption around the world : causes, consequences, scope, and 
cures, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund (Working Paper 98/63) 
Terpstra, R. (2012a): Financial literacy in Egypt, in: Business Today Egypt 18 (6), 
28–29 
– (2012b): Why financial literacy matters, in: Business Today Egypt 18 (6), 48–53
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 203
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Tewari, M. / J. Goebel (2002): Small firm competitiveness in a trade liberalized 
world : lessons for Tamil Nadu, Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International 
Development; online: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/archive/india/pdfs/tewari 
_smallfirms_042102.pdf (accessed: 20 Oct. 2011) 
Tokatli, N. / O. Kizilgün (2004): Upgrading in the global clothing industry : mavi 
jeans and the transformation of Turkish firm from full-package to brand-
name manufacturing and retailing, in: Economic Geography 80 (3), 221–-
239 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (1999): 
Policies and non-fiscal measures for upgrading SME clusters : an assess-
ment : issues paper prepared for the Trade and Development Board, Com-
mission on Enterprise, Business, Facilitation and Development, Fourth 
Session, Geneva, 19–23 July 1999, TD/B/COM.3/22; online: http://www. 
unctad.org/en/docs/c3d22.pdf (accessed: 20 Dec. 2011) 
– (2010): Integrating developing countries’ SMEs into global value chains,
Geneva; online: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeed20095_en.pdf (ac-
cessed: 9 Jan. 2012) 
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2001): Improving the com-
petitiveness of SMEs in developing countries : the role of finance to 
enhance enterprise development, Geneva; online: http://www.unctad.org/ 
en/docs/itetebmisc3_en.pdf (accessed: 8 Jan. 2012) 
– (2004): Business development services : how to guide?, Bratislava: UNDP
Regional Centre 
– (2011): Sustainability and equity : Human Development Report 2011, New York
UNDP / AFESD (United Nations Development Programme / Arab Fund for Econ- 
omic and Social Development) (eds.) (2002): Arab Human Develop-
ment Report 2002 : creating opportunities for future generations, New 
York 
– / – (eds.) (2003): Arab Human Development Report 2003 : building a knowledge
society, New York 
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) 
(2010): The current status of science around the world, Paris (UNESCO 
science report 2010) 
Unger, J. et al. (2011). Human capital and entrepreneurial success : a meta-
analytical review, in: Journal of Business Venturing 26 (3), 341–358 
204 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
UPI (United Press International) (2010): Water scarce in Egypt; online: http:// 
www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2010/07/28/Water-scarce-
in-Egypt/UPI-61361280325992/ (accessed: 20 Dec. 2011) 
UNSTATS (United Nations Statistics Division) (2012): International standard 
industrial classification of all economic activities : Rev.4; online: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=27 (accessed: 1 Mar. 
2012) 
Wahdat, A. (2010): Microenterprises performance under consulting services and 
clustering : a study of Egypt and Turkey, Oberlin, Ohio: College, online: 
http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Wahdat%20Ahmad%20Zia.pdf?oberlin 
1302072031 (accessed: 20 Dec. 2011) 
WEF (World Economic Forum) (2005): The Global Competitiveness Report 2005–
2006, Geneva 
– (2010): The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011, Geneva 
– (2011): The Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012, Geneva 
Weichenrieder, A. (2007): Survey on the taxation of small and medium-sized 
enterprises : draft report on responses to the questionnaire, Paris: OECD; 
online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/25/39597756.pdf (accessed: 20 
Oct. 2011) 
Weltaltlas.de (2012): Karte von Kairo; online: http://www.welt-atlas.de/daten 
bank/karte.php?kartenid=2-55 (accessed: 14 Apr. 2012) 
Wignaraja, G. (2003): Promoting SME exports from developing countries, Paris: 
OECD; online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/54/20167784.pdf (ac-
cessed: 20 Oct. 2011) 
World Bank (2009): KEI and KI indexes : knowledge assessment methodology 
2009; online: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp (ac-
cessed: 3 Feb. 2012) 
– (2010a): Innovation policy : a guide for developing countries, Washington, DC; 
online: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/ 
0PUB0EPI11C10Dislosed061312010.pdf (accessed: 20 Dec. 2011) 
– (2010b): Financial structure dataset, Washington, DC; online: http://data.world 
bank.org/topic/financial-sector (accessed: 3 Feb. 2012) 
– (2011a): MENA facing challenges and opportunities : regional economic update, 
Washington, DC 
WDSP/IB/2010/06/04/000334955_20100604043754/Rendered/PDF/54893
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 205
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
– (2011b): World development indicators 2011, Washington, DC 
– (2012a): Doing business 2012 : doing business in a more transparent world, 
Washington, DC 
– (2012b): Doing business in a more transparent world : economy profile: Egypt, 
Arab Rep., Washington, DC 
– (2012c): Infrastructure dataset, Washington, DC; online: http://data.worldbank. 
org/topic/infrastructure (accessed: 3 Feb. 2012) 
– (2012d): Export of goods and services dataset, Washington, DC; online: http://data. 
worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS/countries (accessed: 3 Feb. 
2012) 
– (2012e): Ease of doing business in Egypt, Washington, DC; online: http://www. 
doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/egypt/ (accessed: 13 Jul. 2012) 
– (2012f): Doing business 2013 : smarter regulations for small and medium-size 
enterprises, Washington, DC 
WEF (World Economic Forum) (2011): The Global Competitiveness Report 2011–
2012, Geneva 
Zahra, S. / G. George (2002): Absorptive capacity : a review, reconceptualization, 
and extension, in: Academy of Management Review 27 (2), 185–203 
Zandniapour, L. / J. Sebstad / D. Snodgrass (2004): Review of impact assessments 
of selected enterprise development projects, Washington, DC: United 
States Agency for International Development (Microreport 3) 
Zia, B. (2008): Export incentives, financial constraints, and the (mis)allocation of 
credit : micro-level evidence from subsidized export loans, in: Journal of 
Financial Economics, 87 (2), 498–527 

German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 207
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
List of interviewed experts  
Interlocutors are listed in alphabetical order by their last name and with 
their affiliation at the time of the interview with them 
Abbas, Mohamed, Projects Operations Supervisor, Industrial Council for Tech-
nology & Innovation Council, Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade. 
Cairo, 20 February 2012 
Abd El Hady, Hisham, Senior Merchandiser, Bishara Textile and Garments Manu-
facturing. 10th of Ramadan City, 13 March 2012 
Abdel Aziz, Dina, Deputy Executive Director Operations, Expolink. Cairo, 12 
March 2012 
Abdel Hameed, Mohammed, Planning and Development Manager, Associate 
Director for Strategic Planning, Textile and Clothing Business Center. 
Cairo, 22 February 2012 
Abdel Hameed, Safa Mostafa, Senior Economic Researcher, International 
Organizations Unit, Ministry of Communications and Information 
Technology. Smart Village, 04 March 2012 
Abdel Malak, Hani, Programme Director Egypt, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung. 
Cairo, 28 February 2012 
Abdel-Rahim, Walid, Deputy Director, KfW Office Cairo. Cairo, 18 September 
2011 
Abo El Wafa, Mohamed, Program Manager Agriculture and Agrobusiness, United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID). Cairo, 21 February 
2012 
Abou Iiana, Mohamed, Managing Director, Textile and Clothing Business Center. 
Cairo, 22 February 2012 
Abouesh, Amro, Executive Chairman, Tanmeyah Microenterprise Services. Cairo, 
14 February 2012 
Abouleish, Helmy, Managing Director, Sekem Group. Giza, 05 March 2012 
Abulata, Nermine, Lead Economist and Technical Assistant to the Minister, 
Ministry for Industry and Foreign Trade. Cairo, 22 February 2012 
208 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
Ahmed, Mahmoud Mohammed, Chairman, Forum for Training and Education 
(FORTE), DEinternational, German-Arab Chamber of Commerce. Giza, 
23 February 2012 
Ahmed, Yossef Zakria, Chairman, Egyptian Small Enterprise Development Foun-
dation. Cairo, 13 March 2012 
Allam, Shereen, Chief Executive Officer, Association for Women's Total Advancement 
& Development. Cairo, 28 February 2012 
Aly, Azmy Moustafa, Chief Director, Technical Office, Social Fund for Develop-
ment. Giza, 17 June 2009 and 19 February 2012 
Assaad, Ragui, Professor, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minne-
sota. Giza, 18 April 2012 
Asfour, Amany, President, Egyptian Business Women Association. Giza, 15 March 
2012 
Aziz, Fatma, Chief External Relations Officer, Egyptian Small Enterprise Devel-
opment Foundation. Cairo, 13 March 2012 
Badawy, Lina, Research Assistant, The World Bank. Cairo, 21 February 2012 
Berkshire, Dan, Financial Sector Results Lead, Egypt's Competitiveness Programme, 
Chemonics. Cairo, 22 February 2012 
Bishara, Louis, Chairman, Bishara Textile and Garments Manufacturing; Marie 
Louis Company for Fashionable Garments. 10th of Ramadan City, 13 
March 2012 
Boldracchi, Raffaele, Senior Operations Manager, Donor Relations, Advisory 
Services, Middle East and North Africa, International Finance Corporation 
(IFC). Cairo, 21 February 2012 
Bremer, Jennifer, Associate Professor of Public Policy, Chair of Department of 
Public Policy Administration, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, 
The American University in Cairo. Cairo, 14 February 2012 
Ceglie, Giovanna, Country Representative and Director Regional Office, United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Cairo, 15 Feb-
ruary 2012 
Dayem, Hesham Wagdy, Director, technical assistance and national programmes, 
policy support and national quality, Industrial Modernization Centre 
(IMC). Cairo, 27 April 2010 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 209
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Dowidar, Ashraf, Head of Central Department for Planning, Marketing and 
Information, Industrial Development Authority. Cairo, 21 June 2009 
Eikenberg, Felix, Country Representative, Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Cairo, 02 
April 2012 
Eissa, Heba, Manager for Public Relations and Communications, The Egyptian 
Exchange (NILEX). Cairo, 22 February 2012 
El Bedawy, Ahmed, Managing Director, Endeavour. Cairo, 26 February 2012 
El Behairy, Khaled, Executive Director, Egyptian Chamber of Textile Industries. 
Cairo, 19 February 2012 
El-Gazawi, Khaled, Chief Executive Officer, The First Microfinance Foundation. 
Cairo, 22 February 2012 
El Ghareni, Khaled, Statistician, Egyptian Stock Exchange. Cairo, 19 February 
2012 
El Hadary, Hanan, Chairman, Industrial Council for Technology & Innovation, 
Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade. Cairo, 20 February 2012 
El-Haddad, Amirah, Assistant Professor, faculty of economics and political 
science, Cairo University. Cairo, 23 February 2012 
El-Hage, Natalija, Programme Manager, German Technical Co-operation (GTZ). 
Cairo, 28 April 2010 
El-Hawari, Anwar, Chief Editor, Al Ahram Al Iqtisadi. 6th of October City, 05 
April 2012 
El Mahdi, Alia, Professor of Economics, Cairo University. Giza, 20 February 2012 
El-Meehy, Tamer, Managing Director, Entrust. Giza, 28 April 2010 and 08 April 
2012 
El Megharbel, Nihal, Director of Decentralization Support Unit, Ministry for Local 
of Development. Cairo, 19 February 2012 
El Mohandes, Muhamed, Vice Chairman, Chamber of Engineering Industries. 
Cairo, 12 March 2012 
El Salamony, Hany, Quality and Food Safety Consultant, Agriculture and Agro-
Industries Technology Center (UNIDO / ETRACE). Cairo, 22 February 
2012 
El Shenawy, Heba, Managing Director, Femina. Cairo, 18 March 2012 
210 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
El Sheridy, Yomna, President, Business Women of Egypt21. Cairo, 29 February 
2012 
El Tobgui, Mona, Senior Advisor, Fraunhofer Office Cairo. Cairo, 18 June 2009 
El-Okdah, Nahla, Finance and Private Sector Development Analyst, The World 
Bank. Cairo, 21 February 2012 
Elsaady, Reem, Executive Director, Bedaya Center for Entrepreneurship and 
SME’s Development, General Authority for Investment and Free Zones. 
Cairo, 16 February 2012 
Elsayed, Ahmed M., Head of Research and Development Section, The Egyptian 
Exchange (NILEX). Cairo, 28 February 2012 
El-Sherbini, Adham, Project Manager, Egypt Enterprise Development Project 
(EEDP). Cairo, 22 February 2012 
Ezz El Din, Noha, Research Assistant, Social Research Center, American 
University in Cairo. Cairo, 13 March 2012 
Fahmy, Alaa, National Program Director, Agriculture and Agro-Industries Tech-
nology Center (UNIDO / ETRACE). Cairo, 22 February 2012 
Fahmy, Omnia, Vice-President, Egyptian Business Women Association. Giza, 15 
March 2012 
Farag, Mohammad, Senior Project Manager, Industrial Modernization Centre 
(IMC). Cairo, 27 February 2012 
Fawzi Abdel Gawad, Sherif, Executive Director, Egyptian Regulatory Reform & 
Development Authority. Giza, 07 March 2012 
Fritz, Heiko, Associate Professor, Economics Department, German University in 
Cairo. Cairo, 20 September 2011 
Gadalla, May, Assistant Professor, Statistics Department, School of Economics 
and Political Science, Cairo University. Cairo, 23 February 2012 
Gamal, Dalia, Senior Projects Manager, Technology Innovation and Entre-
preneurship Center (TIEC). Smart Village, 04 March 2012 
Garf, Mona, Full Professor, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo 
University. Giza, 19 February 2012 
Geneidi, Ahmed, Head of programme “enterprise and social development”, Cairo 
office, Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Cairo, 15 June 2009 and 27 February 
2012 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 211
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Ghali, Marianne, Chairman and Managing Director, Sphinx Private Equity 
Management / Grandview. Cairo, 20 February 2012 
Ghanem, Amina, Secretary General, Egyptian National Competition Council. 
Giza, 07 March 2012 
Giesel, Frank, Senior Expert, Chamber of Food Industries. Cairo, 10 May 2010 
and 15 February 2012 
Hamman, Hans, First Counsellor, development co-operation, German Embassy in 
Cairo. Cairo, 13 February 2012 
Handoussa, Heba, Advisory Committee Member, Economic Research Forum. 
Giza, 29 February 2012 
Hassan, Ahmed Elshahat, Projects Manager, Industrial Training Council (ITC). 
Cairo, 21 February 2012 
Heermann, Lisa, Programme Manager, Global Project Partners. Cairo, 27 February 
2012 
Ismail, Moshir, Executive Director, Enterprise TVET Partnership (ETP) for Ready 
Made Garment/ Traintex. Cairo, 23 February 2012 
Johannes Majewski, Financial System Development, Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Cairo, 29 February 2012 
Kamal. Ashraf, Deputy Sector Head, The Egyptian Exchange (NILEX). Cairo, 28 
February 2012 
Kassem, Mohamed, Chairman, World Trading Company Egypt. Cairo, 22 Feb-
ruary 2012 
Kipper, Regina, Advisor, Cities and Climate Change, Participatory Development 
Programme in Urban Areas, Egypt, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Inter-
nationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Cairo, 20 February 2012 
Kreibaum, Merle, Intern, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ). Cairo, 20 February 2012 
Lee, Steven, Consultant. Cairo/ Dublin via Skype, 17 February 2012 
Lewandowski, Jens, Regional Security Management Officer, Chief Inspector, Ger-
man Embassy in Cairo. Cairo, 13 February 2012 
Lotfi, Ingi, Senior Economist, Policy and Private Sector Office, United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). Cairo, 22 February 2012 
212 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
Lotfy, Abdel Moaty, Vice Chairman, Federation of Economical Development Or-
ganisations. Cairo, 16 June 2010 and 21 February 2012 
Louis, Mohsen, Director, Hatshepsut Women Business Development Center of the 
Egyptian Business Women Association. Giza, 15 March 2012 
Mabrouk, Mohamed, President, Small and Medium Industry Association in 
Gharbiyya. Cairo, 12 March 2012 
Mackensen, Jens, Director, KfW Office Cairo. Cairo, 19 September 2011 
Maher, Ahmed, Senior Business Advisor, Egypt Enterprise Development Project 
(EEDP). Cairo, 22 February 2012 
Mandour, Ahmed Fouad, Executive Director, Food Technology Centre. Giza, 22 
June 2009 
Metwally, Sally, Innovation Support Director, Technology Innovation and Entre-
preneurship Center (TIEC). Smart Village, 04 March 2012 
Meyer, Günter, Director, Centre for Research on the Arab World, University of 
Mainz. Bonn/ Mainz by telephone, 25 January 2012 
Mohamed Sultan, Abd El Salam, Chairman, Chamber of Commerce Sharqeya 
Governorate. Zagazig, 08 March 2012 
Mohamed, Ramadan Hamed, Research Professor, Social Research Center, The 
American University of Cairo. Cairo, 18 September 2011 
Morin, Steven, Supervisory Program Economist, United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). Cairo, 21 February 2012 
Musalla, Samir, Quality Assurance and Quality Control Manager, Juhayna. 6th of 
October City, 08 March 2012 
Nader, Mohamed, Board Member, Egyptian Junior Business Association (EJBA). 
Cairo, 22 February 2012 
Naseem, Kaiser, Programme Manager, Bank Advisory Services, Middle East and 
North Africa, International Finance Corporation (IFC). Cairo, 21 February 
2012 
Nasrallah, Khali, Chief Agrofood Sector, Wadi Food. Cairo, 27 February 2012 
Nazier, Hanan, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Cairo University. 
Cairo, 23 February 2012 
Omar, Hassan, QIZ unit, minister’s office, Ministry for Trade and Industry. Cairo, 
17 June 2009 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 213
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Omran, Emran, Team Leader, SME Programme, Canadian International Devel-
opment Agency (CIDA). Cairo, 09 June 2009 and 16 February 2012 
Radke, Detlef, Consultant. Cairo, 15 February 2012 
Ramadan, Racha, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics and Political Scien-
ces, Cairo University. Cairo, 23 February 2012 
Reil, Florian, Senior Advisor, REEF Component, Egyptian-German Private Sector 
Development Programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusam-
menarbeit (GIZ). Cairo, 16 February 2012 
Rezk, Mohamed Mahmoud, Director General, General Co-operative Productive 
Association for Metal and Engineering Industries. Cairo, 12 March 2012 
Rolf, Thomas, Programme Co-ordinator, Egyptian-German Private Sector Devel-
opment Programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusam-
menarbeit (GIZ). Cairo, 27 February 2012 
Sadaamy, Khali, Director, Enterprise TVET Partnership (ETP) for Food. Cairo, 21 
February 2012 
Said, Mona, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, American University 
in Cairo. Giza, 18 April 2012 
Sebour, Omr, Chairman and Managing Director, Egyptian Junior Business Asso-
ciation (EJBA). Cairo, 22 February 2012 
Sewelam, Khaled, Director, Research and Publications Department, American 
Chamber of Commerce in Egypt. Giza, 07 March 2012 
Shaat, Khalil, Advisor on Informal Areas to Cairo Governorate, Deutsche Gesell-
schaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Cairo, 22 March 2012 
Shelsby, Kim, Deputy Programme Director, streamlined business processes result 
lead, Egypt's Competitiveness Programme, Chemonics. Cairo, 22 February 
2012 
Soliman, Kholoud, Export Development Manager, Social Fund for Development. 
Giza, 06 March 2012 
Steurer, Roland, Country Director, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Cairo, 18 September 2011 
Stone, Andrew, Lead Private Sector Development Specialist, The World Bank. 
Cairo, 21 February 2012 
Sturies, Seija, Programme Coordinator, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Cairo, 02 April 2012 
214 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
Tanatar, Selçuk, Programme Manager, industry development, advisory services 
PEP-MENA, International Finance Corporation. Cairo, 21 June 2009 
Thebet, Fouad, Chairman, Small and Medium Industry Association in Port Said. 
Cairo, 12 March 2012 
Tinawy, Yousri, General Manager, Chamber of Food Industries. Cairo, 25 June 
2009 
Tolba, Magdy, Chairman and Managing Director, Cairo Cotton Center. Cairo, 27 
February 2012 
Valenza, Matteo, Programme Officer, United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO). Cairo, 20 September 2011 
Vennewald, Magnus, Head of Department “economic services”, German-Arab 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce. Cairo. Cairo, 10 June 2009 
Wasmuth, Nele, Programme Coordinator, Economic Integration of Women in 
MENA, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). 
Cairo, 20 February 2012 
Weber, Paul, Irrigation Agronomist, water resources management programme of 
the Ministry for Agriculture and Land Reclamation, German Technical Co-
operation (GTZ). Giza, 05 May 2010 
Winter, Laura, Technical Advisor, Economic Integration of Women in MENA, 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Cairo, 20 
February 2012 
Yousef, Magued, Consultant. Cairo, 19 February 2012 
Youssef, Heba, Deputy Head of Economic Research Department, Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology. Smart Village, 04 March 
2012 
Youssef, Mohamed, Assistant to Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance. Cairo, 16 
February 2012 
Youssef, Mohamed, Executive Director, Egyptian Businessmen’s Association. 
Giza, 14 March 2012 
 
Annexes

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex A 
Results of interviews with SMEs 
 

German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 219
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
T
ab
le
 A
1:
 
Sa
m
pl
in
g 
m
et
ho
d 
 
A
ll 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 w
ith
  
<5
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s  
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
-u
pg
ra
de
rs
 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
N
on
-s
el
ec
tio
n-
bi
as
ed
 li
st
s 
23
 
19
 
6 
13
 
C
ha
m
be
rs
’ r
eg
is
tri
es
 
20
 
16
 
3 
13
 
Y
el
lo
w
 p
ag
es
 
2 
2 
2 
0 
O
th
er
 
1 
1 
1 
0 
Se
le
ct
io
n-
bi
as
ed
 li
st
s 
30
 
25
 
17
 
8 
EC
ES
 e
nt
er
pr
is
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
6 
4 
3 
1 
IT
ID
A
 e
nt
er
pr
is
e 
lis
t 
8 
8 
5 
3 
Te
le
ph
on
e 
bo
ok
 
11
 
10
 
6 
4 
O
th
er
 
5 
3 
3 
0 
E
xp
er
ts
 r
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
30
 
21
 
6 
15
 
N
IL
EX
 
3 
1 
0 
1 
G
A
C
C
  
4 
2 
1 
1 
V
ar
io
us
 S
M
E 
as
so
ci
at
io
ns
 
6 
5 
2 
3 
O
th
er
  
17
 
13
 
3 
10
 
Fi
el
d 
(w
al
ki
ng
 th
e s
tre
et
) 
19
 
15
 
11
 
4 
T
ot
al
 
10
2 
80
 
41
 
39
 
 
220 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
T
ab
le
 A
2:
 
L
oc
at
io
n 
of
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 –
 b
y 
ge
og
ra
ph
ic
al
 r
eg
io
n 
  
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Co
m
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
no
n-
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e n
on
-
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
G
re
at
er
 C
ai
ro
 
66
 
57
 
33
 
24
 
12
 
12
 
83
%
 
60
%
 
Sa
te
lli
te
 c
iti
es
  
(1
0t
h 
of
 R
am
ad
an
,  
6t
h 
of
 O
ct
ob
er
) 
10
 
5 
0 
5 
3 
2 
0%
 
10
%
 
D
el
ta
 
(G
ha
rb
iy
ya
, S
ha
rq
iy
ya
) 
25
 
18
 
7 
11
 
5 
6 
18
%
 
30
%
 
T
ot
al
 
10
2 
80
 
40
 
40
 
20
 
20
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
       
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 221
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
T
ab
le
 A
3:
 
L
oc
at
io
n 
of
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 –
 b
y 
go
ve
rn
or
at
e,
 to
w
n 
an
d 
ur
ba
n 
di
st
ri
ct
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
no
n-
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
C
ai
ro
 G
ov
er
no
ra
te
  
46
 
38
 
23
 
15
 
9 
6 
N
as
r C
ity
 
10
 
8 
5 
3 
1 
2 
A
z-
Za
yt
un
 
6 
4 
4 
0 
0 
0 
M
an
sh
ia
t N
as
r a
nd
 H
ar
af
in
 
5 
5 
4 
1 
1 
0 
M
aa
di
 
5 
5 
2 
3 
2 
1 
10
th
 o
f R
am
ad
an
 C
ity
  
5 
2 
1 
1 
0 
1 
M
at
ar
iy
ya
  
an
d 
su
rro
un
di
ng
s 
4 
4 
1 
3 
3 
0 
H
el
io
po
lis
 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
1 
A
bb
as
iy
ya
 an
d 
G
ur
ry
a 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
G
ar
de
n 
Ci
ty
 an
d 
M
an
ya
l 
2 
2 
0 
2 
1 
1 
D
ow
nt
ow
n,
 R
am
sis
  
an
d 
Bu
la
q 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
N
ew
 C
ai
ro
 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
Sh
ub
ra
 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
G
iz
a 
G
ov
er
no
ra
te
  
19
 
16
 
5 
11
 
6 
5 
Im
ba
ba
 an
d 
W
ar
ra
q 
6 
6 
4 
2 
1 
1 
222 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
T
ab
le
 A
3 
(c
on
t.)
: 
L
oc
at
io
n 
of
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 –
 b
y 
go
ve
rn
or
at
e,
 to
w
n 
an
d 
ur
ba
n 
di
st
ri
ct
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
-u
p-
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
no
n-
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
M
uh
an
di
sin
, G
iz
a, 
A
gu
za
 an
d 
D
uq
qi
 
6 
5 
1 
4 
2 
2 
6t
h 
of
 O
ct
ob
er
 C
ity
 
5 
3 
0 
3 
2 
1 
Sa
qq
ar
a 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
Sm
ar
t V
ill
ag
e  
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
Sh
ar
qi
yy
a 
G
ov
er
no
ra
te
  
13
 
9 
6 
3 
0 
3 
Sh
ub
ra
 al
 K
ha
ym
a 
13
 
9 
6 
3 
0 
3 
G
ha
rb
iy
ya
 G
ov
er
no
ra
te
  
18
 
12
 
4 
8 
4 
4 
Ta
nt
a 
8 
6 
2 
4 
1 
3 
M
ah
al
la
 
8 
5 
2 
3 
3 
0 
N
aw
aq
 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
Sa
m
an
ud
 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Q
al
yu
bi
yy
a 
G
ov
er
no
ra
te
 
6 
5 
2 
3 
1 
2 
Za
ga
zi
g 
2 
2 
0 
2 
0 
2 
Bi
lb
is 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
M
in
ya
 A
l-Q
am
h 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
G
ar
b 
N
ag
m
 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 223
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
T
ab
le
 A
4:
 
E
co
no
m
ic
 se
ct
or
 o
f c
om
pa
ni
es
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
no
n-
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
T
ex
til
es
 &
 g
ar
m
en
ts
 
53
 
42
 
25
 
17
 
9 
8 
C
lo
th
es
 
46
 
37
 
23
 
14
 
7 
7 
O
th
er
 te
xt
ile
s &
 g
ar
m
en
ts
 
7 
5 
2 
3 
2 
1 
Fo
od
-p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
(%
) 
34
 
26
 
9 
17
 
10
 
7 
Sw
ee
ts
 
14
 
10
 
5 
5 
2 
3 
Pr
oc
es
se
d 
ve
ge
ta
bl
es
 
7 
7 
2 
5 
3 
2 
O
th
er
 fo
od
 
13
 
9 
2 
7 
5 
2 
IC
T
 
14
 
11
 
5 
6 
1 
5 
O
th
er
s 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
T
ot
al
 
10
2 
80
 
40
 
40
 
20
 
20
 
    
224 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Markus Loewe et al.
T
ab
le
 A
5:
 
O
w
ne
r’
s g
en
de
r 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
no
n-
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Fe
m
al
e 
16
 
15
 
4 
11
 
6 
5 
M
al
e 
82
 
64
 
35
 
29
 
14
 
15
 
U
nc
le
ar
 b
ec
au
se
 th
e i
nt
er
-
vi
ew
ee
 w
as
 n
ot
 th
e o
w
ne
r 
4 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
T
ot
al
 
10
2 
80
 
40
 
40
 
20
 
20
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
A
6:
 
C
om
pa
ny
 si
ze
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
no
n-
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sm
al
l (
<5
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s)
 
73
 
69
 
39
 
30
 
18
 
12
 
M
ed
iu
m
  
(5
0–
99
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s)
 
18
 
7 
1 
6 
2 
4 
La
rg
e 
 
(1
00
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s o
r m
or
e)
 
11
 
4 
0 
4 
0 
4 
T
ot
al
 
10
2 
80
 
40
 
40
 
20
 
20
 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 225
Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
T
ab
le
 A
7:
 
N
um
be
r 
of
 g
ro
w
in
g 
an
d 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
 
20
07
 –
 2
01
2 
20
00
 –
 2
00
7 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
N
ot
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
co
m
pa
ni
es
  
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
by
 
an
 e
xp
er
t 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
N
ot
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
co
m
pa
ni
es
  
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
by
 
an
 e
xp
er
t 
N
um
be
r o
f 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 th
at
 
ha
d 
gr
ow
n 
an
d 
cr
os
se
d 
th
e 
th
re
sh
ol
d(
s)
 o
f: 
5 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
8 
4 
9 
5 
10
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
11
 
7 
15
 
9 
20
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
15
 
9 
11
 
8 
30
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
16
 
9 
12
 
8 
50
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
12
 
7 
9 
6 
10
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
10
 
3 
3 
3 
5 
an
d 
10
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
4 
1 
8 
4 
10
 a
nd
 2
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
5 
3 
9 
6 
20
 a
nd
 3
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
10
 
5 
9 
7 
30
 a
nd
 5
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
6 
2 
8 
5 
50
 a
nd
 1
00
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
4 
1 
3 
3 
5 
an
d 
20
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
1 
0 
4 
3 
10
 a
nd
 3
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
3 
1 
7 
5 
20
 a
nd
 5
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
4 
1 
7 
5 
30
 a
nd
 1
00
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
2 
0 
3 
3 
5 
an
d 
30
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
1 
0 
3 
2 
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T
ab
le
 A
7 
(c
on
t.)
: 
N
um
be
r 
of
 g
ro
w
in
g 
an
d 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
 
20
07
 –
 2
01
2 
20
00
 –
 2
00
7 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
N
ot
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
co
m
pa
ni
es
  
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
by
 
an
 e
xp
er
t 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
N
ot
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
co
m
pa
ni
es
  
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
by
 
an
 e
xp
er
t 
N
um
be
r o
f c
om
-
pa
ni
es
 th
at
 h
ad
 
gr
ow
n 
an
d 
cr
os
se
d 
th
e t
hr
es
ho
ld
(s
) o
f 
(c
on
t.)
: 
10
 a
nd
 5
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
1 
0 
0 
0 
20
 a
nd
 1
00
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
1 
0 
3 
3 
5 
an
d 
50
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
1 
0 
2 
1 
10
 a
nd
 1
00
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
0 
0 
3 
3 
5 
an
d 
10
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
0 
0 
1 
1 
N
um
be
r o
f c
om
-
pa
ni
es
 th
at
 h
ad
 
gr
ow
n 
in
 re
la
tiv
e 
te
rm
s b
y 
at
 le
as
t: 
25
%
 
52
 
31
 
13
 
8 
50
%
 
48
 
29
 
11
 
6 
75
%
 
36
 
23
 
11
 
6 
10
0%
 
28
 
17
 
11
 
6 
20
0%
 
20
 
11
 
10
 
5 
60
0%
 
6 
3 
3 
2 
10
00
%
 
2 
1 
2 
1 
N
um
be
r o
f  
co
m
pa
ni
es
 th
at
 
ha
d 
gr
ow
n 
in
 
ab
so
lu
te
 te
rm
s b
y 
at
 le
as
t: 
10
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
35
 
18
 
7 
5 
20
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
23
 
11
 
4 
3 
30
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
18
 
8 
4 
3 
50
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
8 
1 
4 
3 
75
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
6 
1 
2 
2 
10
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
3 
1 
1 
1 
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Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
T
ab
le
 A
8:
 
So
m
e 
av
er
ag
es
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
no
n-
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
A
ve
ra
ge
 n
um
be
r o
f  
em
pl
oy
ee
s (
20
12
) 
45
 
28
 
15
 
42
 
23
 
61
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 n
um
be
r o
f  
em
pl
oy
ee
s (
20
07
) 
34
 
15
 
14
 
15
 
19
 
12
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 n
um
be
r o
f e
m
pl
oy
-
ee
s i
n 
th
e 
fo
un
di
ng
 y
ea
r  
10
 
8 
8 
8 
10
 
7 
A
ve
ra
ge
 re
la
tiv
e 
ch
an
ge
  
in
 n
um
be
r o
f e
m
pl
oy
ee
s  
(2
00
7–
20
12
) 
17
%
 
87
%
 
7%
 
18
0%
 
21
%
 
40
8%
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 y
ea
r o
f f
ou
nd
in
g 
19
96
 
19
98
 
19
94
 
20
01
 
19
99
 
20
04
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 co
m
pa
ny
 ag
e (
ye
ar
s)
 
16
 
14
 
18
 
11
 
13
 
8 
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T
ab
le
 A
9:
 
N
um
be
r 
of
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 th
at
 in
tr
od
uc
ed
 ta
ng
ib
le
 in
no
va
tio
n(
s)
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 fi
ve
 y
ea
rs
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
ew
 p
ro
du
ct
(s
) 
39
 
28
 
Im
pr
ov
ed
 p
ro
du
ct
(s
) 
38
 
27
 
R
ed
uc
tio
n 
in
 n
um
be
r o
f p
ro
du
ct
s 
1 
1 
O
ut
so
ur
ci
ng
 
0 
0 
Im
pr
ov
ed
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s 
15
 
13
 
N
ew
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
st
ra
te
gy
 
6 
6 
N
ew
 la
be
lli
ng
 o
r p
ac
ka
gi
ng
 
10
 
7 
N
ew
 e
xp
or
t m
ar
ke
ts
 
6 
7 
O
th
er
 n
ew
 m
ar
ke
ts
 
6 
5 
D
ow
ns
tre
am
in
g 
1 
1 
U
ps
tre
am
in
g 
0 
0 
N
ew
 se
ct
or
 
1 
1 
N
ew
 c
er
tif
ic
at
io
n 
or
 q
ua
lit
y 
st
an
da
rd
 
5 
4 
O
th
er
 
1 
3 
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Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
T
ab
le
 A
9 
(c
on
t):
 
N
um
be
r 
of
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 th
at
 in
tr
od
uc
ed
 ta
ng
ib
le
 in
no
va
tio
n(
s)
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 fi
ve
 y
ea
rs
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
In
tr
od
uc
ed
 a
t l
ea
st
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
se
 in
no
va
tio
ns
 (=
 ‘i
nn
ov
at
or
’) 
73
 
55
 
In
no
va
to
r p
lu
s g
re
w
 b
y 
>5
0%
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
07
 a
nd
 2
01
2 
52
1  
42
 
In
no
va
to
r p
lu
s g
re
w
 fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s 
52
2  
42
 
In
no
va
to
r p
lu
s g
re
w
 b
y 
>5
0%
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
07
 a
nd
 2
01
2 
an
d 
fa
ste
r t
ha
n 
co
m
pe
tit
or
s (
= 
‘u
pg
ra
de
r’)
 
46
3  
40
 
In
no
va
to
r b
ut
 d
id
 n
ot
 g
ro
w
 b
y 
>5
0%
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
07
 a
nd
 2
01
2 
or
 fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s 
15
4  
11
 
D
id
 n
ot
 in
tr
od
uc
e 
an
y 
ki
nd
 o
f i
nn
ov
at
io
n 
(=
 ‘n
on
-in
no
va
to
r’
) 
29
 
25
 
N
on
-in
no
va
to
r b
ut
 g
re
w
 b
y 
>5
0%
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
07
 a
nd
 2
01
2 
10
5  
9 
N
on
-in
no
va
to
r b
ut
 g
re
w
 fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s 
26
 
2 
N
on
-in
no
va
to
r b
ut
 g
re
w
 b
y 
>5
0%
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
07
 a
nd
 2
01
2 
an
d 
fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s 
17
 
1 
N
on
-in
no
va
to
r a
nd
 d
id
 n
ot
 g
ro
w
 b
y 
>5
0%
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
07
 a
nd
 2
01
2 
no
r f
as
te
r t
ha
n 
co
m
pe
tit
or
s 
18
8  
15
 
1 
In
no
va
te
d 
an
d 
gr
ew
 b
y 
m
or
e 
th
an
 5
0%
 b
y 
an
y 
cr
ite
ria
, b
ut
 n
ot
 n
ec
es
sa
ril
y 
fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s;
 d
id
 N
O
T 
gr
ow
 fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s 
2 
In
no
va
te
d 
an
d 
gr
ew
 fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s, 
bu
t n
ot
 n
ec
es
sa
ril
y 
by
 m
or
e 
th
an
 5
0%
;  
gr
ew
 b
y 
le
ss
 th
an
 5
0%
 b
y 
al
l o
f t
he
 a
bo
ve
 c
rit
er
ia
 
3 
Fu
lfi
l a
ll 
th
re
e 
cr
ite
ria
 a
nd
 a
re
 th
er
ef
or
e 
te
rm
ed
 ‘u
pg
ra
de
rs
’  
4 
In
no
va
te
d 
bu
t n
ei
th
er
 g
re
w
 fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s n
or
 b
y 
at
 le
as
t 5
0%
 b
y 
ei
th
er
 o
f t
he
 a
bo
ve
 c
rit
er
ia
 
5 
G
re
w
 b
y 
m
or
e 
th
an
 5
0%
 b
y 
an
y 
cr
ite
ria
 b
ut
 n
ot
 n
ec
es
sa
ril
y 
fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s;
  d
id
 n
ot
 g
ro
w
 fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s 
6 
In
no
va
te
d 
an
d 
gr
ew
 fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s, 
bu
t n
ot
 n
ec
es
sa
ril
y 
by
 m
or
e 
th
an
 5
0%
;  
di
d 
no
t g
ro
w
 b
y 
m
or
e 
th
an
 5
0%
 b
y 
an
y 
cr
ite
ria
 
7 
G
re
w
 b
y 
m
or
e 
th
an
 5
0%
 b
y 
an
y 
cr
ite
ria
 a
nd
 fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s, 
bu
t d
id
 n
ot
 in
no
va
te
 
8 
D
id
 n
ot
 in
no
va
te
 a
nd
 n
ei
th
er
 g
re
w
 fa
st
er
 th
an
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s n
or
 b
y 
at
 le
as
t 5
0%
 b
y 
ei
th
er
 o
f t
he
 a
bo
ve
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rit
er
ia
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T
ab
le
 A
10
: 
In
iti
al
 n
um
be
r 
of
 c
om
pa
ny
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 w
ith
 
<5
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 w
ith
 
>5
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
T
ot
al
 
N
on
-u
pg
ra
di
ng
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
40
 
16
 
56
 
C
on
tr
ac
te
d 
(%
) 
11
 
6 
17
 
U
nc
ha
ng
ed
 (%
) 
15
 
5 
20
 
G
re
w
 (%
) 
14
 
5 
19
 
U
pg
ra
di
ng
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
40
 
6 
46
 
G
az
el
le
s (
%
) 
20
 
1 
21
 
N
on
-g
az
el
le
s (
%
) 
20
 
21
 
41
 
T
ot
al
 
80
 
22
 
10
2 
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Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
T
ab
le
 A
11
a:
 
M
ai
n 
ob
st
ac
le
s t
o 
up
gr
ad
in
g 
(o
pe
n 
qu
es
tio
n)
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
La
ck
 o
f s
ki
lle
d 
la
bo
ur
 
45
 
46
%
 
35
 
45
%
 
17
 
43
%
 
18
 
47
%
 
7 
37
%
 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
fin
an
ce
 
26
 
27
%
 
23
 
29
%
 
9 
23
%
 
14
 
37
%
 
9 
47
%
 
Ec
on
om
ic
 d
ow
nt
ur
n 
af
te
r r
ev
ol
ut
io
n 
21
 
21
%
 
17
 
22
%
 
13
 
33
%
 
4 
11
%
 
1 
5%
 
H
ig
h 
pr
ic
e 
of
 in
pu
ts 
19
 
19
%
 
14
 
18
%
 
8 
20
%
 
6 
16
%
 
3 
16
%
 
Re
gu
la
tio
n 
16
 
16
%
 
12
 
15
%
 
5 
13
%
 
7 
18
%
 
3 
16
%
 
Sa
tis
fie
d/
lo
ya
l w
or
ke
rs
 
18
 
18
%
 
11
 
15
%
 
5 
13
%
 
6 
16
%
 
5 
26
%
 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
la
nd
 
8 
8%
 
8 
10
%
 
2 
5%
 
6 
16
%
 
4 
21
%
 
U
nf
ai
r c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
fro
m
 b
ig
 o
r  
in
flu
en
tia
l c
om
pa
ni
es
 
10
 
10
%
 
7 
9%
 
2 
5%
 
5 
13
%
 
4 
21
%
 
Ta
xa
tio
n 
9 
9%
 
6 
8%
 
4 
10
%
 
2 
5%
 
1 
5%
 
Ch
ea
p 
im
po
rte
d 
pr
od
uc
ts 
6 
6%
 
6 
8%
 
3 
8%
 
3 
8%
 
0 
0%
 
Pe
tty
 c
or
ru
pt
io
n 
7 
7%
 
5 
6%
 
2 
5%
 
4 
11
%
 
1 
5%
 
La
ck
 o
f m
ar
ke
tin
g 
str
at
eg
y 
5 
5%
 
5 
6%
 
1 
3%
 
4 
11
%
 
2 
11
%
 
Tr
ad
e 
re
gi
m
e 
4 
4%
 
4 
5%
 
1 
3%
 
3 
8%
 
1 
5%
 
Q
ua
lit
y 
of
 in
pu
ts 
4 
4%
 
4 
5%
 
2 
5%
 
2 
5%
 
2 
11
%
 
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 
6 
6%
 
3 
4%
 
1 
3%
 
2 
5%
 
2 
11
%
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T
ab
le
 A
11
a 
(c
on
t.)
: 
M
ai
n 
ob
st
ac
le
s t
o 
up
gr
ad
in
g 
(o
pe
n 
qu
es
tio
n)
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
no
n-
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
H
ea
vy
 m
ar
ke
t c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
 
4 
4%
 
3 
4%
 
3 
8%
 
0 
0%
 
0 
0%
 
U
nf
ai
r c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
al
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
3 
3%
 
3 
4%
 
1 
3%
 
2 
5%
 
0 
0%
 
En
tre
pr
en
eu
r’s
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
3 
3%
 
3 
4%
 
3 
8%
 
0 
0%
 
0 
0%
 
Em
pl
oy
ee
s’
 w
or
k 
et
hi
cs
 
5 
5%
 
2 
3%
 
1 
3%
 
1 
3%
 
1 
5%
 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
m
ar
ke
ts 
3 
3%
 
2 
3%
 
2 
5%
 
0 
0%
 
0 
0%
 
W
or
ke
r i
ns
ur
an
ce
 
2 
2%
 
2 
3%
 
2 
5%
 
0 
0%
 
0 
0%
 
Lo
ca
tio
n 
2 
2%
 
2 
3%
 
2 
5%
 
0 
0%
 
0 
0%
 
La
ck
 o
f c
or
po
ra
te
 la
w
 
3 
3%
 
1 
1%
 
0 
0%
 
1 
3%
 
0 
0%
 
Fo
rm
al
ity
 st
at
us
 
1 
1%
 
1 
1%
 
1 
3%
 
0 
0%
 
0 
0%
 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 ra
te
 
2 
2%
 
0 
0%
 
0 
0%
 
0 
0%
 
0 
0%
 
O
th
er
 
21
 
21
%
 
15
 
19
%
 
7 
18
%
 
8 
21
%
 
5 
26
%
 
To
ta
l r
es
po
nd
in
g 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
98
 
 
78
 
 
40
 
 
38
 
 
19
 
 
To
ta
l a
ns
w
er
s  
(m
ul
tip
le
 a
ns
w
er
s p
er
 in
te
rv
ie
w
ee
 p
os
sib
le
) 
43
3 
 
34
0 
 
17
4 
 
16
8 
 
87
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Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
T
ab
le
 A
11
b:
 
M
ai
n 
ob
st
ac
le
s f
or
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 w
ith
 <
50
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s i
n 
20
07
 –
 b
y 
se
ct
or
, s
iz
e 
an
d 
ag
e 
(o
pe
n 
qu
es
tio
n)
 
 
B
y 
se
ct
or
 
B
y 
si
ze
 
B
y 
ag
e 
 
Fo
od
 
  
(to
ta
l: 
26
) 
Te
xt
ile
s &
 
ga
rm
en
ts
 
(to
ta
l: 
42
) 
So
ftw
ar
e 
  
(to
ta
l: 
11
) 
10
 o
r f
ew
er
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
  
(to
ta
l: 
32
) 
20
 o
r m
or
e 
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s  
(2
00
7)
  
(to
ta
l: 
31
) 
<1
0 
ye
ar
s 
ol
d 
 
 
(to
ta
l: 
28
) 
15
 y
ea
rs
 o
ld
 
or
 m
or
e 
 
(to
ta
l: 
25
) 
La
ck
 o
f s
ki
lle
d 
la
bo
ur
 
11
 
42
%
 
19
 
45
%
 
5 
45
%
 
10
 
31
%
 
22
 
71
%
 
9 
32
%
 
13
 
52
%
 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
fin
an
ce
 
7 
27
%
 
13
 
31
%
 
3 
27
%
 
11
 
34
%
 
4 
13
%
 
10
 
36
%
 
7 
28
%
 
Ec
on
om
ic
 d
ow
nt
ur
n 
af
te
r 
re
vo
lu
tio
n 
3 
12
%
 
13
 
31
%
 
1 
9%
 
7 
22
%
 
5 
16
%
 
8 
29
%
 
5 
20
%
 
H
ig
h 
pr
ic
e 
of
 in
pu
ts
 
4 
15
%
 
10
 
24
%
 
0 
0%
 
4 
13
%
 
6 
19
%
 
6 
21
%
 
6 
24
%
 
R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
9 
35
%
 
3 
7%
 
0 
0%
 
6 
19
%
 
5 
16
%
 
5 
18
%
 
2 
8%
 
Sa
tis
fie
d/
lo
ya
l w
or
ke
rs
 
4 
15
%
 
5 
12
%
 
2 
18
%
 
1 
3%
 
8 
26
%
 
3 
11
%
 
4 
16
%
 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
la
nd
 
4 
15
%
 
3 
7%
 
1 
9%
 
1 
3%
 
4 
13
%
 
3 
11
%
 
1 
4%
 
U
nf
ai
r c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
w
ith
 b
ig
  
or
 in
flu
en
tia
l c
om
pa
ni
es
 
3 
12
%
 
2 
5%
 
2 
18
%
 
3 
9%
 
1 
3%
 
2 
7%
 
2 
8%
 
Ta
xa
tio
n 
2 
8%
 
4 
10
%
 
0 
0%
 
4 
13
%
 
1 
3%
 
2 
7%
 
4 
16
%
 
C
he
ap
 im
po
rt 
pr
od
uc
ts
 
1 
4%
 
5 
12
%
 
0 
0%
 
0 
0%
 
5 
16
%
 
1 
4%
 
4 
16
%
 
Pe
tty
 c
or
ru
pt
io
n 
3 
12
%
 
0 
0%
 
2 
18
%
 
3 
9%
 
2 
6%
 
2 
7%
 
2 
8%
 
La
ck
 o
f m
ar
ke
tin
g 
st
ra
te
gy
 
2 
8%
 
1 
2%
 
2 
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to
 im
pr
ov
e 
32
 
33
%
 
26
 
34
%
 
12
 
31
%
 
14
 
38
%
 
6 
30
%
 
U
se
 o
f t
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
an
d 
m
ar
ke
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
26
 
27
%
 
20
 
26
%
 
10
 
26
%
 
10
 
27
%
 
5 
25
%
 
R
is
k 
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 
25
 
25
%
 
19
 
25
%
 
10
 
26
%
 
9 
24
%
 
7 
35
%
 
In
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e 
21
 
22
%
 
17
 
22
%
 
11
 
28
%
 
6 
16
%
 
6 
30
%
 
Sk
ill
ed
 la
bo
ur
 
20
 
21
%
 
16
 
21
%
 
7 
18
%
 
9 
24
%
 
8 
40
%
 
Pe
rs
on
al
 re
la
tio
ns
/ w
as
Ġa 
16
 
17
%
 
15
 
20
%
 
5 
13
%
 
10
 
27
%
 
6 
30
%
 
O
w
ne
r’
s e
du
ca
tio
n 
 
14
 
15
%
 
13
 
17
%
 
7 
18
%
 
6 
16
%
 
2 
10
%
 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
fin
an
ce
 
9 
9%
 
7 
9%
 
3 
8%
 
4 
11
%
 
4 
20
%
 
C
om
pa
ny
 si
ze
 
7 
7%
 
7 
9%
 
5 
13
%
 
2 
5%
 
2 
10
%
 
C
o-
op
er
at
io
n 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 fi
rm
s 
6 
6%
 
5 
7%
 
2 
5%
 
3 
8%
 
1 
5%
 
Fo
rm
al
ity
 st
at
us
 o
f c
om
pa
ny
 
7 
7%
 
5 
7%
 
1 
3%
 
4 
11
%
 
0 
0%
 
G
en
de
r o
f o
w
ne
r 
7 
7%
 
5 
7%
 
5 
13
%
 
0 
0%
 
0 
0%
 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 ra
te
 
6 
6%
 
4 
5%
 
1 
3%
 
3 
8%
 
1 
5%
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T
ab
le
 A
14
a 
(c
on
t.)
: 
M
os
t p
os
iti
ve
 fa
ct
or
s f
or
 c
om
pa
ny
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t (
cl
os
ed
 li
st
) 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
3 
3%
 
3 
4%
 
1 
3%
 
2 
5%
 
1 
5%
 
Ta
x 
sy
st
em
 
5 
5%
 
2 
3%
 
0 
0%
 
2 
5%
 
0 
0%
 
Po
lit
ic
al
 st
ab
ili
ty
 
3 
3%
 
2 
3%
 
0 
0%
 
2 
5%
 
1 
5%
 
In
fla
tio
n 
1 
1%
 
1 
1%
 
0 
0%
 
1 
3%
 
1 
5%
 
Tr
ad
e 
sy
st
em
 
1 
1%
 
1 
1%
 
0 
0%
 
1 
3%
 
0 
0%
 
R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
1 
1%
 
1 
1%
 
1 
3%
 
0 
0%
 
0 
0%
 
T
ot
al
 r
es
po
nd
in
g 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
96
 
 
76
 
 
39
 
 
37
 
 
20
 
 
T
ot
al
 a
ns
w
er
s  
(u
p 
to
 fo
ur
 a
ns
w
er
s w
er
e 
po
ss
ib
le
) 
40
0 
 
32
5 
 
15
8 
 
16
7 
 
87
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Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Ta
bl
e 
A
14
b:
 
Si
ng
le
 p
os
iti
ve
 fa
ct
or
 fo
r 
co
m
pa
ny
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t (
cl
os
ed
 li
st
) 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Co
m
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
no
n-
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
B
us
in
es
s e
nv
ir
on
m
en
t 
22
 
16
 
11
 
5 
2 
28
%
 
10
%
 
Co
m
pe
tit
io
n:
 in
ce
nt
iv
e t
o 
im
pr
ov
e
7 
7 
5 
2 
1 
13
%
 
5%
 
In
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e 
3 
2 
2 
0 
0 
5%
 
0%
 
Sk
ill
ed
 la
bo
ur
 
6 
4 
3 
1 
1 
8%
 
5%
 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
fin
an
ce
 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
3%
 
0%
 
B
D
Ss
 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0%
 
0%
 
Ta
x 
sy
st
em
 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0%
 
0%
 
Po
lit
ic
al
 st
ab
ili
ty
 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0%
 
0%
 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 ra
te
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0%
 
0%
 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0%
 
0%
 
In
fla
tio
n 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0%
 
0%
 
Tr
ad
e 
sy
st
em
 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0%
 
0%
 
B
ur
ea
uc
ra
cy
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0%
 
0%
 
Bu
sin
es
s l
in
ka
ge
s 
8 
8 
3 
5 
1 
8%
 
5%
 
Pe
rs
on
al
 re
la
tio
ns
/ w
as
Ġa 
6 
6 
2 
4 
1 
5%
 
5%
 
C
o-
op
er
at
io
n 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 fi
rm
s 
2 
2 
1 
1 
0 
3%
 
0%
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T
ab
le
 A
14
b 
(c
on
t.)
: 
Si
ng
le
 p
os
iti
ve
 fa
ct
or
 fo
r 
co
m
pa
ny
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t (
cl
os
ed
 li
st
) 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Co
m
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
no
n-
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
E
nt
er
pr
is
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
14
 
10
 
5 
5 
1 
13
%
 
5%
 
U
se
 o
f t
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
an
d 
 
m
ar
ke
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
7 
5 
3 
2 
0 
8%
 
0%
 
Lo
ca
tio
n 
3 
3 
1 
2 
0 
3%
 
0%
 
Si
ze
 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0%
 
5%
 
Se
ct
or
 
3 
1 
1 
0 
0 
3%
 
0%
 
Fo
rm
al
ity
 st
at
us
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0%
 
0%
 
E
nt
re
pr
en
eu
r 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
50
 
42
 
18
 
24
 
16
 
46
%
 
80
%
 
W
or
k 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
20
 
16
 
7 
9 
6 
18
%
 
30
%
 
A
m
bi
tio
n 
19
 
17
 
7 
10
 
7 
18
%
 
35
%
 
R
is
k 
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 
6 
5 
2 
3 
1 
5%
 
5%
 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
3 
2 
2 
0 
0 
5%
 
0%
 
G
en
de
r 
2 
2 
0 
2 
2 
0%
 
10
%
 
N
on
e 
of
 th
e 
su
gg
es
te
d 
fa
ct
or
s 
8 
4 
3 
1 
0 
8%
 
0%
 
T
ot
al
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
10
2 
80
 
40
 
40
 
20
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
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Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Ta
bl
e 
A
15
: 
C
om
pa
ni
es
’ v
ie
w
 o
f s
up
po
rt
 n
ee
de
d 
to
 g
ro
w
 (o
pe
n 
qu
es
tio
n)
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Co
m
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
no
n-
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
W
or
ke
rs
 
26
 
18
 
8 
10
 
3 
 
Tr
ai
n 
w
or
ke
rs
 
21
 
15
 
6 
9 
3 
16
%
 
19
%
 
C
ha
ng
e 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t l
aw
 
3 
2 
2 
0 
0 
5%
 
0%
 
H
el
p 
fin
d 
w
or
ke
rs
 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0%
 
0%
 
Ea
se
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
cr
ed
it/
  
re
du
ce
 in
te
re
st
 r
at
e 
17
 
17
 
9 
8 
4 
24
%
 
25
%
 
O
th
er
 B
D
Ss
 
41
 
33
 
8 
25
 
10
 
 
Su
pp
or
t p
ur
ch
as
e 
of
 m
ac
hi
ne
s 
12
 
9 
3 
6 
2 
8%
 
13
%
 
C
on
su
lta
nc
y 
 
(b
us
in
es
s a
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n)
 
10
 
10
 
3 
7 
3 
8%
 
19
%
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l s
up
po
rt 
fo
r t
ra
de
 
fa
irs
/e
xp
or
t s
up
po
rt 
9 
5 
1 
4 
2 
3%
 
13
%
 
Pr
ov
is
io
n 
of
 te
ch
ni
ca
l  
kn
ow
-h
ow
 
5 
4 
1 
3 
1 
3%
 
6%
 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
3 
3 
0 
3 
0 
0%
 
0%
 
H
el
p 
w
ith
 re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
 
an
d 
lic
en
si
ng
 
2 
2 
0 
2 
2 
0%
 
13
%
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Ta
bl
e 
A
15
 (c
on
t.)
: 
C
om
pa
ni
es
’ v
ie
w
 o
f s
up
po
rt
 n
ee
de
d 
to
 g
ro
w
 (o
pe
n 
qu
es
tio
n)
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Co
m
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
no
n-
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
D
er
eg
ul
at
io
n 
38
 
29
 
17
 
12
 
9 
 
Lo
w
er
 ta
xe
s/
ch
an
ge
 ta
x 
sy
st
em
 
17
 
13
 
9 
4 
3 
24
%
 
19
%
 
Si
m
pl
ify
/re
du
ce
 b
ur
ea
uc
ra
cy
 
16
 
11
 
6 
5 
3 
16
%
 
19
%
 
Lo
w
er
 c
os
t o
f w
or
ke
r i
ns
ur
an
ce
  
3 
3 
1 
2 
2 
3%
 
13
%
 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
m
ar
ke
ts
 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3%
 
6%
 
M
or
e 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
25
 
20
 
15
 
5 
1 
 
Re
du
ce
 in
pu
t c
os
ts 
(e
sp
. o
n 
im
po
rts
)
16
 
12
 
8 
4 
1 
21
%
 
6%
 
Re
str
ic
t i
m
po
rt 
of
 fo
re
ig
n 
pr
od
uc
ts 
5 
5 
5 
0 
0 
13
%
 
0%
 
In
tro
du
ce
/e
nf
or
ce
 q
ua
lit
y 
sta
nd
ar
ds
 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
5%
 
0%
 
Im
pr
ov
e 
tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
7 
4 
0 
4 
3 
0%
 
19
%
 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
la
nd
/in
du
st
ri
al
 z
on
es
 
15
 
14
 
4 
10
 
7 
11
%
 
44
%
 
O
th
er
 
26
 
20
 
10
 
10
 
5 
26
%
 
31
%
 
T
ot
al
 a
ns
w
er
s  
(M
ul
tip
le
 a
ns
w
er
s p
os
sib
le
) 
29
9 
23
7 
11
1 
12
6 
62
 
 
N
ot
hi
ng
 fr
om
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t –
 
it 
ca
n'
t h
el
p 
12
 
8 
2 
6 
4 
 
T
ot
al
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
10
2 
80
 
40
 
40
 
20
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Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
T
ab
le
 A
16
: 
M
os
t h
el
pf
ul
 B
D
Ss
 (c
lo
se
d 
lis
t) 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Co
m
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
no
n-
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
cr
ed
it 
40
 
30
 
19
 
11
 
4 
61
%
 
27
%
 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
m
ar
ke
ts
 
33
 
27
 
20
 
7 
3 
65
%
 
20
%
 
Tr
ai
n 
w
or
ke
rs
 
29
 
21
 
10
 
11
 
5 
32
%
 
33
%
 
H
el
p 
fin
d 
w
or
ke
rs
 
22
 
18
 
11
 
7 
2 
35
%
 
13
%
 
H
el
p 
in
 c
o-
op
er
at
io
n 
w
ith
  
ot
he
r f
irm
s 
13
 
11
 
4 
7 
6 
13
%
 
40
%
 
C
on
su
lta
nc
y 
(m
an
ag
er
ia
l) 
9 
9 
5 
4 
3 
16
%
 
20
%
 
C
on
su
lta
nc
y 
(te
ch
ni
ca
l) 
9 
9 
2 
7 
2 
6%
 
13
%
 
H
el
p 
w
ith
 re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
an
d 
 
lic
en
si
ng
 
9 
8 
3 
5 
3 
10
%
 
20
%
 
O
th
er
 
10
 
10
 
4 
6 
5 
13
%
 
33
%
 
T
ot
al
 a
ns
w
er
s  
(M
ul
tip
le
 a
ns
w
er
s p
os
sib
le
) 
17
4 
14
3 
78
 
65
 
33
 
 
 
N
on
e 
of
 th
es
e 
27
 
19
 
9 
10
 
5 
 
 
T
ot
al
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
10
2 
80
 
40
 
40
 
20
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Ta
bl
e 
A
17
: 
O
w
ne
r’
s r
ea
so
ns
 to
 st
ar
t t
he
 b
us
in
es
s 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 C
om
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s
U
pg
ra
de
rs
O
nl
y 
no
n-
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
no
n-
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s
In
he
rit
ed
 fa
m
ily
 b
us
in
es
s 
22
 
18
 
11
 
7 
4 
3 
27
%
 
15
%
 
Re
la
tiv
es
 ac
tiv
e i
n 
sa
m
e f
ie
ld
 
13
 
10
 
5 
5 
3 
2 
12
%
 
10
%
 
Fr
ie
nd
s a
ct
iv
e 
in
 sa
m
e 
fie
ld
 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0%
 
5%
 
W
or
ke
d 
be
fo
re
 in
 le
ad
 fi
rm
 
(s
am
e 
se
ct
or
)  
25
 
21
 
5 
16
 
10
 
6 
12
%
 
30
%
 
W
or
k 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e i
n 
ot
he
r f
ie
ld
  
26
 
20
 
12
 
8 
3 
5 
29
%
 
25
%
 
Pa
ss
io
n 
an
d 
vi
si
on
 
16
 
13
 
5 
8 
6 
2 
12
%
 
10
%
 
N
ec
es
si
ty
 
6 
6 
3 
3 
2 
1 
7%
 
5%
 
Pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
de
m
an
d 
by
 c
us
to
m
er
s 
10
 
7 
3 
4 
1 
3 
7%
 
15
%
 
R
ec
om
m
en
de
d 
by
 fr
ie
nd
(s
) 
6 
5 
2 
3 
1 
2 
5%
 
10
%
 
C
he
ap
 m
at
er
ia
l 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0%
 
5%
 
A
ll 
in
pu
ts
 e
as
ily
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 
lo
ca
tio
n 
3 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2%
 
5%
 
Eq
ui
pm
en
t a
lre
ad
y 
on
-s
ite
 
4 
3 
0 
3 
2 
1 
0%
 
5%
 
O
th
er
 re
as
on
(s
) 
9 
6 
3 
3 
2 
1 
7%
 
5%
 
M
en
tio
ne
d 
at
 le
as
t o
ne
 r
ea
so
n 
95
 
77
 
37
 
40
 
20
 
20
 
90
%
 
10
0%
 
N
o 
an
sw
er
 
6 
3 
3 
0 
0 
0 
7%
 
0%
 
T
ot
al
 
10
2 
80
 
41
 
39
 
20
 
20
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
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Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
Ta
bl
e 
A
18
a:
 
O
w
ne
r’
s e
du
ca
tio
na
l l
ev
el
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Co
m
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s  
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
no
n-
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
no
n-
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Pr
im
ar
y 
or
 le
ss
 
5 
5 
3 
2 
2 
0 
8%
 
0%
 
Se
co
nd
ar
y 
20
 
17
 
11
 
6 
2 
4 
28
%
 
20
%
 
B
A
 o
r e
qu
iv
al
en
t 
57
 
48
 
24
 
24
 
14
 
10
 
60
%
 
50
%
 
M
A
 o
r a
bo
ve
 
13
* 
9*
 
1 
8*
 
2 
6*
 
3%
 
30
%
 
N
o 
an
sw
er
 
7 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
3%
 
0%
 
T
ot
al
 
10
2 
80
 
40
 
40
 
20
 
20
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
* 
O
nl
y 
1 
ga
ze
lle
 u
pg
ra
de
r d
ec
la
re
d 
th
at
 h
e 
ha
d 
up
gr
ad
ed
 h
is
 fo
rm
al
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 5
 y
ea
rs
. A
ny
 c
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 h
en
ce
 p
ro
ba
bl
y 
no
t p
re
do
m
in
an
tly
 d
ue
 to
 re
ve
rs
e 
ca
us
al
ity
. 
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Ta
bl
e 
A
18
b:
 
O
w
ne
r’
s e
du
ca
tio
na
l l
ev
el
 (f
oo
d 
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Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
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Which factors determine the upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)?
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Ta
bl
e 
A
29
: 
R
ea
so
ns
 fo
r 
no
t t
ak
in
g 
a 
ba
nk
 lo
an
 
 
A
ll 
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Co
m
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 <
50
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s  
(2
00
7)
 
N
on
- 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
U
pg
ra
de
rs
 
O
nl
y 
no
n-
ga
ze
lle
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
O
nl
y 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
no
n-
 
up
gr
ad
er
s 
Sh
ar
e 
 
ga
ze
lle
  
up
gr
ad
er
s 
R
ef
us
ed
 
7 
7 
4 
3 
2 
1 
10
%
 
6%
 
In
su
ffi
ci
en
t c
ol
la
te
ra
l 
5 
5 
3 
2 
1 
1 
8%
 
6%
 
In
te
re
st 
ra
te
s t
oo
 h
ig
h 
14
 
12
 
6 
6 
2 
4 
15
%
 
24
%
 
Fe
ar
 o
f c
re
di
t d
ef
au
lt 
16
 
13
 
6 
7 
3 
4 
15
%
 
24
%
 
To
o 
co
m
pl
ic
at
ed
/ 
to
o 
m
uc
h 
pa
pe
rw
or
k 
3 
3 
2 
1 
0 
1 
5%
 
6%
 
R
el
ig
io
n 
10
 
9 
5 
4 
3 
1 
13
%
 
6%
 
N
ot
 n
ee
de
d 
9 
8 
4 
4 
2 
2 
10
%
 
12
%
 
O
th
er
 
10
 
7 
3 
4 
3 
1 
8%
 
6%
 
N
o 
an
sw
er
 
30
 
20
 
13
 
7 
2 
5 
33
%
 
29
%
 
T
ot
al
 
93
 
76
 
39
 
35
 
57
 
17
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex B 
Questionnaire used for interviews with SMEs 
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A
nn
ex
 B
: 
Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
 u
se
d 
fo
r 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s w
ith
 S
M
E
s 
G
en
er
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Se
ct
or
: 
 
N
o.
 o
f i
nt
er
vi
ew
: 
 
N
am
e 
of
 c
om
pa
ny
: 
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
er
: 
 
N
am
e 
of
 in
te
rv
ie
w
ee
: 
 
M
in
ut
e 
ta
ke
r: 
 
Po
si
tio
n 
(in
te
rv
ie
w
ee
): 
 
D
at
e:
 
 
G
en
de
r (
in
te
rv
ie
w
ee
): 
 
En
gl
ish
/A
ra
bi
c i
nt
er
vi
ew
: 
 
U
rb
an
/ru
ra
l/i
nd
us
tri
al
: 
 
N
am
e 
of
 tr
an
sl
at
or
: 
 
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
c 
cl
us
te
r: 
 
So
ur
ce
 o
f c
om
pa
ny
 (f
ro
m
 
w
hi
ch
 li
st
?,
  
w
ho
 to
ld
 u
s a
bo
ut
 it
?)
: 
V
er
y 
im
po
rt
an
t!
 
N
am
e o
f t
ow
n:
 
 
N
am
e o
f n
ei
gh
bo
ur
ho
od
: 
 
Se
le
ct
io
n 
m
od
e:
 
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
: 
(m
ad
e 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
) 
C
at
eg
or
is
at
io
n 
(t
o 
be
 fi
lle
d 
in
 im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
) 
U
pg
ra
de
r: 
   
   
(  
 ) 
ye
s  
 ( 
  )
 n
o 
Ta
x 
ID
: 
   
   
(  
 ) 
ye
s  
 ( 
  )
 n
o 
G
ro
w
er
: 
   
   
(  
 ) 
ye
s  
 ( 
  )
 n
o 
N
um
be
r o
f e
m
pl
oy
ee
s:
: 
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A
nn
ex
 B
 (c
on
t.)
: 
Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
 u
se
d 
fo
r 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s w
ith
 S
M
E
s 
In
tr
od
uc
tio
n 
1:
 In
 w
hi
ch
 y
ea
r d
id
 y
ou
r c
om
pa
ny
 st
ar
t o
pe
ra
tin
g?
  
 
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 (
A
ge
 o
f b
us
in
es
s)
:_
__
__
__
__
__
_ 
2:
 W
he
re
 h
av
e 
yo
u 
st
ar
te
d 
yo
ur
 b
us
in
es
s?
 
to
 b
e 
tic
ke
d 
by
 m
in
ut
e 
ta
ke
r: 
  (
  )
 sa
m
e 
pl
ac
e 
as
 to
da
y 
  (
  )
 fa
m
ily
 h
ou
se
   
(  
) s
om
ew
he
re
 in
 to
w
n 
  (
  )
 o
th
er
 to
w
n 
 
 
   
   
   
   
(  
) o
th
er
, s
pe
ci
fy
:  
 _
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2a
: I
f e
ls
ew
he
re
: W
hy
 h
av
e 
yo
u 
m
ov
ed
? 
  _
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
2b
: W
he
re
 is
 th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tio
n 
of
 y
ou
r f
irm
? 
   
 T
hi
s p
la
ce
 h
er
e 
(  
), 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 S
om
ew
he
re
 e
ls
e,
 sp
ec
ify
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
2c
: W
he
re
 is
 th
e 
fa
ct
or
y/
pr
od
uc
tio
n?
   
   
   
   
   
   
 T
hi
s p
la
ce
 h
er
e 
(  
), 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 S
om
ew
he
re
 e
ls
e,
 sp
ec
ify
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
V
er
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 g
ro
w
th
 (q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
as
pe
ct
 o
f u
pg
ra
di
ng
) 
3:
 W
ha
t p
ro
du
ct
s /
 se
rv
ic
es
 d
o 
yo
u 
of
fe
r?
 
 
(a
) _
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
 
(c
) _
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
 
(b
) _
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
 
(d
) _
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
4:
 D
id
 y
ou
 in
tro
du
ce
 n
ew
 p
ro
du
ct
s o
ve
r t
he
 la
st
 5
 y
ea
rs
? 
 
(  
 ) 
ye
s 
   
  (
   
) n
o 
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A
nn
ex
 B
 (c
on
t.)
: 
Q
ue
st
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nn
ai
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 u
se
d 
fo
r 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s w
ith
 S
M
E
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4a
: I
f y
es
: w
ha
t e
xa
ct
ly
 is
 n
ew
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
pr
od
uc
t(s
)?
  
(a
) _
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
(b
) _
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
(c
) _
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
5:
 H
ow
 m
an
y 
re
gu
la
r (
un
lim
ite
d 
te
rm
) e
m
pl
oy
ee
s d
o 
yo
u 
ha
ve
? 
 
(  
 ) 
m
or
e 
th
an
 2
0 
(  
 ) 
le
ss
 th
an
 2
0 
   
nu
m
be
r: 
__
__
__
__
__
_ 
6:
 H
ow
 m
an
y 
re
gu
la
r (
un
lim
ite
d 
te
rm
) e
m
pl
oy
ee
s d
id
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
5 
ye
ar
s a
go
? 
 
nu
m
be
r: 
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_ 
 
6a
: (
an
sw
er
ed
 b
y 
m
in
ut
e 
ta
ke
r)
: W
as
 th
is
 a
 g
ro
w
th
 b
y 
at
 le
as
t 5
0 
pe
r c
en
t?
  
 
(  
  )
 y
es
 
(  
  )
 n
o 
 
6b
: H
ow
 m
an
y 
em
pl
oy
ee
s d
id
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
w
he
n 
yo
u 
st
ar
te
d 
yo
ur
 b
us
in
es
s?
 _
__
__
__
__
 
7:
 H
ow
 m
uc
h 
w
er
e 
ap
pr
ox
im
at
el
y 
yo
ur
 to
ta
l s
al
es
 in
 2
01
1?
 
A
m
ou
nt
:  
__
__
__
__
_ 
EG
P 
pe
r _
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
8:
 D
id
 y
ou
r s
al
es
 g
ro
w
 b
y 
at
 le
as
t h
al
f o
ve
r t
he
 la
st
 5
 y
ea
rs
? 
 
(  
  )
 y
es
 
(  
  )
 n
o 
   
   
   
  C
om
m
en
t: 
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_ 
9:
 D
id
 th
e 
si
ze
 o
f y
ou
r p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
ar
ea
 (s
to
ra
ge
, a
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n)
 in
cr
ea
se
 b
y 
at
 le
as
t h
al
f o
ve
r t
he
 la
st
 5
 y
ea
rs
? 
 
(  
  )
 y
es
 
(  
  )
 n
o 
 
10
: D
id
 y
ou
r a
ss
et
s g
ro
w
 b
y 
at
 le
as
t h
al
f o
ve
r t
he
 la
st
 5
 y
ea
rs
? 
(  
  )
 y
es
 
(  
  )
 n
o 
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A
nn
ex
 B
 (c
on
t.)
: 
Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
 u
se
d 
fo
r 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s w
ith
 S
M
E
s 
11
: D
id
 y
ou
r p
ro
fit
s g
ro
w
 b
y 
at
 le
as
t h
al
f o
ve
r t
he
 la
st
 5
 y
ea
rs
? 
(  
  )
 y
es
 
(  
  )
 n
o 
 
 
12
. C
on
cl
us
io
n 
to
 b
e 
dr
aw
n 
by
 m
in
ut
e 
ta
ke
r:
 
(  
 ) 
gr
ow
er
, i
f A
N
Y 
of
 th
e 
Q
ue
sti
on
s 6
a,
 8
, 9
, 1
0,
 1
1 
ar
e 
af
fir
m
ed
 
(  
 ) 
no
n-
gr
ow
er
, i
f N
O
N
E 
of
 th
e 
Q
ue
sti
on
s 6
a,
 8
, 9
, 1
0,
 1
1 
ar
e 
af
fir
m
ed
  
=>
  c
on
tin
ue
 w
ith
 q
ue
sti
on
 1
9 
Q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
up
gr
ad
in
g/
In
no
va
tio
n 
13
: W
ou
ld
 y
ou
 sa
y 
th
at
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
gr
ow
n 
fa
st
er
 th
an
 y
ou
r c
om
pe
tit
or
s?
  
(in
 te
rm
s o
f n
um
be
r o
f e
m
pl
oy
ee
s, 
sa
le
s, 
ar
ea
 o
f s
to
ra
ge
 a
nd
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 a
ss
et
s, 
pr
of
its
) 
(  
  )
 y
es
 
(  
  )
 n
o 
 
14
: W
ha
t d
id
 y
ou
 d
o 
to
 g
ro
w
 fa
st
er
 th
an
 y
ou
r c
om
pe
tit
or
s?
 
to
 b
e 
tic
ke
d 
by
 m
in
ut
e 
ta
ke
r: 
 
(  
  )
 n
ew
 p
ro
du
ct
  
(  
  )
 im
pr
ov
ed
 p
ro
du
ct
 
( 
  
 )
 i
m
pr
ov
em
en
t 
of
 p
ro
-
ce
ss
 
(  
  )
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
st
ra
te
gy
 
(  
  )
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 la
be
lli
ng
 o
r p
ac
ka
gi
ng
 
(  
  )
 e
nt
er
in
g 
ne
w
 m
ar
ke
ts
  
(  
  )
 d
ow
ns
tre
am
in
g 
(  
  )
 u
ps
tre
am
in
g 
(  
  )
 n
ew
 se
ct
or
 
(  
  )
 c
er
tif
ic
at
io
n 
or
 q
ua
lit
y 
st
an
da
rd
s f
or
 p
ro
du
ct
  
 
(  
  )
 n
on
e 
of
 th
es
e 
 
If
 q
ue
st
io
n 
is
 n
ot
 w
el
l u
nd
er
st
oo
d 
or
 a
ns
w
er
ed
: 
 
14
a:
 Is
 th
is
 g
ro
w
th
 th
e 
re
su
lt 
of
 im
pr
ov
em
en
t i
n 
pr
od
uc
ts
? 
 
 
(  
 ) 
ye
s  
(  
 ) 
no
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14
b:
  
Is
 th
is
 g
ro
w
th
 th
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su
lt 
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n 
pr
oc
es
s?
  
 
 
(  
 ) 
ye
s 
 
(  
 ) 
no
 
 
14
c:
  
Is
 th
is
 g
ro
w
th
 th
e 
re
su
lt 
of
 a
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
st
ra
te
gy
? 
 
 
(  
 ) 
ye
s 
 
(  
 ) 
no
 
 
14
d:
  
Is
 th
is
 g
ro
w
th
 th
e 
re
su
lt 
of
 a
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 la
be
lli
ng
 o
r p
ac
ka
gi
ng
? 
 
 
(  
 ) 
ye
s 
 
(  
 ) 
no
 
 
14
e:
 
Is
 th
is
 g
ro
w
th
 th
e 
re
su
lt 
of
 th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 y
ou
 n
ow
 p
ro
du
ce
 in
pu
ts
 o
n 
yo
ur
 o
w
n 
th
at
 y
ou
 b
ou
gh
t b
ef
or
e?
 
 
 
(  
 ) 
ye
s 
 
(  
 ) 
no
 
 
14
f: 
 
Is
 th
is
 g
ro
w
th
 th
e 
re
su
lt 
of
 o
bt
ai
ni
ng
 so
m
e 
ki
nd
 o
f c
er
tif
ic
at
io
n 
or
 q
ua
lit
y 
st
an
da
rd
 fo
r y
ou
r p
ro
du
ct
s?
 
 
 
(  
 ) 
ye
s 
 
(  
 ) 
no
 
 
14
g:
  
Is
 th
is
 g
ro
w
th
 th
e 
re
su
lt 
of
 e
nt
er
in
g 
(a
) n
ew
 m
ar
ke
t(s
) (
do
m
es
tic
 n
ew
 o
ne
s o
r a
br
oa
d)
? 
 
 
(  
 ) 
ye
s 
 
(  
 ) 
no
 
 
14
h:
  
Is
 th
is
 g
ro
w
th
 th
e 
re
su
lt 
of
 th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 y
ou
 a
re
 n
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 se
lli
ng
 to
 o
th
er
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dd
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 se
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s?
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ye
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 ) 
no
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. C
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cl
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io
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to
 b
e 
dr
aw
n 
by
 m
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ut
e 
ta
ke
r:
 
(  
  )
 u
pg
ra
de
r  
(  
  )
 n
on
-g
ro
we
r 
16
. O
nl
y 
up
gr
ad
er
s:
 W
he
re
 d
id
 th
e 
id
ea
 fo
r t
hi
s i
nn
ov
at
io
n 
co
m
e 
fr
om
? 
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_ 
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
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C
on
st
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in
ts
 
19
: N
ow
, r
eg
ar
di
ng
 y
ou
r s
itu
at
io
n:
 
   
   
W
hy
 d
id
 y
ou
 st
ar
t y
ou
r b
us
in
es
s?
  
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
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__
__
__
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__
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19
a:
 H
av
e 
yo
u 
be
en
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br
oa
d?
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ye
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(  
 ) 
no
 
19
b:
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: H
ow
 h
as
 th
is
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flu
en
ce
d 
yo
ur
 b
us
in
es
s?
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 _
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_ 
20
: W
ou
ld
 y
ou
 li
ke
 to
 e
xp
an
d 
bu
sin
es
s a
nd
 e
m
pl
oy
 m
or
e 
pe
op
le
? 
(  
  )
 y
es
 
(  
  )
 n
o 
 
20
a:
 If
 n
o:
 W
hy
 n
ot
? 
 
__
__
__
__
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Annex C 
Results of the logit estimations with the EICS panel data 
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